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Abstract  
 
This  thesis  probes  for  patterns  in  the  escalation  of  Russian  interventions  against  neighboring  
post-Soviet  states  after  the  Cold  War.  It  then  seeks  to  explain  the  causation  of  such  patterns.  I  
conclude  that  the  factors  influencing  the  intensity  levels  of  Russian  interventions  can  be  understood  
within  a  periodized  framework.  After  the  USSR’s  collapse,  Russia’s  limited  economic  capacity  
prevented  it  from  intensifying  its  interventions  against  neighboring  ex-Soviet  states.  An  increase  in  
economic  power  at  the  turn  of  the  century  then  shifted  Russia’s  intervention  calculus.  Russia  is  most  
likely  to  escalate  to  a  significant  intensity  level  when  its  economy  is  strong  and  the  targeted  state  is  
not  a  NATO  member  but  is  progressing  toward  membership.  The  likelihood  of  Russian  intervention  
increases  if  these  factors  remain  true  and  Russia  can  act  with  plausible  deniability  —  especially  at  a  
time  when  the  U.S.  is  unlikely  to  interfere  militarily  with  Russia’s  plans.  Yet,  even  in  times  of  
economic  strength,  Russia  will  cap  its  interventions  against  NATO  member  states  below  the  level  of  
armed  conflict.  
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Chapter  1:  The  Question  
 
Introduction  
 
If,  on  an  occasional  sunny  day  in  the  Estonian  city  of  Narva,  one  were  to  walk  along  the  
city’s  eponymous  river  from  south  to  north,  one  would  encounter  a  charming  sight.  The  quaint  
medieval  Hermann  Castle  complex,  its  white  tower  peering  over  the  outer  walls,  clings  to  the  
western  riverbank.  Hugging  the  eastern  bank  across  the  narrow  river,  the  impressive  Ivangorod  
Fortress,  dwarfing  the  Hermann  Castle,  faces  its  smaller  neighbor.  Together,  these  timeworn  sentries  
bookend  the  Estonia-Russia  border  as  it  runs  in  the  middle  of  the  Narva  River.   
Despite  the  pleasant  picture  formed  by  these  castles,  their  history  is  chilly  —  and  some  fear  
they  may  provide  the  backdrop  to  a  violent  future.  Dating  to  the  early  fourteenth  century,  the  
Hermann  Castle  originated  as  the  local  Danish  inhabitants’  easternmost  outpost  to  protect  the  
population  during  conflicts  with  Russians  living  across  the  river.  The  castle’s  second  inhabitants,  
members  of  a  Germanic  Teutonic  Knights  offshoot,  bolstered  its  defenses  the  following  century  
after  the  Moscovian  Grand  Prince  Ivan  III  built  the  imposing  Ivangorod  fortress  on  the  opposite  
side  of  the  river  crossing.   Some  scholars  and  policymakers  now  worry  that,  centuries  later,  Narva  1
must  once  again  prepare  for  Russian  aggression  from  across  the  river.  Following  the  2014  Russian  
annexation  of  the  Ukrainian  Crimean  peninsula,  eyes  around  the  world  turned  to  Narva,  wondering  
if  the  tranquil  Estonian  border  city  might  soon  follow.   The  connection  is  logical;  the  two  regions  2
share  striking  similarities  in  their  substantial  ethnic  Russian  populations,  histories  of  secessionist  
referendums  and  exposed  geographic  positions  bordering  Russian  territory.  The  likelihood  of  such  
1  “Hermann  Castle,  Narva,  Estonia.”  SpottingHistory.  Accessed  March  30,  2020.  
2  Trimbach,  David  J.,  and  Shannon  O’Lear.  “Russians  in  Estonia:  Is  Narva  the  next  Crimea?”  
Eurasian  Geography  and  Economics  56,  no.  5  (2015):  493.  
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an  annexation  is,  however,  highly  debatable.  This  would  represent  not  only  a  violation  of  Estonian  
sovereignty  but  also  an  unprecedented  and  provocative  incursion  into  the  borders  of  the  North  
Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO).  Russia  has  already  once  crippled  Estonia  with  attacks  in  the  
cyber  domain,  and  further  escalation  remains  possible.  
Narva’s  predicament  is  not  unique  in  the  region.  As  the  Soviet  Union  disintegrated  as  a  
political  entity  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s,  the  former  superpower’s  territory  fractured  into  
fifteen  independent  states,  many  of  which  contained  autonomous  territories  within  their  borders.  
For  the  last  three  decades,  the  Russian  Federation  —  the  USSR’s  legal  successor  and  by  far  the  
largest,  wealthiest  and  most  politically  powerful  of  these  states  —  has  developed  complicated  
relations  with  the  other  independent  states  that  emerged  and  reemerged  along  its  border.  Within  the  
last  fifteen  years,  as  Russia  has  recovered  from  significant  economic  decline  and  increased  its  
capacity  for  projecting  power  across  the  region,  it  has  engaged  in  conflicts  with  several  of  its  weaker  
neighbors.  Many  Western  scholars,  policymakers  and  even  casual  observers  have  labeled  this  
behavior  as  Russian  revisionism,  often  implying  that  Russia’s  leaders  and  citizens  seek  to  restore  
Russia  to  the  Soviet  Union’s  regional  and  prominent  global  position.  While  this  thesis  does  not  
evaluate  the  validity  of  this  claim,  it  does  investigate  the  stimuli  that  appear  to  trigger  these  Russian  
escalations.  Situations  such  as  that  of  Narva  beg  the  question:  what  factors  lead  Russia  to  escalate  
the  intensity  of  its  interventions  against  neighboring  post-Soviet  states?  
Through  this  examination,  this  paper  aims  to  create  a  portrait  of  the  conditions  that  increase  
the  intensity  levels  of  Russian  interventions.  An  understanding  of  the  factors  that  impact  this  
Russian  calculus  can  inform  policymakers  and  scholars  of  the  causes  of  aggressive  Russian  behavior,  
as  opposed  to  a  general  diagnosis  of  nostalgia  for  the  eminence  of  the  USSR.  As  countries  along  the  
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Russian  border  fear  their  massive  neighbor  could  soon  attempt  to  raise  the  Russian  flag  above  their  
cities,  back  disruptive  separatist  movements  within  their  borders  or  cripple  their  economies  through  
the  internet,  analysis  of  the  trends  behind  Russian  escalation  against  its  neighbors  becomes  even  
more  urgent.  This  paper  examines  issues  and  patterns  that  could  impact  the  behavior  of  leaders  and  
states  for  decades  to  come.  
After  an  extended  study  of  Russian  intervention  in  the  cases  of  Ukraine,  Georgia  and  
Estonia,  I  conclude  that  the  factors  influencing  escalation  of  Russian  interventions  can  be  best  
understood  within  a  periodized  framework  of  two  distinct  eras.  After  the  USSR’s  collapse,  Russia’s  
limited  economic  capacity  prevented  it  from  escalating  the  intensity  levels  of  its  interventions  against  
neighboring  post-Soviet  states  for  an  extended  period  of  time.  Even  at  points  at  which  Russian  
escalation  was  plausible,  such  as  aggressive  diplomacy  during  the  1993  Crimean  crisis  and  severe  
tensions  in  1993  over  troop  movements  and  the  treatment  of  Russian  minorities  in  Estonia,  Russia  
was  simply  too  weak  to  intervene  at  higher  intensity  levels.   
By  2007,  however,  Russia’s  economy  had  largely  recovered  from  this  lengthy  period  of  
economic  vulnerability,  which  in  turn  enabled  more  assertive  behavior.  Higher  level  intervention  in  
the  region  was  back  on  the  table,  and  Russia’s  heightened  capacity  led  to  increasingly  aggressive  
interventions  in  response  to  specific  triggers.  Yet,  even  this  newly  bellicose  Russia  still  displayed  an  
unwillingness  to  cross  the  threshold  of  direct  military  intervention  against  NATO  states  in  its  
neighborhood.  Instead,  as  demonstrated  by  the  2007  Russian  cyberattacks  against  NATO  member  
Estonia,  increased  aggression  against  NATO  remained  restricted  to  strictly  non-kinetic  domains.  
Non-NATO  states  in  the  region,  however,  experienced  interventions  reaching  the  threshold  of  
armed  conflict.  When  these  states  began  to  achieve  substantial  progress  in  the  process  leading  to  
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NATO  membership,  Russia  launched  military  interventions  to  block  those  states’  accessions  into  
NATO,  as  in  Georgia  in  2008  and  Ukraine  in  2014.  Since  these  attacks,  Russia  has  remained  
entrenched  in  its  ongoing  conflict  in  eastern  Ukraine,  but  it  has  not  pursued  further  major  
interventions  in  the  region.  Its  signals  to  NATO  about  eastward  expansion  appear  to  have  dissuaded  
the  Western  alliance  from  further  courting  former  Soviet  states.   
 
Chapter  2:  The  Theory  
Case  Selection  
The  paper  tests  this  argument  by  examining  variation  of  intervention  intensity  levels  within  
and  across  three  case  studies:  Russian  intervention  in  Ukraine,  Georgia  and  Estonia.  These  three  
case  studies  were  selected  because  they  constitute  the  universe  of  cases  of  high-intensity  Russian  
intervention  against  states  in  its  near  abroad  after  the  fall  of  the  USSR.   Although  Russia’s  3
relationships  with  its  other  neighbors  are  certainly  intriguing  and  worthy  of  examination,  this  paper  
does  not  include  neighboring  states  that  were  not  Soviet  republics.  The  research  question  is  limited  
to  states  formerly  incorporated  into  Soviet  territory  because  of  the  unique  relationship  created  by  
their  lengthy  and  only  recently  dissolved  union.  For  this  reason,  former  members  of  the  Soviet  
Union’s  Warsaw  Pact  military  alliance,  like  Poland  and  Hungary,  are  not  included  in  the  study.  Due  to  
this  focus  on  the  former  Soviet  space,  cases  like  recent  Russian  intervention  in  Syria  and  Russian  
nonintervention  in  the  former  Yugoslavia  during  the  1990s  are  not  examined.  Additionally,  the  
research  question  only  examines  Russian  interventions  against  states  and  not  against  non-state  
3  The  term  “near  abroad”  is  used  in  scholarly  discourse  with  diverse  implications,  often  referring  to  
states  that  Russia  considers  within  its  sphere  of  influence.  For  the  sake  of  brevity  throughout  this  
paper,  I  use  the  term  “near  abroad  states,”  abbreviated  as  “NA  states,”  to  refer  specifically  and  solely  
to  the  subset  of  states  that  were  formerly  republics  in  the  Soviet  Union,  excluding  Russia.   
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actors.  Conflicts  like  the  Chechen  Wars  or  the  War  of  Dagestan  are  therefore  not  considered  in  this  
paper,  although  the  level  of  Russian  intervention  was  significant  in  both  cases.   
Lastly,  the  cases  examined  are  limited  to  those  in  which  Russia  has  experienced  its  most  
serious  disputes.  Although  discussions  of  Russia’s  security  posture  toward  all  of  its  former  Soviet  
republic  neighbors  is  an  important  topic  of  discussion,  this  paper  focuses  on  how  Russia  scales  the  
intensity  of  its  interventions  when  disputes  arise  with  these  NA  states.  The  cases  of  Russian  relations  
with  Ukraine,  Georgia  and  Estonia  involve  the  most  serious  disputes  with  NA  states.  Furthermore,  
these  cases  represent  the  only  cases  of  NA  state  disputes  in  which  Russia  has  escalated  interventions  
to  significant  intensities,  with  reasonable  evidence  indicating  Russian  state  support.  The  three  
selected  case  studies  therefore  represent  the  full  range  of  cases  relevant  to  the  research  question.  
Each  of  the  cases  represents  an  appropriate  point  of  examination  under  the  parameters  
described  above.  This  paper  analyzes  why,  in  all  three  instances,  Russia  intervened  at  different  levels  
during  different  crises.  Comparative  analysis  of  the  patterns  within  each  case  study  against  those  of  
the  other  two  then  provides  a  robust  framework  for  testing  the  hypotheses.   
 
Intervention  Intensity  Scale  
This  paper  conceptualizes  the  use  of  force  as  part  of  a  continuum  of  intensity  levels  in  the  
following  figure.  This  represents  the  scale  of  possible  actions  Russia  could  take  when  intervening  
against  NA  states,  ordered  from  least  assertive  to  most  assertive.  This  continuum  reflects  that  the  
actions  at  the  highest  intensity  levels  are  generally  the  most  likely  to  be  deterred,  as  states  will  only  
select  into  such  conflicts  when  no  less  costly  solution  agreeable  to  both  parties  exists.  Low-intensity  
and  low-visibility  actions  like  espionage  at  the  conventional  and  cyber  levels  are  exceedingly  difficult  
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for  states  to  prevent  and  are  therefore  placed  at  the  lower  end  of  both  axes.  Cyberattacks  represent  a  
significant  increase  in  intensity,  due  to  their  potential  to  cripple  a  country’s  civil  networks,  military  
communications  and  economic  infrastructure.  The  threshold  of  violence  intersects  cyberattacks  on  
the  continuum,  as  cyberattacks  possess  the  potential  to  directly  cause  physical  damage.  The  next  
steps  of  intervention  in  the  continuum,  all  in  the  kinetic  domain,  progress  in  intensity  due  to  the  
substantial  increases  in  both  the  stakes  at  hand  and  the  countries’  kinetic  engagements  at  each  step.   
 
 
 
Theoretical  Reasoning  
This  paper’s  conclusions  about  the  factors  influencing  Russian  escalation  follow  the  
predictions  of  four  hypotheses  and  one  sub-hypothesis,  which  are  each  grounded  in  security  studies  
literature.  After  evaluating  these  hypotheses  within  each  case  study  and  across  the  cases  collectively,  I  
         Rabin  10  
synthesize  the  findings  for  the  hypotheses  into  one  theory,  which  articulates  how  the  interaction  of  
different  factors  causes  variation  in  the  intensity  level  of  Russian  intervention  against  NA  states.   
H1  asserts  that  Russia  is  less  likely  to  directly  intervene  at  the  level  of  military  action  against  
NA  states  with  NATO  membership.  Its  sub-hypothesis,  H1A,  claims  that  U.S.  credibility  at  a  given  
point  affects  the  intensity  level  at  which  Russia  is  willing  to  intervene.  H2  argues  that  Russia  is  more  
likely  to  intervene  aggressively  against  a  non-NATO  member  NA  state  when  that  state  is  already  
making  significant  progress  toward  NATO  accession.  H3  contends  that  Russia  is  more  willing  to  
increase  its  intervention  intensity  level  when  it  can  rely  upon  a  method  that  provides  plausible  
deniability.  H4  argues  that  Russia’s  economic  capacity  determines  whether  it  intervenes  at  a  high  
intensity  level.   
 
H1:  Near  abroad  states  with  NATO  membership  are  more  likely  to  successfully  achieve  general  deterrence  toward  
Russia.  
NATO,  a  security  alliance  between  the  United  States  and  many  powerful  European  states,  
including  France,  the  United  Kingdom  and  (formerly  West)  Germany,  was  the  principal  adversary  of  
the  USSR’s  Warsaw  Pact  alliance  during  the  Cold  War.  After  the  USSR’s  disintegration,  NATO  
remained  intact.  The  alliance  is  now  the  dominant  institution  for  transatlantic  security  cooperation  
and  is  buttressed  considerably  by  the  conventional  and  nuclear  capabilities  of  the  U.S.   
  H1  posits  that  after  a  post-Soviet  state  enters  NATO,  it  acquires  an  enhanced  capacity  for  
deterring  Russian  aggression.  NATO’s  central  premise  is  that  all  member  states  will  defend  any  
member  in  the  event  of  a  direct  military  conflict.  The  alliance’s  effectiveness  hinges  upon  the  ability  
of  all  member  states  to  invoke  Article  V,  which  is  a  mutual  defense  pact  obligating  the  entire  alliance  
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to  provide  military  assistance  if  a  member  is  attacked.  This  mechanism  for  summoning  the  military  
might  of  powerful  European  states,  but  even  more  importantly,  of  the  U.S.,  serves  as  a  strong  
deterrent  for  Russian  aggression  against  NATO  members.  H1  therefore  assumes  that  Russia  
operates  in  an  environment  in  which  it  seeks  to  avoid  a  military  confrontation  against  NATO.   
A  skeptic  of  the  significance  of  alliances  could  argue  that  Russia  might  wager  that  the  U.S.  
would  not  support  Estonia  when  its  immediate  foreign  policy  goals  do  not  justify  the  costs  of  such  
protection.  In  this  scenario,  Russia  might  consider  escalating  its  interventions  against  Estonia.  Yet,  
even  though  military  alliances  have  not  historically  served  as  absolute  guarantees  of  mutual  support,  
the  risk  of  retaliation  created  by  a  state’s  NATO  membership  may  prove  a  sufficient  deterrent  
mechanism.  It  is  true  that  the  alliance  cannot  ensure  third  party  support  during  conflict  beyond  a  
reasonable  doubt;  NATO  suffers  from  the  same  lingering  possibility  of  defection  as  all  other  
alliances.  Yet,  for  the  NATO  alliance  to  successfully  dissuade  Russian  high-intensity  intervention  
against  a  member,  the  threat  of  a  NATO  response  does  not  need  to  be  absolute  and  beyond  any  
doubt,  but  simply  credible.  Rather  than  proving  it  will  intervene,  the  alliance  must  merely  
communicate  that  the  probability  of  NATO  intervention  (and,  by  extension,  the  imposition  of  
unacceptable  costs)  is  large  enough  to  prove  too  risky  for  Russia.   
Non-cooperative  game  theorist  James  Morrow  reasons  that  costly  signaling  increases  a  
military  alliance’s  credibility,  supporting  the  argument  that  Russia  is  unlikely  to  intervene  at  the  level  
of  military  invasion  against  NATO  members.  Successful  alliances  rely  upon  states’  self-enforcement  
of  obligations  both  to  function  effectively  and  to  communicate  the  alliance’s  strength  to  would-be  
attackers.   Morrow  explains  that  because  alliances  impose  costs  on  members,  states  will  only  enter  4
4  Morrow,  James  D.  “Alliances:  Why  Write  Them  Down?”  Annual  Review  of  Political  Science  3,  no.  1  
(2000):  63.  
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alliances  with  other  states  if  they  share  meaningful  interests  and  if  they  anticipate  meeting  their  
commitments  in  the  event  of  war.   These  costs  often  take  the  form  of  audience  costs,  meaning  5
leaders  will  face  domestic  and  international  ridicule  if  they  do  not  support  an  ally.  Joining  the  alliance  
requires  the  undertaking  of  these  new  costs  in  the  event  of  failure  to  defend  allies;  had  the  leaders  
not  entered  the  alliance,  they  would  not  have  experienced  this  ridicule.  The  formal  alliance  is  
therefore  a  commitment  device  incentivizing  the  defense  of  any  member  targeted  by  Russia,  since  
the  inherent  costs  of  failing  to  defend  that  state  are  higher  than  they  would  have  been  in  a  world  
without  the  alliance.   Addressing  NATO  specifically,  Morrow  argues  that  NATO’s  extensive  6
peacetime  military  coordination  increases  the  odds  that  the  allies  will  succeed  if  they  fight  together,  
which  in  turn  increases  the  likelihood  that  NATO  states  will  defend  each  other.   7
These  factors  increase  the  likelihood  that  Russia  will  anticipate  that  NATO  will  honor  its  
commitment  to  defend  its  members.  Since  Russia  does  not  seek  to  provoke  a  conflict  against  
U.S.-led  NATO  forces,  even  if  it  maintains  some  level  of  intervention  against  NATO  states,  it  will  
refrain  from  escalating  this  aggression  to  the  point  of  overt  military  conflict.   
  
H1A:  The  United  States’  credibility  positively  affects  near  abroad  states’  abilities  to  deter  Russia.  
A  sub-hypothesis  of  H1,  H1A  argues  that  U.S.  credibility  as  a  potential  defender  impacts  the  
degree  to  which  Russia  intervenes  against  NA  states.  Due  to  the  U.S.’s  central  role  within  NATO’s  
military  core  and  strategic  direction,  this  paper  focuses  largely  on  the  U.S.  rather  than  other  NATO  
5  Ibid,  73.  
6  Ibid,  72.  
7  Ibid,  71.  
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states.  Essentially,  Russia’s  assessment  of  the  likelihood  of  a  U.S.  response  determines  whether  it  
escalates  its  interventions.  This  credibility  hinges  upon  two  major  factors:  capacity  and  willingness.   
If  Russia  believes  that  U.S.  military  capacity  would  enable  it  to  win  a  military  confrontation  
and  assumes  the  U.S.  might  intervene,  Russia  is  unlikely  to  escalate  its  aggression  against  NA  states  
to  the  level  of  military  intervention.  One  indicator  of  U.S.  capability  would  be  a  recent  display  of  its  
ability  to  accomplish  its  military  objectives  abroad.  When  the  U.S.  can  demonstrate  the  effectiveness  
of  its  conventional  military,  Russia  is  less  likely  to  risk  any  confrontation  that  could  trigger  a  U.S.  
military  response.  Likewise,  if  the  U.S.  military  performs  poorly,  it  suffers  a  reputational  loss  that  
may  embolden  actors  like  Russia.  Another  indicator  of  capacity  for  intervention  against  Russia  is  
whether  the  U.S.  has  the  ready  supply  of  forces,  materials  and  funding  necessary  for  a  military  
intervention.  Substantial  U.S.  military  involvement  in  other  areas  of  the  world  would  decrease  the  
availability  of  such  necessities  and  would  therefore  reduce  U.S.  capacity.  
This  deterrence  relies  upon  not  only  demonstrated  U.S.  military  capacity  but  also  the  
perceived  degree  of  U.S.  willingness  to  directly  confront  a  global  power  like  Russia.  This  willingness  
can  be  predicted  by  the  shifts  over  time  in  the  U.S.’s  international  reputation  as  an  actor  likely  to  
intervene  abroad.  The  U.S.  is  less  likely  to  convince  Russia  of  its  willingness  to  intervene  in  an  
eastern  European  conflict  when  its  military  is  entrenched  in  other  conflicts  around  the  world.  This  is  
due  to  material  constraints  limiting  the  number  of  major  conflicts  in  which  the  U.S.  can  afford  to  
participate  at  one  time.  The  level  of  prior  U.S.  engagement  elsewhere  therefore  influences  the  degree  
to  which  Russia  may  increase  the  intensity  level  of  its  interventions  against  NA  states,  as  this  
decreases  the  likelihood  of  U.S.  willingness  to  commit  further  forces  to  a  new  conflict.  Furthermore,  
the  U.S.  is  unlikely  to  engage  in  further  military  conflicts  if  it  is  experiencing  a  significant  domestic  
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crisis  at  the  time,  as  the  population  is  unlikely  to  approve  of  allocation  of  significant  funding  for  that  
purpose.   
Russia  is  also  more  likely  to  intervene  when  the  U.S.  has  recently  failed  to  act  in  situations  
that  would  have  logically  warranted  U.S.  intervention  given  its  strategic  interests.  When  the  U.S.  
intervenes  consistently  to  aid  other  countries,  Russia  is  likely  to  anticipate  new  U.S.  interventions.  
Yet,  if  the  U.S.  has  not  intervened  in  situations  in  which  it  indicated  it  would  or  situations  that  appear  
to  align  with  its  interests,  the  implied  odds  of  a  new  U.S.  intervention  are  decreased.  Due  to  the  
democratic  nature  of  the  U.S.  government,  however,  other  critical  factors  affect  this  calculation.  If  
the  U.S.  is  already  entrenched  in  conflicts  that  are  faring  poorly  or  unpopular  among  the  U.S.  
population,  the  collective  political  will  to  enter  a  new  conflict  among  U.S.  leaders  and  policymakers,  
who  often  consider  their  reelection  prospects  when  making  decisions,  is  unlikely.   
Thus,  the  variation  of   U.S.  credibility,  consisting  of  its  capacity  and  reputation  of  willingness  
as  perceived  by  Russia,  influences  the  degree  of  escalation  that  Russia  undertakes  in  its  interventions.   
 
H2:  Overt  NATO  deliberations  surrounding  an  NA  state’s  possible  entry  without  officially  giving  membership  
decrease  that  state’s  ability  to  deter  Russia.  
H2  claims  that  Russia  is  more  likely  to  intervene  in  an  NA  state’s  affairs  when  that  state  is  
significantly  strengthening  its  relationship  with  NATO  but  is  not  yet  a  member.  This  hypothesis  
draws  upon  the  predictions  of  H1  and  assumes  that  Russia  is  indeed  deterred  to  a  higher  degree  
when  a  state  has  achieved  NATO  membership,  as  a  result  of  the  Article  V  collective  defense  
mechanism’s  implications.  Therefore,  the  inclusion  of  additional  countries  into  NATO  increases  the  
number  of  states  that  possess  this  potent  deterrent  capability.  This  appears  particularly  threatening  
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to  Russia  when  NATO  expands  eastward,  into  Russia’s  neighborhood.  Russia  bristles  at  the  prospect  
of  former  Soviet  states,  which  it  considers  within  its  cultural,  economic  and  security  spheres  of  
influence,  foregoing  closer  ties  with  Russia  in  favor  of  NATO  accession.  Russia  therefore  regards  
NATO  efforts  to  bring  former  Soviet  states  into  the  alliance  as  a  direct  threat.  
H2  is  rooted  in  James  Fearon’s  theory  that  commitment  problems  between  rational  states  
incentivize  preventive  interventions.  Fearon  explains  that  even  when  states  accurately  perceive  each  
other’s  capabilities  and  motivations,  war  may  still  occur  instead  of  successful  peaceful  bargaining.  In  
a  situation  with  two  mutually  distrustful  states,  when  one  state  has  the  prospect  of  becoming  more  
powerful  in  the  future,  the  other  state  is  more  likely  to  escalate  its  intervention  against  its  adversary.  
Yet,  Fearon  argues,  separately  from  the  classic  argument  that  states  intervene  preventively  to  prevent  
future  dangerous  attacks,  that  the  disadvantaged  state  will  instead  intervene  because  it  anticipates  a  
new  peaceful  status  quo  that  it  will  find  unacceptable.   As  applied  to  the  relationship  between  Russia  8
and  an  NA  state  hoping  for  NATO  accession,  this  situation  arises  from  the  strong  deterrent  
capabilities  provided  by  NATO  membership,  which  are  discussed  in  H1.  Therefore,  although  Russia  
would  accept  a  situation  in  which  NA  states  join  NATO  but  promise  credibly  to  abide  by  Russian  
preferences,  after  the  NA  states  achieve  NATO  membership,  they  have  greater  incentives  to  
disregard  inconvenient  Russian  preferences.  Russia  therefore  cannot  trust  such  pre-NATO  accession  
commitments  made  by  NA  states  and,  consequently,  has  an  incentive  to  act  preventively.  
As  a  result  of  this  dilemma,  Russia  is  likely  to  act  assertively  when  NA  states  approach  
NATO  membership.  This  intervention  is  a  preventive  strategy  intended  to  freeze  the  process  of  the  
state’s  integration  into  NATO.  Russian  intervention  achieves  this  through  two  distinct  but  related  
8   Fearon,  James.  “Rationalist  Explanations  for  War.”  International  Organization  49,  no.  3  (1995):  406.  
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effects.  Firstly,  intervention  serves  to  unhinge  the  target  country’s  political  stability,  convincing  
NATO  that  the  NA  state  is  an  unstable  liability  and  could  require  undesirable  deployments  of  
NATO  aid.  Demonstrated  political  stability  within  a  state  has  essentially  served  as  a  prerequisite  for  
NATO  accession,  and  states  experiencing  domestic  turmoil  are  unlikely  to  prove  theirs.  
Furthermore,  this  intervention  signals  that  Russia,  openly  regarding  eastward  NATO  expansion  as  a  
threat  to  its  territorial  integrity,  remains  risk-acceptant  regarding  this  issue  and  could  initiate  a  fight  
over  the  NA  state  in  question.   
These  strategies  benefit  Russia  directly.  By  discouraging  further  NATO  moves  to  
incorporate  the  NA  state  into  the  alliance,  Russia  isolates  the  state  from  European  integration  and  
incentivizes  the  state  to  turn  toward  Russia  for  strategic  cooperation.  Ultimately,  this  should  be  
visible  through  increased  Russian  intervention  at  times  of  substantial  progress  in  the  state’s  accession  
efforts.  The  inverse  of  this  idea  should  remain  true;  Russia  has  less  incentive  to  intervene  and  
disrupt  the  NATO  accession  process  when  an  NA  state’s  relations  with  NATO  are  demonstrably  
poor  and  the  state  remains  far  from  accession.  Therefore,  for  H2  to  be  supported,  increased  Russian  
intervention  during  or  after  periods  of  serious  cooperation  and  progress  toward  accession  should  be  
observable.  
 
H3:  Near  abroad  states  are  less  likely  to  successfully  deter  Russia  if  Russia  is  able  to  use  a  covert  method  of  attack.  
H3  asserts  that  Russia  is  more  likely  to  intervene  if  it  can  do  so  in  a  manner  that  provides  
plausible  deniability.  Undesirable  consequences  for  overt  intervention  can  range  from  economic  
repercussions,  like  sanctions  enacted  by  the  international  community,  to  military  responses.  Yet,  if  
Russia  can  achieve  its  goals  while  leaving  little  evidence  of  its  meddling,  it  can  plausibly  deny  
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accusations  against  it,  increasing  the  odds  of  avoiding  these  negative  responses.  If  Russia  can  pursue  
strategic  objectives  while  maintaining  diplomatic  distance  from  the  events,  it  is  more  likely  to  select  
into  intervention  situations.  It  will  pursue  any  intervention  to  the  highest  possible  intensity  level  at  
which  it  can  plausibly  deny  any  responsibility.  Therefore,  Russia  is  more  likely  to  intervene  in  
situations  in  which  it  can  rely  upon  proxy  forces  to  accomplish  its  objectives  or  to  create  the  
deception  that  its  troops  are  actually  local,  nonaffiliated  groups.  Similarly,  Russia  is  likely  to  rely  upon  
cyber  intervention  in  conjunction  with  higher  level  kinetic  intervention  or,  if  significantly  deterred,  
in  lieu  of  kinetic  intervention.  By  employing  these  strategies,  Russia  can  escalate  to  the  point  of  
low-level  military  action  with  reduced  fear  of  meaningful  international  retribution.  
 
H4:  The  extent  of  Russian  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  near  abroad  states  reflects  the  strength  of  the  Russian  
economic  strategic  position.  
H4  argues  that  Russia’s  economic  capacity  is  a  significant  factor  driving  its  escalatory  
behavior.  Escalating  interventions  to  the  point  of  military  action  incurs  significant  expenses  for  
states.  When  economic  conditions  are  poor  in  Russia,  the  resulting  low  capacity  may  prove  
prohibitive  for  high-level  interventions  abroad,  as  politicians  are  likely  to  divert  the  required  funds  to  
domestic  needs.  Beyond  the  inherent  cost  of  military  intervention,  if  Russia’s  economy  has  been  
performing  poorly,  the  government  simply  is  less  likely  to  pursue  interventions  that  could  risk  
harmful  international  responses.  Russia  must  anticipate  the  possibility  of  severe  international  
economic  sanctions  in  response  to  aggressive  military  actions  against  neighboring  states.  The  
restrictive  effect  of  this  risk  can  be  identified  in  periods  like  the  1990s,  when  the  Russian  economy  
contracted  significantly.  Although  the  economic  collapse  affected  the  Russian  oil  industry,  oil  exports  
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still  constituted  a  major  portion  of  the  government’s  revenue.   Any  international  sanctions  against  9
these  Russian  exports  would  have  devastated  such  a  weak  and  narrowly  focused  export  economy.  
Yet,  this  principle  also  applies  throughout  the  early  2000s,  when  the  growing  economy  depended  
upon  exports  of  oil  and  natural  gas.   Russian  leaders  were  simply  less  likely  to  risk  aggressive  10
behaviors  that  could  provoke  devastating  sanctions  against  these  essential  exports.  Each  of  these  
factors  inhibits  significant  Russian  intervention  during  periods  of  economic  vulnerability.   
When  Russia  achieves  economic  strength,  escalating  intervention  to  higher  intensity  levels  
becomes  possible.  While  Russia  was  unable  to  act  beyond  low-intensity  measures  during  its  weak  
period,  it  now  has  the  capacity  to  launch  interventions  in  support  of  its  interests.  A  resurgent  
economy  both  allows  for  the  direct  costs  of  expensive  interventions  and  enables  Russia  to  withstand  
the  indirect  costs  of  intense  intervention.  Once  economically  stable,  Russia  can  consider  
intervention  in  desirable  situations.  
 
Alternative  Hypotheses  
Although  the  hypotheses  listed  above  were  the  final  hypotheses  selected  for  examination,  
several  other  hypotheses  were  initially  considered  as  well.  These  two  alternative  hypotheses  were  the  
“domestic  diversion”  hypothesis  and  the  “territorial  annexation”  hypothesis.  
 
 
 
9  Vatansever,  Adnan.  “Russia’s  Oil  Exports:  Economic  Rationale  Versus  Strategic  Gains.”  Carnegie  
Papers.  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  December  2010.  p.  5.  
10  Ibid,  p.  5.  
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The  Domestic  Diversion  Hypothesis  
Although  the  “diversion”  hypothesis  initially  appeared  to  add  a  new  and  valuable  dimension  
to  the  examination,  closer  analysis  reveals  significant  weaknesses.  When  I  considered  whether  any  
specific  factors  within  Russian  domestic  politics  could  partially  explain  patterns  of  Russian  
intervention  in  NA  states,  I  was  initially  intrigued  by  the  idea  that  Russian  leaders  could  intervene  at  
times  of  political  weakness  as  a  diversionary  tactic.  Yet,  further  scrutiny  reveals  that  the  historical  
record  of  Russian  intervention  in  Ukraine,  Georgia  and  Estonia  does  not  reflect  this  concept.   
Polling  shows  former  Russian  President  Boris  Yeltsin’s  approval  ratings  remained  largely  
below  the  40%  mark  after  1993  and  below  30%  after  1994.  His  ratings  dipped  to  between  20%  and  
10%  approval  between  1995  and  1996,  and  they  remained  below  10%  from  late  1998  until  his  
resignation.   Yet,  Russia  did  not  engage  in  significant  intervention  in  its  near  abroad  (or  elsewhere)  11
throughout  this  period.  During  Russian  President  Vladimir  Putin’s  initial  2000-2008  tenure,  his  
annual  approval  ratings  ranged  from  66%  to  85%,  with  his  lowest  points  occurring  in  2005  (66%)  
and  2000,  his  first  year  in  office  (70%).   These  low  points  compare  favorably  to  those  of  other  12
Russian  presidents.   
Outside  of  Putin’s  ratings,  the  most  notable  moments  of  public  disapproval  during  his  first  
two  terms  occurred  in  response  to  the  2000  Kursk  submarine  accident,  Putin’s  2002  hostage  crisis  
response  and  Putin’s  2004  hostage  crisis  response.   In  contradiction  to  this  hypothesis,  Russian  13
intervention  in  the  three  countries  did  not  approach  significant  levels  at  any  of  these  hotspots;  the  
11  Treisman,  Daniel.  “Presidential  Popularity  in  a  Hybrid  Regime:  Russia  under  Yeltsin  and  Putin.”  
American  Journal  of  Political  Science  55,  no.  3  (January  2011):  590–609.  
12  “Vladimir  Putin's  Approval  Rating  Russia  2000  to  2020.”  Statista,  March  24,  2020.  
13  “Timeline:  Vladimir  Putin  -  20  Tumultuous  Years  as  Russian  President  or  PM.”  Reuters.  Thomson  
Reuters,  August  9,  2019.  
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2007  cyber  operations  against  Estonia  occurred  in  the  context  of  72%  approval  (2006)  and  81%  
approval  (2007).  Former  Russian  President  Dmitry  Medvedev’s  approval  ratings  ranged  between  
56%  and  78%  during  his  2008-2012  term.   His  2007  approval  totaled  65%,  while  he  received  76%  14
approval  in  2008,  the  year  in  which  Russia  intervened  against  Georgia.  He  was  not  in  a  position  of  
weakness  at  the  time  of  intervention,  and  the  crisis  had  its  roots  during  Putin’s  term  in  2007.  
Furthermore,  during  Medvedev’s  presidency,  Putin,  who  had  been  forced  to  the  role  of  prime  
minister  by  legal  bars  on  consecutive  presidential  terms,  controlled  the  government’s  major  
decision-making.   During  Putin’s  second  presidential  tenure  (2012-present),  his  lowest  ratings  points  15
were  63%  (2013)  and  2019  (64%).  The  2013  point  does  precede  Russia’s  2014  intervention;  yet,  that  
year  did  not  represent  a  steep  decline  from  his  popularity  in  2012  (68%)  or  2011  (69%).  Protests  
around  potential  voter  fraud  influencing  Putin’s  reelection  had  occurred  since  2011.  Rather  than  
corresponding  to  the  latest  point  in  a  three-year  trend,  the  2014  intervention  appears  to  correlate  
much  more  closely  with  the  early  2014  deposition  of  Ukrainian  President  Viktor  Yanukovych.    
Furthermore,  a  proponent  of  the  diversionary  explanation  would  expect  leaders  to  intervene  
abroad  directly  before  elections  to  boost  their  domestic  standings;  these  case  studies  do  not  provide  
any  evidence  to  support  this  notion.  Russian  presidential  elections  occurred  in  1991,  1996,  2000,  
2004,  2008,  2012  and  2018.  The  only  significant  interventions  that  occurred  during  the  three  cases  
were  in  2007,  2008  and  2014.  The  2008  intervention  in  Georgia  occurred  late  in  the  year,  while  the  
election  occurred  previously  in  March.  Russian  intervention  against  Estonia  occurred  in  May  2007,  
14  “Dmitry  Medvedev's  Approval  Rating  in  Russia  2007-2019.”  Statista,  February  24,  2020.  
15  Ryabov,  Andrei.  “Tandemocracy  in  Today’s  Russia.”  Russian  Analytical  Digest.  ETH  Zurich,  2008.  
p.  2.  
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nearly  a  year  before  the  election.  None  of  these  interventions,  therefore,  occur  directly  before  
presidential  elections.   
These  preliminary  findings  reflect  Taylor  Fravel’s  criticisms  of  the  diversionary  hypothesis.  In  
his  examination  of  two  case  studies,  he  finds  standard  realist  foreign  policy  and  “coercive  
diplomacy”  to  have  played  a  far  greater  role  in  the  instances  of  intervention  than  domestic  politics.  16
I  reach  the  same  conclusion  in  this  case  and  align  my  findings  with  his  critique.  
Russian  intervention  did  not  reach  a  significant  level  during  the  vast  majority  of  leaders’  
domestic  weak  points,  and  two  of  its  highest  intensity  intervention  points  —  the  2007  cyber  
intervention  in  Estonia  and  2008  Russo-Georgian  War  —  do  not  correlate  with  weak  periods.  While  
the  third  significant  intervention  point,  the  2014  Russian  actions  in  Ukraine,  roughly  follows  a  
slightly  weak  point  for  Putin,  it  is  more  directly  linked  to  events  in  Ukraine.  As  a  result  of  this  lack  of  
plausible  validity,  I  did  not  examine  this  hypothesis  further.  
 
The  Territorial  Annexation  Hypothesis  
The  second  alternative  hypothesis  initially  considered  for  examination  was  that  NA  states  
might  be  less  likely  to  successfully  deter  Russian  intervention  over  territorial  sovereignty  disputes.  
Yet,  multiple  separate  arguments  challenge  this  notion.  Firstly,  it  is  possible  that  Russian  intervention  
to  resolve  territorial  disputes  reflects  an  opposite  causation;  essentially,  Russia  does  not  use  force  
specifically  because  of  territorial  disputes,  but  it  instead  intervenes  more  intensely  in  such  disputes  
during  periods  when  it  feels  comfortable  using  force.   
16  Fravel,  M.  Taylor.  “The  Limits  of  Diversion:  Rethinking  Internal  and  External  Conflict.”  Security  
Studies  19,  no.  2  (2010):  338.  
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Secondly,  Russia  has  often  only  intervened  after  years  or  decades  since  the  onset  of  its  
disputes,  reducing  the  likelihood  of  a  sovereignty  dispute  serving  as  the  independent  variable.  
Russia’s  major  interventions  over  territorial  sovereignty  have  occurred  after  long  periods  of  time  
since  the  dispute  initially  arose  or  was  resolved.  For  example,  while  Russia  claimed  Crimean  territory  
in  the  early  1990s,  it  was  not  until  2014  that  Russian  soldiers  facilitated  a  Crimean  referendum  that  
Russia’s  leadership  then  cited  as  justification  for  the  integration  of  Crimea  into  Russia.  Similarly,  
although  Russia  had  supported  the  separatist  republics  of  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia  in  Georgia  
since  Georgia’s  exit  from  the  Soviet  Union,  it  only  intervened  overtly  and  officially  recognized  their  
independence  in  2008.  While  these  interventions  occur  in  the  context  of  sovereignty  disputes,  
Russia’s  decisions  to  use  force  stem  from  other  external  triggers.  
In  instances  of  Russian  intervention  over  territorial  sovereignty  disputes,  Russia’s  level  of  
comfort  in  using  force  in  response  to  external  stimuli  may  result  in  higher  level  intervention,  rather  
than  the  opposite  causation.  This  is  especially  visible  in  some  of  its  most  significant  and  intense  
interventions,  which  actually  occurred  several  decades  after  their  origins.  As  a  result  of  the  unclear  
(and  perhaps  unfavorable)  causal  linkage,  this  hypothesis  was  also  ultimately  not  included  in  the  
thesis.    
 
Chapter  3:  The  Case  Studies  
Ukraine:  Historical  Overview  
The  Ukraine  case  study  supports  this  paper’s  argument,  setting  a  foundation  for  Russian  
behavior  toward  non-NATO  member  NA  states.  The  case  contains  flashpoints  for  potential  Russian  
intervention  in  1993,  2004  and  2014.  Out  of  these,  Russia  intervened  at  a  significant  level  only  in  
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2014.  This  supports  the  periodized  argument  that  Russia  will  refrain  from  escalation  during  
economically  weak  periods  but  will  intervene  at  significant  intensity  levels  against  non-NATO  NA  
states  after  economic  revival.  A  description  of  relevant  historical  events  throughout  Ukraine’s  
relationships  with  both  Russia  and  NATO  will  support  discussion  of  the  hypotheses.   
Ukraine  and  Russia  have  a  lengthy  and  contentious  historical  relationship.  The  Muscovite  
Empire,  which  would  later  evolve  into  the  Russian  Empire,  annexed  eastern  Ukraine  in  the  sixteenth  
century.  After  the  Russian  tsar  fell  and  the  Bolshevik  uprising  commenced  in  1917,  the  Ukrainian  
People’s  Republic  briefly  declared  independence  before  the  Soviet  Union  absorbed  it  in  1921.  
Western  and  Eastern  Ukraine  then  functioned  as  one  region  under  the  Soviet  Union.   The  17
Ukrainian  Supreme  Soviet  declared  independence  in  1991.  18
Ukrainian  cooperation  with  NATO  began  early  in  the  independent  country’s  post-Soviet  
history,  as  it  joined  the  alliance’s  North  Atlantic  Cooperation  Council  in  1991.  Partnership  gradually  
increased  during  the  mid-1990s  with  solid  first  steps  of  cooperation,  such  as  Ukraine’s  1994  entry  
into  the  Partnership  for  Peace  (PFP)  initiative,  1996  deployment  of  Ukrainian  soldiers  to  NATO’s  
peacekeeping  operation  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  1997  construction  of  the  NATO  Information  
and  Documentation  Centre  in  Kyiv  and  1999  deployment  of  the  Polish-Ukrainian  Battalion  to  aid  
NATO’s  Kosovo  peacekeeping  operation.   Throughout  the  1990s,  Russia  encouraged  Ukraine  to  19
join  its  own  post-Soviet  multilateral  regional  institution,  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  
17  Kappeler,  Andreas.  “Ukraine  and  Russia:  Legacies  of  the  Imperial  Past  and  Competing  Memories.”  
Journal  of  Eurasian  Studies  5,  no.  2  (July  2014):  110.  
18  Reid,  Anna.  Borderland:  a  Journey  through  the  History  of  Ukraine .  London:  Weidenfeld  &  Nicolson,  
2015.  p.  xv.  
19  “Relations  with  Ukraine.”  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization,  February  4,  2020.   
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(CIS).  It  was  instead  forced  to  watch  Ukraine  form  close  ties  with  the  security  alliance  founded  
expressly  to  counter  the  USSR  —  likely  a  stinging  irony.   
During  and  after  the  breakdown  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  early  1990s,  numerous  
disagreements  emerged  between  Ukraine  and  Russia  over  the  new  political  status  of  Crimea.  These  
revolved  around  the  national  status  of  Crimea  but  also  the  status  of  the  Crimean  port  of  Sevastopol,  
which  served  as  the  Soviet  Black  Sea  Fleet  base.  While  a  1991  Crimean  referendum  reestablished  the  
Crimean  Autonomous  Soviet  Socialist  Republic  within  the  USSR,  the  superpower’s  formal  
dissolution  and  the  subsequent  emergence  of  an  independent  Ukraine  resulted  in  a  Supreme  Council  
of  Crimea  vote  to  declare  Crimean  independence  and  establish  an  independent  government.  After  
significant  tension  and  additional  Ukrainian  concessions,  however,  the  Crimean  constitution  was  
amended  to  designate  Crimea  as  an  area  within  Ukraine.   Within  this  time  period,  Russia  and  20
Ukraine  agreed  to  divide  the  Black  Sea  Fleet  at  Sevastopol.  The  Crimeans  then  pressured  Ukraine  
for  additional  freedoms,  and  its  parliament’s  leadership  advocated  for  the  devolution  of  presidential  
powers  to  the  territory.   
Emboldened  by  evident  factionalism  among  Crimeans,  Russian  officials  openly  challenged  
Ukraine’s  claims  to  Crimea  and  stoked  dissent  within  the  territory.   The  Russian  deputy  declared  21
Russia’s  willingness  to  oversee  a  Crimean  independence  referendum  and  to  recognize  the  territory  as  
an  independent  CIS  polity.  Further  challenges  over  Crimea  emanated  from  the  Russian  Supreme  
Soviet,  as  it  declared  the  1954  transfer  of  Crimea  from  the  USSR  to  Ukraine  to  be  illegal.  When  
former  Russian  Vice  President  Alexander  Rutskoi  traveled  to  Crimea  in  1992,  he  advocated  for  the  
20  Wydra,  Doris.  “The  Crimea  Conundrum:  The  Tug  of  War  Between  Russia  and  Ukraine  on  the  
Questions  of  Autonomy  and  Self-Determination.”  International  Journal  on  Minority  and  Group  Rights  10,  
no.  2  (2004):  114.  
21  Hall,  M.  Clement.  Crimea:  A  Very  Short  History .  Lulu,  2014.  p.  57.  
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territory  to  secede  from  Ukraine.   The  following  year,  the  Supreme  Soviet  nearly  unanimously  voted  22
in  a  law  “enshrining  the  federal  status  of  the  town  of  Sevastopol  in  the  Russian  Federation  
constitution.”   Pro-Russian  groups  within  Crimea  reacted  accordingly.  Within  the  month,  a  leader  of  23
the  Russian  Society  of  Crimea  asserted  the  group’s  desire  to  force  the  transfer  of  Crimea  into  
Russian  jurisdiction  through  violent  rebellion.   After  additional  tension  for  several  years,  Russia  and  24
Ukraine  eventually  signed  the  1997  Ukraine-Russia  Friendship  Treaty,  which  leased  Sevastopol  to  the  
Russian  navy  and  officially  split  the  Black  Sea  Fleet,  with  the  majority  under  Russian  control.  25
Ukrainians  perceived  the  deal  as  heavily  weighted  toward  Russia  and  potentially  problematic  for  
Ukrainian  security.   26
The  internal  Crimean  political  situation  was  volatile  throughout  this  period,  in  part  due  to  
the  administration  of  Yuriy  Meshkov,  who  was  elected  Crimean  President  in  1994.  An  ethnic  Russian  
and  former  KGB  guard,  Meshkov  ran  on  a  platform  of  closer  Crimean-Russian  relations  and  
dominated  the  election.  In  office,  he  wrestled  with  the  Kiev  government  for  further  Crimean  
autonomy,  refused  to  relinquish  control  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  to  Ukraine,  established  
Crimean  defense  offices  and  pushed  for  mandatory  Crimean  conscription.   In  line  with  his  election  27
platform,  Meshkov  sought  to  establish  closer  relations  with  Russia  and  attempted  to  secure  
22Kuzio,  Taras.  Ukraine-Crimea-Russia:  Triangle  of  Conflict .  Ibidem-Verlag,  2007.  p.  116.  
23  Ibid,  117.   
24  Hall.  Crimea .  2014.  p.  57.  
25  Toucas,  Boris.  “The  Geostrategic  Importance  of  the  Black  Sea  Region:  A  Brief  History.”  Center  
for  Strategic  and  International  Studies,  2017.   
26  “A  Treaty  on  Friendship:  The  End  of  Fiction.”  Warsaw  Institute,  September  4,  2018.  
27  Zaborsky,  Victor.  “Crimea  and  the  Black  Sea  Fleet  in  Russian-Ukrainian  Relations.”  Harvard  
Kennedy  School  Belfer  Center  for  Science  and  International  Affairs,  September  1995.  
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circulation  of  the  ruble  in  Crimea.  From  the  late  1990s  to  the  early  2000s,  Russia  and  Ukraine  
remained  highly  economically  mutually  reliant,  and  no  potential  flashpoints  emerged.   28
Although  Ukraine  strengthened  its  cooperation  with  NATO  throughout  the  1990s,  the  early  
2000s  marked  a  difficult  period  for  the  alliance  and  Ukraine.  After  the  U.S.  accused  Ukraine  of  
selling  early-warning  radar  technology  to  Iraq  and  breaking  a  United  Nations  embargo,  
NATO-Ukraine  relations  soured.  This  rift  became  humiliatingly  evident  for  Ukraine  at  the  2002  
NATO  Prague  summit.  NATO  downsized  a  meeting  with  Ukraine  to  a  minister-level  session,  asked  
Ukrainian  President  Leonid  Kuchma  to  refrain  from  attending  the  summit  and  shifted  his  seat  away  
from  the  United  States’  and  the  United  Kingdom’s  leaders  after  he  disregarded  this  request.  29
Despite  Kuchma’s  2002  declaration  of  his  intent  to  bring  Ukraine  into  the  NATO  alliance,  the  2002  
creation  of  an  Action  Plan  at  the  Prague  summit  and  2003  Ukrainain  commitments  to  send  
peacekeepers  to  Iraq,  relations  between  NATO  and  Ukraine  remained  icy.   Yet,  the  following  year’s  30
events  considerably  altered  the  dynamic  between  Ukraine,  NATO  and  Russia.  
Ukraine’s  2004  Orange  Revolution,  centered  around  that  year’s  presidential  elections,  
presented  serious  concerns  for  Russia.  Erupting  only  one  year  after  the  Georgian  Rose  Revolution,  
in  which  protesters  ousted  the  Russia-friendly  Georgian  leadership  in  favor  of  pro-Western  leaders,  
the  Orange  Revolution  manifested  Russian  fears  of  Ukraine’s  turn  toward  the  West.  Despite  his  
eligibility  to  pursue  a  third  term,  Kuchma,  the  incumbent,  endorsed  the  candidacy  of  Viktor  
Yanukovych,  who  was  backed  publicly  by  Russian  President  Vladimir  Putin.   The  campaign  31
28  Molčanov  Michail.  Political  Culture  and  National  Identity  in  Russian  Ukrainian  Relations .  College  
Station,  TX:  Texas  A&M  Univ.  Press,  2003.  p.  254.  
29  Bransten,  Jeremy.  “NATO:  Solidarity  With  Russia,  Cold  Shoulder  To  Kuchma.”  Radio  Free  
Europe/Radio  Liberty,  April  9,  2008.  
30  Glasser,  Susan.  “U.S.  Shifts  Stance  on  Ukrainian.”  The  Washington  Post ,  July  27,  2003.   
31  Karatnycky,  Adrian.  “Ukraine’s  Orange  Revolution.”  Foreign  Affairs  84,  no.  2  (2005):  35.  
         Rabin  27  
highlighted  a  significant  geographical  divide,  as  Yanukovych’s  pro-Russian  stance  earned  him  the  
support  of  eastern  Ukraine,  with  its  substantial  ethnic  Russian  population  and  favorable  attitude  
toward  Russia,  while  Yanukovych’s  opponent,  Viktor  Yushchenko,  drew  his  support  primarily  from  
western  Ukraine.   In  the  leadup  to  the  election,  Yushchenko  was  with  dioxin,  a  move  often  32
attributed  to  the  Ukrainian  Security  Service  but  also  potentially  linked  to  Russia  by  telephone  
transcripts.   33
Yanukovych  initially  declared  victory  after  the  election  runoff,  but  Yushchenko  supporters  
alleged  election  fraud,  based  on  election  monitor  reports.   Suspiciously,  Putin  publicly  lauded  34
Yanukovych’s  success  before  the  Central  Election  Committee  even  announced  the  winner.  35
Yushchenko’s  supporters  then  assembled  the  public  protests  that  would  become  known  as  the  
Orange  Revolution.   For  weeks,  hundreds  of  thousands  of  demonstrators  marched,  and  36
approximately  one  million  protesters  peacefully  occupied  the  streets  of  Kiev.   Yanukovych’s  37
campaign  urged  for  counterdemonstrations  in  his  eastern  strongholds,  and  some  of  his  eastern  
supporters  threatened  secession.   The  Ukrainian  Supreme  Court  declared  the  first  runoff  invalid,  38
and  a  second  runoff  vote  commenced  under  heavy  international  scrutiny.  Yushchenko  emerged  
victorious  and,  despite  Yanukovych’s  legal  allegations  of  an  invalid  election,  the  courts  and  election  
committee  upheld  the  results.  This  marked  the  ascendance  of  Yushchenko,  a  leader  aiming  to  build  
32  “A  Treaty  on  Friendship.”  Warsaw  Institute.  2018.   
33  Zon,  Hans  Van.  “Why  the  Orange  Revolution  Succeeded.”  Perspectives  on  European  Politics  and  Society  
6,  no.  3  (2005):  388.  
34  Ibid,  387.  
35  Ibid,  388.  
36  Ibid,  388.  
37  Polese,  Abel.  “Ukraine  Orange  Revolution,  2004-2005.”  The  International  Encyclopedia  of  Revolution  
and  Protest ,  2009,  1.   
38  “A  Treaty  on  Friendship.”  Warsaw  Institute.  2018.   
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closer  relationships  between  the  West  and  Ukraine,  and  the  removal  of  Putin-backed  Moscow  ally  
Yanukovych.  Yet,  at  this  point,  the  Russian  military  remained  within  Russian  borders,  and  Ukrainian  
territorial  integrity  remained  intact.   Nevertheless,  Putin’s  Russia  was  clearly  shaken  by  the  Orange  39
Revolution,  as  it  responded  by  increasing  the  Russian  government’s  internal  central  control  over  
non-governmental  organizations  and  forming  new  political  organizations.   40
In  the  years  following  the  Orange  Revolution,  the  new  Ukrainian  leadership  was  fraught  with  
tension.  Rapid  cabinet  turnovers  and  infighting  between  Yushchenko  and  other  leaders  of  the  
revolution,  such  as  Yuliya  Tymoshenko,  hobbled  the  new  government’s  hopes  for  stable  and  
effective  governance.   In  2006,  Yushchenko  pushed  for  a  NATO  Membership  Action  Plan  (MAP)  41
—  essentially  a  guided  plan  for  achieving  the  conditions  necessary  for  NATO  membership.  Russia’s  
disapproval  of  this  direction  glared  in  Defence  Minister  Sergey  Ivanov’s  2006  warning  of  the  
“negative  consequences”  that  would  follow  a  Ukrainian  NATO  accession.   However,  after  a  42
parliamentary  defeat  forced  Yushchenko  to  name  Yanukovych  his  prime  minister,  Yanukovych’s  
direct  opposition  to  the  MAP  prevented  any  progress  and  effectively  shelved  the  country’s  pursuit  of  
NATO  membership.   43
In  2008,  with  the  support  of  new  prime  minister  Tymoshenko  and  the  parliament,  
Yushchenko  again  pushed  for  a  MAP.  Russia  again  vocalized  its  opposition,  and  despite  the  support  
of  U.S.  President  George  W.  Bush,  numerous  NATO  leaders,  reluctant  to  sour  the  alliance’s  relations  
with  Russia,  declined  Yushchenko’s  application.   Yet,  NATO  leaders  still  proclaimed  that  Ukraine  44
39  Karatnycky.  “Ukraine’s  Orange  Revolution.”  Foreign  Affairs  (2005):  35.  
40  Petrov,  Nikolay.  “Russia’s  Orange  Revolution  Syndrome.”  PONARS  Eurasia,  2010.  
41  Charap,  Samuel.  “Seeing  Orange.”  Foreign  Policy,  January  18,  2010.  
42  Perepelytsia,  Grigoriy.  “NATO  and  Ukraine:  At  the  Crossroads.”  NATO  Review,  April  1,  2007.   
43  Pifer,  Steven.  “Order  from  Chaos.”  Brookings,  June  6,  2019.  
44  Ibid.  
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would  eventually  join  NATO.  Russia’s  outspoken  opposition  persisted.   Later  in  the  year,  as  45
Yushchenko  and  Putin  stood  together  at  a  public  speech,  Putin  threatened  to  aim  nuclear  weapons  
at  Ukraine  if  Ukraine  were  to  join  NATO,  and  the  chief  of  the  Russian  general  staff  predicted  that  
military  action  would  follow  a  Ukrainian  NATO  accession.   That  year,  Russia  and  Ukraine  also  46
feuded  over  transfers  of  Russian  gas,  and  the  Ukrainian  economy  began  to  tank  from  the  effects  of  
the  global  recession.   By  the  end  of  Yushchenko’s  term,  his  approval  ratings  stood  at  a  dismal  4  47
percent.   48
Yanukovych  emerged  victorious  in  the  2010  election  and  ousted  Yushchenko,  the  politician  
who  had  defeated  him  five  years  prior.  Although  Yanukovych  maintained  cooperation  with  NATO  
throughout  his  term,  he  declared  in  2010  that  Ukrainian  membership  in  NATO  was  an  “unrealistic  
prospect”  and  officially  removed  the  issue  from  the  Ukrainian  agenda.  His  foreign  policy  focused  on  
building  positive  relationships  with  Russia.  49
Yanukovych’s  complicated  attitude  toward  incorporating  Ukraine  into  the  West  would  result  
in  Ukraine’s  largest  political  crisis  since  the  Orange  Revolution:  the  Euromaidan  protests.  
Yanukovych,  sensitive  to  Russian  threats  of  a  gas  cutoff,  chose  to  renege  on  a  popular  2013  planned  
association  agreement  with  the  European  Union  and  prepared  to  reorient  trade  toward  Russia.  50
Protesters  occupied  the  Kiev  city  hall  with  demands  for  the  president’s  immediate  resignation.  These  
45  Pifer,  Steven.  “Averting  Crisis  in  Ukraine.”  Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  January  2009.  
46  Ibid.  
47  Otarashvilli,  Maia.  “Ukraine  and  the  Global  Economic  Crisis.”  Foreign  Policy  Research  Institute,  
2013.   
48  Ray,  Julie,  and  Neli  Esipova.  “Approval  Ratings  in  Ukraine,  Russia  Highlight  Differences.”  Gallup,  
October  22,  2018.   
49  Taylor,  Adam.  “That  Time  Ukraine  Tried  to  Join  NATO  —  and  NATO  Said  No.”  The  Washington  
Post ,  September  4,  2014.  
50  Kappeler.  “Ukraine  and  Russia:  Legacies.”  Journal  of  Eurasian  Studies  (2014):  108.  
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protests  evolved  into  riots,  and  when  Yanukovych  attempted  to  sign  laws  to  constrain  protesting  
rights,  hundreds  of  thousands  of  protesters  responded  in  the  Kiev  streets.  These  riots  became  
violent,  with  substantial  bloodshed  between  protesters  and  police.  The  protests  spread  to  eastern  
Ukraine,  Yanukovych’s  former  stronghold  of  support.  After  protesters  occupied  the  justice  ministry,  
the  parliament  removed  restrictions  on  protesting.  Yet,  the  brief  respite  in  violence  ended  after  the  
parliamentary  opposition  failed  to  secure  limitations  on  presidential  power.  The  European  Union  
enacted  sanctions  against  Ukraine  after  Yanukovych  again  resorted  to  violence  against  the  protesters.  
On  February  21,  the  EU  worked  to  create  a  peace  agreement  between  Yanukovych  and  the  
opposition,  while  the  parliament  granted  amnesty  to  the  protesters  and  voted  to  impeach  
Yanukovych.  While  a  member  of  Tymoshenko’s  Fatherland  party  assumed  the  role  of  acting  
president,  Yanukovych  fled  the  country  and  later  reemerged  in  Russia,  decrying  what  he  viewed  as  a  
coup.   
Russia’s  next  steps  represented  a  notable  shift  in  Russian  Ukraine  policy.  As  the  Euromaidan  
protesters  occupied  government  buildings  and  flooded  the  streets,  the  Sevastopol  City  Council  had  
urged  the  creation  of  Crimean  defense  squads  to  defend  the  city.   This  decision  may  have  been  51
spurred  by  Russian  media  claims  that  militarized  Ukrainian  nationalists  would  travel  from  Kiev  to  
Crimea.   Immediately  after  Yanukovych  fled  Ukraine  and  reappeared  across  the  Russian  border,  52
Russian  special  operations  forces  were  deployed  to  covertly  take  over  key  civic  and  infrastructural  
sites  in  Crimea.  Although  the  deployed  units  had  no  insignias  to  betray  their  Russian  identities,  their  
weaponry,  fatigues,  accents  and  equipment  clearly  identified  them  to  observers  as  professional  
51  Belotserkovskaya,  Julia.  “Sevastopol  City  Council  Appealed  to  the  Authorities  of  Ukraine  with  a  
Demand  to  Ban  the  Activities  of  VO  ‘Freedom.’”  Sevastopol  News,  2014.  
52  Carbonnel,  Alissa  de.  “How  the  Separatists  Delivered  Crimea  to  Moscow.”  Reuters.  Thomson  
Reuters,  March  12,  2014.   
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Russian  soldiers.   The  newly  formed  Russian  Special  Operations  Command  occupied  the  Crimean  53
parliament  building,  securing  the  election  of  Sergei  Askyonov  as  prime  minister  and  seizing  major  
Ukrainian  compounds.   Numerous  Crimean  lawmakers  alleged  that  despite  their  absences  from  the  54
building,  their  votes  were  counted  as  supporting  Askyonov’s  election.   While  Putin  initially  claimed  55
that  the  “little  green  men”  occupying  buildings  were  Crimean  separatists,  the  Crimean  defense  
groups  appear  to  have  instead  played  a  largely  cosmetic  role  in  the  operation,  providing  a  “local  
image.”   In  the  midst  of  the  crisis,  Putin  secured  permission  from  his  Federation  Council  to  deploy  56
Russian  forces  to  Ukraine  for  the  purposes  of  stabilization.   In  under  three  weeks  after  the  57
Russians’  takeover  of  the  Crimean  parliament,  after  another  rigged  referendum,  Askyrov’s  new  
government  and  the  Russian  government  signed  a  March  treaty  to  facilitate  the  accession  of  Crimea  
into  Russia.  A  week  later,  the  Ukrainian  military  units  in  Crimea  surrendered,  marking  the  
completion  of  a  bloodless  annexation  of  Crimea.   Russian  military  exercises  along  the  58
Russia-Ukraine  border  pressured  Ukraine  to  accept  the  shift  in  status  quo.  59
The  next  phase  of  direct  Russian  intervention  in  Ukraine,  the  war  in  the  Donbas  region  of  
eastern  Ukraine,  has  proved  far  more  violent.  While  the  region  had  served  as  a  source  of  support  for  
Yanukovych,  violent  clashes  between  supporters  and  opponents  of  the  Euromaidan  uprising  
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escalated  after  March.   Key  journalists  and  local  Ukrainian  officials  identified  a  mounting  presence  60
of  the  military  intelligence  forces  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Armed  Forces  (GRU)  in  the  region  as  
early  as  March,  directly  after  the  Crimean  crisis  and  nearly  a  month  before  hostilities  erupted  in  the  
east.   From  April  7  to  April  14,  armed  pro-Russian  squads  took  over  government  buildings  in  the  61
eastern  cities  of  Donetsk  and  Luhansk,  before  reinforcing  separatists  secured  substantial  amounts  of  
ground  in  the  surrounding  Donetsk  and  Luhansk  provinces.   These  separatists  proceeded  to  62
establish  breakaway  entities  called  the  People’s  Republics  of  Donetsk  and  Luhansk  in  mid-2014.   
Remarkably,  Russian  intelligence  agencies  appear  to  have  been  involved  in  recruiting  
separatists  and  organizing  different  militant  groups  into  a  central  separatist  army.  In  late  2014,  
regular  Russian  troops  engaged  in  combat  to  prevent  the  separatists  from  defeat  against  Ukrainian  
forces,  and  Russia  has  continued  to  supply  manpower  and  weapons  to  the  separatists;  however,  
Russia  maintains  it  has  not  been  involved.   Ukraine  and  the  separatists  signed  the  Minsk  63
Agreements  in  2014  and  2015  to  establish  conditions  for  a  ceasefire  and  territorial  reintegration,  but  
these  agreements  remain  ineffective.   The  conflict  has  raged  on  for  years,  but  no  new  opportunities  64
for  Russia  to  intervene  on  a  new  front  have  emerged.  
Throughout  this  entire  period  of  relations  between  Ukraine  and  Russia,  multiple  
opportunities  have  emerged  during  which  Russia  could  have  acted  to  intervene  in  Ukrainian  affairs  
and  secure  political  gains.  The  scenarios  this  paper  considers  the  most  likely  to  result  in  Russian  
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intervention  are  the  1992-1993  Russian  meddling  in  Crimea,  the  2004  Orange  Revolution,  the  2014  
annexation  of  Crimea  and  the  2014  war  in  Donbas.  Since  both  2014  conflicts  stemmed  from  the  
2013  Euromaidan  protests,  this  paper  often  treats  them  together  when  examining  causation  of  
intervention.  The  dependent  variable  of  Russian  intervention  varies  across  these  incidents.  Russia  
refrained  from  intervening  militarily  in  the  early  1990s  and  during  the  Orange  Revolution,  but  it  
intervened  to  annex  Crimea  and  stoke  separatist  conflict  in  Donbas.  Due  to  the  similarities  across  
these  incidents,  this  thesis  questions  why  Russia  chose  to  intervene  in  2014  but  not  in  1993  or  2004.  
 
Ukraine:  Hypothesis  Analysis  
H1:  Near  abroad  states  with  NATO  membership  are  more  likely  to  successfully  achieve  general  deterrence  toward  
Russia.  
H1  proposes  that  near  abroad  (NA)  states  with  official  NATO  membership  possess  an  
enhanced  capacity  for  general  deterrence  toward  Russia,  implying  that  Russia,  fearing  a  failure  to  
achieve  its  strategic  objectives  or  fearing  unacceptable  retaliation,  is  less  likely  to  initiate  challenges  
against  these  states.  The  inverse  follows;  NA  states  that  do  not  possess  NATO  memberships,  all  
other  factors  remaining  equal,  are  less  likely  to  successfully  achieve  general  deterrence  toward  Russia  
and  prevent  an  initial  challenge  to  the  status  quo.  Russia,  according  to  this  logic,  is  likely  to  display  an  
increased  propensity  for  intervening  in  Ukraine’s  affairs.  This  propensity  should  take  the  form  of  
increased  likelihood  of  interventions  of  disproportionately  high  intensity  levels  for  non-NATO  
member  NA  states  like  Ukraine.  
The  Ukraine  case  does  not  have  direct  bearing  on  H1,  as  there  is  no  internal  variation  of  the  
independent  variable  (Ukraine’s  NATO  status)  within  this  case.  This  limits  this  case’s  relevance  to  
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the  discussion  of  H1.  However,  it  does  support  the  inverse  implications  of  H1.  Throughout  the  case,  
the  IV  remains  constant,  as  Ukraine  has  never  become  a  NATO  member,  although  the  country’s  
leadership  has  professed  varying  degrees  of  desire  to  join  NATO  over  time.  However,  Ukraine’s  
relations  with  Russia  can  contribute  evidence  to  a  theoretical  baseline  level  of  intervention  that  
Russia  is  willing  to  take  against  non-NATO  member  NA  states.   
H1’s  inverse  implications  predict  Ukraine  to  have  a  lesser  capability  of  initially  deterring  
Russian  challenges  than  NA  NATO  members  like  Estonia.  Several  flashpoints  in  the  Ukraine-Russia  
bilateral  relationship  confirm  Ukraine’s  difficulty  in  deterring  Russia,  while  other  flashpoints  pose  
challenges  for  the  prediction.  The  primary  shift  in  Russian  behavior  is  visible  between  the  1993  and  
2004  instances  of  Russian  nonintervention  and  the  Russian  intervention  in  the  2014  Euromaidan  
protests.   
The  1993  flashpoint,  which  marks  that  decade’s  apex  of  Russian  governmental  efforts  to  
stoke  dissent  within  Crimea,  does  not  necessarily  support  the  hypothesis’  implications.  According  to  
H1,  this  is  a  situation  in  which  Russia  is  more  likely  to  intervene  at  a  high  intensity,  but  Russia  did  
not  escalate  at  this  point.  Yet,  it  is  notable  that  Russian  leadership  opted  for  political  intervention,  in  
the  form  of  Rutskoi’s  and  the  Russian  deputy’s  suggestion  of  Crimean  secession,  as  well  as  the  
Supreme  Soviet’s  votes  to  condemn  the  transfer  of  Crimea  to  Ukraine  and  to  claim  Sevastopol  as  
Russian  territory.   
The  Orange  Revolution  also  does  not  provide  supportive  evidence  for  this  prediction.  The  
nullification  of  the  election  of  Yanukovych  —  who  Putin  publicly  backed  —  and  the  Orange  
Revolution’s  massive  organized  protests  evidently  led  to  serious  consternation  in  the  Kremlin.  
Despite  this,  Russia  refrained  from  escalating  against  Ukraine.  The  subsequent  defeat  of  Yanukovych  
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and  victory  of  Yushchenko,  who  aimed  to  orient  Ukraine  toward  NATO,  likely  heightened  Russian  
concerns.  Relative  to  Fearon’s  ideas,  it  is  notable  that  Ukraine  did  not  pursue  a  particularly  moderate  
policy  to  avoid  provoking  Russia.  In  this  scenario,  the  evident  commitment  problem  suggests  the  
possibility  of  Russian  escalation  to  prevent  an  unacceptable  shift  in  status  quo.  The  extended  process  
of  supporting  Yushchenko’s  claims  and  opting  for  further  elections  marks  a  point  at  which  H1  
would  predict  Russian  escalation.  Yet,  despite  Ukraine’s  non-member  NATO  status,  Russia  chose  to  
refrain  from  more  intense  intervention.   
When  a  comparable  predicament  emerged  ten  years  later,  however,  Russia  opted  for  
intervention.  The  2013  Euromaidan  protests  were  sparked  by  Yanukovych’s  retraction  of  his  
commitment  to  achieve  closer  European  integration  through  a  European  Union  Association  
Agreement,  due  to  Russian  pressure.  To  Russia,  this  situation  presented  a  provocation  similar  to  the  
Orange  Revolution.  The  Orange  Revolution  protests  nullified  the  fraudulent  election  of  Russia’s  
preferred  candidate  in  favor  of  a  pro-NATO  candidate,  while  the  Euromaidan  protests  ousted  a  
candidate  with  pro-Russian  views  because  he  failed  to  achieve  a  closer  relationship  with  the  
European  Union.  Although  these  situations  presented  comparable  stimuli  to  Russia,  one  situation  
resulted  in  intervention  and  one  did  not.   
Ultimately,  because  Ukraine  has  never  joined  NATO  and  the  IV  therefore  remains  constant,  
the  Ukraine  case  study  is  most  useful  to  H1  because  it  reflects  Russia’s  willingness  to  interfere  
militarily  in  the  affairs  of  a  non-NATO  state.  This  supports  the  inverse  implications  of  H1  and  will  
provide  a  useful  comparison  relative  to  the  other  case  studies.  
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H1A:  The  United  States’  credibility  positively  affects  near  abroad  states’  abilities  to  deter  Russia.  
The  U.S.’s  credibility  as  an  actor  willing  to  use  force  is  an  important  factor  that  directly  
influences  the  effectiveness  of  NATO  deterrence.  The  three  primary  flashpoints  in  
Ukrainian-Russian  relations  where  Russian  military  intervention  was  a  possibility  are  the  1993  height  
of  bilateral  tensions  over  Crimea,  the  2004  Orange  Revolution  and  2014  Euromaidan  protests.  If  the  
case  supports  H1A,  Russia  will  be  less  likely  to  intervene  after  events  indicating  the  U.S.’s  willingness  
to  use  force  in  response  to  threats  or  to  enforce  American  deterrent  threats.  Similarly,  it  will  be  more  
likely  to  intervene  after  events  implying  that  the  U.S.  is  not  willing  to  use  force  in  comparable  
situations.  
In  the  early  1990s,  the  U.S.  military  was  an  exceptionally  credible  force.  The  U.S.  emerged  as  
the  sole  hegemon  in  a  unipolar  world  at  the  expense  of  the  USSR,  the  legal  predecessor  of  Russia.  
Furthermore,  the  U.S.  demonstrated  both  its  conventional  power  and  its  willingness  to  intervene  
abroad  in  its  1990  Desert  Shield  and  1991  Desert  Storm  operations.   
In  the  three  years  preceding  the  Orange  Revolution,  the  United  States  had  invoked  the  
NATO  Article  V  mutual  defense  clause  to  oust  the  Taliban  from  power  in  Afghanistan,  defeat  
Saddam  Hussein  in  Iraq  and  combat  the  remaining  insurgents  in  the  region.   This  sequence  gave  65
the  U.S.  enormous  credibility  as  the  most  powerful  conventional  military  in  the  world  and  added  
substantially  to  NATO’s  deterrent  credibility  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution.   
However,  the  events  of  the  decade  following  the  Orange  Revolution  negatively  impacted  the  
U.S.’s  reliability  as  a  force  willing  to  launch  an  invasion  in  defense  of  a  non-NATO  country.  For  
nearly  a  decade,  the  U.S.’s  displays  of  power  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  had  degraded  into  long,  costly  
65  Sanger,  David.  “President  Says  Military  Phase  in  Iraq  Has  Ended.”  The  New  York  Times ,  May  2,  
2003.  
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and  unpopular  counterinsurgency  operations.   The  American  public  was  weary  of  fighting  such  66
wars  abroad.  Another  incident,  in  which  Russia  played  a  direct  role,  expedited  the  decline  of  
American  credibility.  In  late  2013,  Syrian  President  Bashar  al-Assad  evidently  crossed  a  “red  line”  
previously  established  by  President  Obama:  the  use  of  chemical  weapons  on  civilians.  Based  on  the  
expectations  established  by  the  red  line  comment,  U.S.  intervention  should  have  occurred.  However,  
Assad’s  ally  Putin  mobilized  Russian  naval  vessels  in  the  region,  in  combination  with  hawkish  public  
messaging.  Obama  then  failed  to  enforce  the  red  line,  and  Russia  chose  to  annex  Crimea  mere  
months  later.   H1A  is  therefore  supported  by  the  timeline  of  events  in  the  Ukraine  case  study.  67
 
H2:  Overt  NATO  deliberations  surrounding  an  NA  state’s  possible  entry  without  officially  giving  membership  
decrease  that  state’s  ability  to  deter  Russia.  
H2  argues  that  when  an  NA  state  lacking  NATO  membership  engages  in  serious  public  
dialogue  with  NATO  over  membership,  Russia  is  more  likely  to  intervene  in  that  state’s  affairs.  This  
is  preventive  behavior  intended  to  dissuade  NATO  from  permitting  the  NA  state’s  accession.  
Implicitly,  the  incentive  to  engage  in  this  preventive  behavior  stems  from  an  acknowledgment  of  the  
potent  deterrent  effect  created  by  NATO  membership.   NATO  membership  in  turn  derives  its  68
strength  from  the  Article  V  mutual  defense  pact.  H2  therefore  predicts  that  serious  progress  toward  
membership  between  NATO  and  a  non-member  NA  state  creates  an  incentive  for  Russia  to  
intervene  before  the  NA  state  can  invoke  the  mandatory  support  of  powerful  NATO  states.   
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Although  the  Ukraine  case  study  provides  promising  evidence  for  H2,  Russian  behavior  
during  the  Orange  Revolution  does  not  fit  neatly  within  the  hypothesis’  predictions.  The  1993  
flashpoint  is  likely  not  relevant  to  this  hypothesis  because  NATO  and  Ukraine  had  not  yet  
developed  substantive  relations  by  this  point.  Further,  it  is  unclear  whether  the  events  surrounding  
the  2004  Orange  Revolution  support  the  hypothesis.  After  establishing  the  cause  for  Russian  anxiety  
over  this  uprising,  I  examine  arguments  supporting  and  opposing  the  application  of  H2  in  this  case.  
Not  long  after  Ukraine  gained  its  independence  from  the  Soviet  Union,  it  developed  steady  
cooperation  with  NATO  by  participating  in  several  NATO  peacekeeping  initiatives  in  central  
Europe  and  joining  NATO  partnership  initiatives.  Although  this  ultimately  resulted  in  a  relatively  
close  relationship  between  the  two  parties  throughout  the  1990s,  the  partnership  had  not  progressed  
to  the  point  of  serious  membership  talks.   
The  events  of  the  early  2000s  reduced  the  probability  of  Russian  perception  of  Ukraine  as  
nearing  NATO  accession,  so  the  Orange  Revolution  understandably  alarmed  Russian  leaders.  At  
face  value,  Kuchma’s  overtures  toward  NATO  in  2002  and  the  creation  in  the  same  year  of  an  
Action  Plan  to  strengthen  Ukraine’s  relationship  with  the  alliance  hinted  toward  ambitions  of  
accession.  Yet,  these  events  were  likely  of  little  concern  to  Russian  leaders.  Ukraine’s  
embargo-flouting  sales  of  radar  technology  to  Iraq,  Kuchma’s  unwelcome  2002  NATO  summit  
appearance  and  the  U.S.’s  disapproval  of  Kuchma’s  conspicuous  failure  to  promote  democratic  
processes  all  evidently  remained  thorns  in  the  NATO-Ukraine  relationship  —  and  United  States  
apparently  disclosed  this  reality  directly  to  Kuchma.   The  lip  service  NATO  paid  to  the  partnership  69
at  the  time  was  hardly  a  cause  for  Russian  apprehension.  In  the  aftermath  of  these  disputes,  the  
69  Glasser.  “U.S.  Shifts.”  The  Washington  Post ,  2003.   
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Kremlin  viewed  the  candidacy  of  Yanukovych  in  the  2004  election  as  a  means  for  securing  a  
stronger  bilateral  relationship  with  Ukraine  at  the  expense  of  Ukraine’s  NATO  membership  
aspirations.  It  is  no  surprise,  then,  that  the  Orange  Revolution  surrounding  the  election  disquieted  
Russia.   
On  one  level,  the  NATO-Ukraine  disputes  of  the  early  2000s  and  MAP  plans  of  the  later  
2000s  can  explain  the  variation  in  intervention  in  a  manner  consistent  with  H2.  The  public  tension  
between  Kuchma  and  NATO  would  have  dispelled  Russian  concerns  over  recently  improved  
relations  up  to  2004.  Furthermore,  Ukraine  remained  distant  from  the  conditions  necessary  for  
NATO  membership,  as  Kuchma  proved  unable  to  institute  reforms  laid  out  in  the  2002  Action  Plan.  
Public  opinion  —  a  significant  factor  incorporated  into  NATO’s  decisions  to  include  new  members  
—  also  remained  decidedly  skeptical  of  joining  NATO.   Overall,  the  concrete  progress  toward  70
membership  that  had  been  achieved  by  2004  was  negligible,  and,  in  line  with  H2,  Russia  did  not  
intervene.  When  Ukraine  applied  for  MAPs  in  2006  and  2008,  Russian  reactionary  rhetoric  signaled  
the  Kremlin’s  deep  displeasure.  As  the  MAP  program  is  an  important  early  step  in  the  NATO  
accession  process,  Putin’s  threats  reflect  Russia’s  recognition  that  a  successful  MAP  application  
would  constitute  both  a  sign  of  progress  and,  correspondingly,  a  threat  to  Russian  interests.   
Yet,  Ukraine’s  MAP  applications  were  rejected,  and  Yanukovych’s  presidency,  which  began  
with  the  new  president’s  officially  shelving  Ukrainian  accession  plans,  effectively  made  the  issue  of  
Ukraine’s  relations  with  the  West  disappear  until  the  controversy  over  the  EU  Association  
Agreement  ignited  the  2013  Euromaidan  protests.  The  fact  that  Russia  did  not  intervene  before  the  
70  Woehrel,  Steven.  “Ukraine’s  Orange  Revolution  and  U.S.  Policy.”  CRS  Report  for  Congress.  
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Ukrainian  MAP  applications  and  did  intervene  militarily  after  the  MAP  applications  is  a  sequence  
promising  for  H2.  
An  additional  dimension  reinforces  the  link  between  H2  and  the  timing  of  the  interventions.  
The  hypothesis  fits  the  timeline  described  above  well,  but  the  delay  between  the  2006-2008  MAP  
applications  and  Russia’s  early  2014  intervention  should  be  considered.  Another  potential  
explanation  is  that  Ukraine’s  gradual  increase  in  efforts  to  secure  a  NATO  MAP  before  
Yanukovych’s  election,  in  the  context  of  a  general  long-term  trend  of  NATO  expansion,  created  
conditions  in  which  a  triggering  situation,  even  indirectly  related  to  NATO,  could  spark  Russian  
intervention.  This  triggering  event  could  take  the  form  of  Yanukovych’s  removal,  which  could  
appear  as  a  de  facto  step  away  from  a  Russia-oriented  policy  and  toward  NATO  membership,  as  
discussed  above.   
An  explanation  combining  the  long-term  buildup  of  relations  with  NATO  and  the  
immediate  Euromaidan  catalyst  of  an  agreement  with  the  EU  may  also  account  for  Russia’s  timing.  
It  is  possible  that  Russian  leaders  viewed  the  Euromaidan  protests  —  originally  a  response  to  
Yanukovych’s  submission  to  Russian  pressure  and  retraction  of  his  commitment  to  enter  the  
landmark  Association  Agreement  with  the  European  Union  —  as  a  popular  rejection  of  Russia  and  
turn  toward  the  West.  Further,  it  is  possible  that  Russia  considered  both  bodies  in  its  calculations;  
perhaps  Russian  leaders  viewed  heightened  EU  integration,  especially  in  a  post-Yanukovych  
environment,  as  a  harbinger  of  closer  NATO  ties.  The  widespread  and  violent  protests  pushing  this  
agenda  would  have  only  underscored  this  message.  This  interpretation  could  easily  explain  the  time  
gap  between  the  MAP  applications  and  the  Russian  intervention,  since  it  would  anticipate  the  
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immediate  Russian  reaction  to  Euromaidan  while  still  allowing  for  Russian  nonintervention  in  2004  
as  previously  examined.   
H2  fits  well  with  the  discussion  of  the  Ukrainian  case,  but  the  discrepancy  between  Russia’s  
responses  to  the  Orange  Revolution  and  Euromaidan  protests  is  notable.  However,  the  
consideration  of  the  impact  of  relevant  triggering  events  like  elections  in  combination  with  official  
progress  can  help  to  partially  —  if  not  fully  —  explain  the  non-intervention  in  2004  and  
intervention  in  2014.  Later  examination  of  the  relationship  between  the  respective  implications  of  
H2  and  H4  more  fully  resolves  this  discrepancy.  
 
H3:  Near  abroad  states  are  less  likely  to  successfully  deter  Russia  if  Russia  is  able  to  use  a  covert  method  of  attack.  
H3  argues  that  if  Russia  is  able  to  intervene  in  a  covert  manner,  it  is  more  likely  to  intervene  
in  an  NA  state’s  affairs.  By  doing  so,  Russia  can  attempt  to  avoid  the  identification  of  its  forces  
altogether  or,  at  minimum,  achieve  plausible  deniability.  This  would  allow  it  to  continue  to  pursue  its  
goals  while  denying  involvement  through  overt  diplomatic  channels,  enabling  it  to  secure  tactical  and  
strategic  gains  while  avoiding  international  punishment  and  military  responses.   
The  Ukraine  case  study  yields  a  mixed  result  for  this  hypothesis,  and  the  connection  remains  
inconclusive.  Russia  has  relied  on  two  primary  covert  methods  in  Ukraine:  covert  conventional  
forces  and  proxy  forces.  In  its  2014  efforts  to  annex  Crimea,  Russia  relied  heavily  on  unidentified  
soldiers  —  “little  green  men”  —  to  secure  key  strategic  points.  Russia  also  supported  separatist  
groups  during  its  campaign  to  force  the  splintering  of  eastern  Ukrainian  regions.  However,  although  
Russia  utilized  both  of  these  strategies  in  Ukraine,  determining  whether  these  options  were  viable  
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for  Russia  at  other  points  of  time  remains  complicated.  The  discussion  below  will  first  examine  
support  for  the  hypothesis’  application  and  subsequently  cover  its  challenges.   
Russia’s  heavy  reliance  upon  covert  conventional  forces  to  make  strategic  gains  in  Crimea  
implies  their  importance  for  Russia  in  its  decision  to  intervene.  At  the  1993  flashpoint,  Russian  
officials  openly  encouraged  a  Crimean  separatist  movement,  causing  the  leader  of  at  least  one  group,  
the  Russian  Society  of  Crimea,  to  advocate  for  armed  rebellion  against  Ukraine.  It  is  notable  that  
Russia  did  not  intervene  militarily  at  this  point,  although  it  did  pursue  political  intervention.  Thus,  
while  this  does  not  support  the  idea  that  Russia  is  more  likely  to  escalate  its  intervention  if  given  the  
chance  by  local  separatists,  Russia  did  try  to  use  these  separatists  to  cause  political  damage  in  
Ukraine.  Throughout  the  1990s  and  early  2000s,  Kuchma  earned  a  reputation  for  silencing  and  
marginalizing  Crimean  separatism  through  legal  and  political  processes.   For  Russia,  this  likely  71
would  have  ruled  out  stoking  a  Crimean  separatist  movement,  and  by  extension,  using  covert  forces  
to  propel  the  separatist  movement  at  the  time  of  the  Orange  Revolution.   
Yet,  Crimean  separatists  began  to  regain  traction  after  Yanukovych  became  prime  minister  in  
2006,  as  his  party  coalition  depended  on  their  support.   This  resurgence  had  tangible  implications  72
for  Ukraine  and  NATO,  as  these  separatists  prevented  NATO  from  holding  joint  exercises  on  the  
peninsula.   Years  later,  the  volatile  atmosphere  of  the  late  2013  Euromaidan  protests  convinced  73
Crimean  official  Vladimir  Konstantinov  to  tell  Russian  security  ministers  that  Crimea  would  seek  a  
71  Kuzio,  Taras.  “Yanukovych's  Election  Opens  Up  Crimean  Separatist  Threat.”  Eurasia  Daily  
Monitor.  Jamestown  Foundation,  March  3,  2010.   
72  Kuzio,  Taras.  “The  Orange  and  Euromaidan  Revolutions:  Theoretical  and  Comparative  
Perspectives.”  Kyiv-Mohyla  Law  and  Politics  Journal ,  no.  2  (2016):  92.   
73  Paton  Walsh,  Nick.  “Protests  Threaten  Nato  War  Games.”  The  Guardian.  Guardian  News  and  
Media,  June  12,  2006.   
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union  with  Russia  if  Yanukovych  were  removed  from  office.   The  Sevastopol  City  Council’s  public  74
appeal  to  Crimeans  to  form  self-defense  squads  indicates  the  tense  atmosphere  in  which  Russian  
officials  opted  to  use  covert  troops  for  intervention.  Yanukovych’s  removal  after  the  upheaval  of  the  
Euromaidan  protests,  as  Konstantinov  predicted,  sparked  fears  among  the  Crimean  public  that  its  
interests  might  not  be  represented  by  the  new  administration,  and  the  Ukrainian  Rada’s  late  February  
2014  vote  to  remove  Russian  as  an  official  language  in  Ukraine  provoked  Crimean  protests  in  
Crimea.   Russia  started  to  prepare  for  the  deployment  of  its  “little  green  men”  on  February  24,  75
three  days  after  Yanukovych’s  flight  from  Ukraine  and  one  day  after  the  Russian  language  vote,  
indicating  that  the  active  disapproval  of  Crimeans  likely  contributed  to  the  Russian  decision  to  
intervene  and  annex  Crimea.  
This  timing  created  an  ideal  pretext  for  the  deployment  of  professional  soldiers  capable  of  
occupying  strategic  points,  but  the  troops  needed  to  appear  local  to  deter  any  direct  responses  or  
international  action  against  Russia.  By  masquerading  their  soldiers  as  Crimean  self-defense  groups  
—  like  those  advocated  by  the  Sevastopol  council  —  Russia  was  also  able  to  manufacture  the  
appearance  of  legitimacy  and  self-determination  for  the  operation.  For  example,  the  Russian  special  
forces  commandos  who  occupied  the  Crimean  Parliament  on  February  27  claimed  to  be  members  
of  a  local  Crimean  defense  group,  while  Russian  intelligence  operators  worked  for  the  next  week  to  
construct  defensive  groups  from  local  militias,  Cossacks  and  former  berkut  riot  policemen.   These  76
latter  groups  apparently  contributed  little  military  help  and  were  incorporated  specifically  to  add  a  
74  O’Loughlin,  John,  and  Gerard  Toal.  “The  Crimea  Conundrum:  Legitimacy  and  Public  Opinion  
after  Annexation.”  Eurasian  Geography  and  Economics  60,  no.  1  (February  2019):  12.  
75  Ibid,  11.  
76  Kofman,  Michael,  Katya  Migacheva,  Brian  Nichiporuk,  Andrew  Radin,  Olesya  Tkacheva,  and  
Jenny  Oberholtzer.  “Lessons  from  Russia's  Operations  in  Ukraine.”  RAND  Corporation,  May  9,  
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Crimean  dimension  to  the  occupying  force.   The  Russian  plan  appears  to  have  revolved  around  77
maintaining  the  narrative  that  the  Crimeans  instigated  the  uprising  and  required  Russian  protection  
to  ensure  their  rights  to  self-determination.  This  suggests  that  the  use  of  covert  troops  to  
accomplish  strategic  goals  while  constructing  a  local  image  and  integrating  local  structures  into  the  
operation  was  an  integral  tool  necessary  for  success.  Russia’s  deployment  of  “little  green  men”  in  
2014  therefore  supports  H3.   
Russian  collaboration  with  separatist  entities  in  the  ensuing  2014  Donbas  conflict  also  
supports  H3.  While  locating  data  on  the  specific  pre-existing  groups  with  which  Russia  collaborated  
proves  exceedingly  difficult  due  to  the  reorganization  of  many  separatists  into  standardized  units,  
Russia  undeniably  relied  upon  local  proxies  to  pursue  its  goals  in  the  Donbas  region.  By  gradually  
creating  a  separatist  army  of  diverse  actors  infused  with  its  own  personnel,  Russia  relied  heavily  on  a  
proxy  force.  Local  leaders  were  co-opted  into  recruiting  local  fighters  as  Russian  volunteers  and  
veterans  traveled  to  the  region  to  support  the  separatist  initiative.  The  vast  majority  of  those  
protesting  the  Ukrainian  parliament’s  move  to  revoke  the  official  status  of  the  Russian  language  were  
local  Ukrainians,  and  pro-Russian  locals  tried  to  occupy  government  buildings  throughout  eastern  
Ukraine.  This  indicated  a  promising  recruitment  pool  and  likely  contributed  to  Russian  decisions  to  
pursue  those  means.   78
Russia  also  took  advantage  of  the  patronage  links  of  local  elites,  including  Yanukovych,  to  
recruit  new  political  leaders  and  fighters.  Additionally,  Ukrainian  miners,  volunteers  and  former  
77  Bukkvoll,  Tor.  “Russian  Special  Operations  Forces  in  Crimea  and  Donbas.”  Parameters  46,  no.  2  
(2016):  16.  
78  Kofman,  et  al.  “Lessons.”  RAND  Corporation,  2017,  p.  33.   
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Ukrainian  riot  policemen  constituted  significant  portions  of  the  separatist  forces.   However,  specific  79
units  appeared  to  be  Russian-handled  professionals  tasked  not  only  with  performing  well  but  also  
with  reining  in  the  diverse  groups  constituting  the  separatist  forces  under  Russian  direction.  Many  of  
these  groups  were  majority  Ukrainian  manpower  with  an  experienced  core  or  leader  with  Russian  
connections.   The  clear  reliance  upon  separatist  proxies  suggests  the  importance  of  such  actors  in  80
the  Russian  decision  to  escalate  its  intervention  to  the  kinetic  realm,  further  supporting  H3.  
The  two  primary  challenges  for  this  case  study’s  support  for  H3  are  accounting  for  the  lack  
of  intense  intervention  in  1993  and  confirming  the  absence  of  true  proxies  around  the  time  of  the  
Orange  Revolution.  In  1993,  the  clear  Russian  willingness  to  stoke  tensions  in  Crimea  resulted  not  in  
military  intervention,  which  H3  claims  is  increasingly  likely,  but  in  political  meddling  and  
encouragement  of  potentially  violent  separatist  groups.  Although  there  was  no  military  action,  
Russia’s  aggressive  political  provocations  seemed  to  result  from  the  availability  of  potential  separatist  
splinter  groups;  the  intervention  just  occurred  at  a  lower  intensity  level  than  predicted.    
While  Russia’s  covert  invasion  of  Crimea  in  2014  carried  with  it  the  implicit  threat  of  further  
and  more  intense  military  action,  the  option  to  deploy  Russian  troops  covertly  and  masquerade  them  
as  local  defense  units  would  have  been  available  in  2004  as  well.  Russia’s  military  was  far  less  
intimidating  at  the  time,  but  it  would  likely  have  proved  threatening  enough  to  accomplish  its  
objective  of  bloodlessly  returning  Crimea  to  the  Russian  fold.  Therefore,  the  opportunity  for  covert  
action  seems  to  have  been  available  —  if  less  viable  —  at  multiple  flashpoints.  A  more  serious  
challenge  stems  from  the  lack  of  information  regarding  the  specific  pre-existing  separatist  groups  
79  Bigg,  Claire.  “Vostok  Battalion,  A  Powerful  New  Player  In  Eastern  Ukraine.”  Radio  Free  
Europe/Radio  Liberty,  May  30,  2014.   
80  Luhn,  Alec.  “Volunteers  or  Paid  Fighters?  The  Vostok  Battalion  Looms  Large  in  War  with  Kiev.”  
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that  were  used  to  form  Russia’s  separatist  army  in  addition  to  the  groups  formed  after  Euromaidan.  
Many  units  of  the  separatist  army  appear  to  have  been  standardized  in  structure  and  name,  making  
identifying  precursor  groups  difficult.  Full  information  about  which  existing  separatist  groups  
contributed  to  the  army  would  allow  further  examination  of  the  state  of  separatist  militant  groups  
during  the  Orange  Revolution.  This  would  in  turn  permit  a  more  decisive  assessment  of  whether  any  
of  the  groups  could  have  served  as  a  viable  proxy  force  for  potential  Russian  intervention  during  the  
Orange  Revolution.  Without  this  background,  H3  lacks  important  information  that  could  facilitate  a  
proper  assessment  of  H3’s  applicability  at  the  Orange  Revolution  flashpoint.  
Ultimately,  the  evidence  supports  H3,  albeit  in  a  limited  manner.  In  its  2014  intervention  in  
Crimea,  Russia  relied  upon  the  existence  of  active  Crimean  separatist  sentiment  to  provide  a  cover  
for  its  covert  units,  which  were  the  central  actors  carrying  out  the  annexation  plan.  It  may  have  been  
possible  to  use  covert  units  at  earlier  points  in  time,  but  the  relatively  weak  nature  of  Russia’s  army,  
coupled  with  the  recent  termination  of  direct  Russian  military  involvement  in  the  Second  Chechen  
War,  greatly  reduced  the  plausibility  of  these  forces’  deployment.  The  subsequent  Donbas  case  
shows  that  Russia  relied  immensely  on  proxy  forces  at  the  onset  of  the  conflict.   
Although  additional  information  regarding  the  specific  separatist  groups  included  in  the  
separatist  army  would  greatly  strengthen  the  body  of  evidence  for  this  incident,  the  fact  that  Russia  
perceived  the  opportunity  to  construct  proxy  forces  from  locals  and  by  capitalizing  upon  local  
power  structures  provides  sufficient  support  for  the  theory.  This  mirrors  the  Russian  behavior  of  the  
early  1990s,  when  governmental  bodies  and  officials  attempted  to  stoke  a  Crimean  separatist  
movement,  although  this  flashpoint  provides  largely  minor  support.  The  evidence  in  both  2014  
         Rabin  47  
scenarios  implies  the  centrality  of  both  covert  and  proxy  forces  to  the  Russians’  plan,  which  
ultimately  suggests  that  Russia  is  more  likely  to  intervene  if  it  identifies  such  forces.  
 
H4:  The  extent  of  Russian  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  near  abroad  states  reflects  the  strength  of  the  Russian  
economic  strategic  position.  
H4  suggests  that  Russia  is  more  inclined  to  intervene  in  near  abroad  states’  affairs  if  Russia  
possesses  a  favorable  economic  position.  Several  economic  metrics  are  examined  at  the  point  of  
Russian  military  intervention  —  2014  —  and  at  both  1993  and  2004,  points  of  Russian  
nonintervention.  Ultimately,  the  Ukraine  case  study  offers  solid  support  for  H4.  
Examination  of  Russian  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  growth  provides  a  useful  indicator  
in  support  of  H4,  while  a  comparison  with  that  of  the  U.S.  adds  an  additional  informative  
dimension.  From  1990  to  1994,  Russian  GDP  decreased  by  a  substantial  average  rate  of  -8.76%,  
while  U.S.  GDP  increased  steadily  and  averaged  a  2.23%  growth  rate  over  the  same  period.   This  81
aligns  well  with  Russian  nonintervention  at  the  1993  flashpoint.  In  the  lead-up  to  the  2004  Orange  
Revolution  flashpoint,  from  2000  to  2004,  Russia  averaged  6.07%  growth.  Yet,  it  should  be  noted  
that  the  Russian  economy  at  this  point  was  still  much  smaller  than  it  had  been  at  the  start  of  the  
1990s,  due  to  that  decade’s  recession.  At  this  time,  the  U.S.  economy  was  continuing  its  long  trend  of  
growth  at  a  steady  2.41%  rate.   While  the  Russian  growth  rate  during  this  time  was  more  drastic  82
than  that  of  the  U.S.,  which  clashes  with  Russian  nonintervention  at  this  flashpoint,  the  Russian  
economy  was  still  markedly  smaller  than  it  had  been  ten  years  before,  while  the  U.S.’  economy  had  
81  “GDP  Growth  (Annual  %)  -  Russian  Federation.”  The  World  Bank.  Accessed  March  15,  2020.  All  
measures  of  Russian  GDP  in  this  section  relate  to  this  citation.  
82  “GDP  Growth  (Annual  %)  -  United  States.”  The  World  Bank.  Accessed  March  15,  2020.  All  
measures  of  U.S.  GDP  in  this  section  relate  to  this  citation.  
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grown  over  a  long  period  of  time  to  a  size  it  had  never  before  achieved.  The  average  relative  growth  
rate  would  suggest  Russian  intervention  at  this  point,  but  broader  consideration  of  long-term  trends  
in  each  economy  and  evaluation  of  each  country’s  capacity  suggests  nonintervention.   
Leading  up  to  the  2014  flashpoint,  Russian  GDP  was  still  rising,  but  its  rate  was  declining  
steadily  into  the  rates  of  3.7  percent  in  2012  and  1.8  percent  in  2013.  2013  marked,  by  far,  the  largest  
size  of  the  Russian  economy  ever.  Over  the  same  period,  the  U.S.  economy  continued  to  experience  
a  painfully  slow  recovery  from  the  2008  financial  crisis  as  U.S.  GDP  growth  declined  from  2.25  to  
1.84.  This  vein  of  examination  supports  H4  because  Russian  intervention  and  nonintervention  
patterns  clearly  follow  a  trend  of  Russian  economic  capacity,  and  this  trend  dovetails  with  the  
evolution  of  comparative  economic  strength  between  the  economies  of  Russia  and  the  U.S.  Russia  
was  unwilling  to  intervene  in  1993  when  its  economy  was  in  freefall  and  in  2004  when  its  recent  
growth  was  just  overcoming  the  damage  caused  by  the  recent  recession.  However,  when  an  
opportunity  to  intervene  in  Ukrainian  affairs  emerged  in  2014,  after  the  economy  had  long  since  
recovered,  intervention  occurred.  This  pattern  clearly  supports  H4.  
An  examination  of  trade  dynamics  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  at  the  three  points  of  interest  
can  provide  further  insight.  At  the  1993  flashpoint,  Russia  and  Ukraine  were  engaged  in  positive  
trade  discussions,  and  they  reached  a  free  trade  agreement  in  June  1993,  suggesting  intentions  to  
strengthen  the  bilateral  economic  relationship.   Although  a  series  of  trade  disputes  emerged  83
between  the  countries  from  2000  to  2002,  bilateral  trade  exchange  grew  substantially  after  this  point.  
Exchange  was  particularly  high  before  the  2004  elections  and  Orange  Revolution.   Poor  trade  84
83  “Free  Trade  Agreement  Between  the  Government  of  Ukraine  and  the  Government  of  the  Russian  
Federation,”  June  24,  1993.   
84  Szeptycki,  Andrzej.  “Trade  Relations  between  the  Russian  Federation  and  Ukraine  .”  The  Polish  
Institute  of  International  Affairs,  January  2008.  p.  30.  
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relations,  however,  directly  caused  the  2014  Euromaidan  protests.  As  Ukraine  pursued  the  signing  of  
an  Associated  Agreement  with  the  European  Union,  Russia  increased  pressure  on  Yanukovych  to  
forsake  this  plan  and  instead  pursue  further  economic  integration  with  Russia.   
In  response,  Putin  applied  punishment  and  then  offered  incentives.  In  August  2013,  Russia  
blocked  all  Ukrainian  imports  from  entering  Russia,  shocking  the  Ukrainian  economy.   As  protests  85
erupted  around  Yanukovych’s  failure  to  pursue  the  Association  Agreement,  Putin  offered  to  slash  
the  price  of  Russian  gas  by  one  third  and  buy  billions  of  Ukrainian  bonds.   Yet,  the  arrangement  86
crumbled  and  Russia  retained  its  superior  trade  position  as  the  Ukrainian  economy  slid  into  
recession.  Russia  began  its  annexation  of  Crimea  mere  months  afterward.  Again,  in  a  manner  similar  
to  the  growth  comparison  between  the  two  countries,  trade  patterns  offer  insights  into  the  timing  of  
Russian  intervention.  Russia  refrained  from  intervention  when  strong  trade  links  existed  between  the  
two  countries.  Yet,  as  the  two  countries  reached  a  critical  point  in  their  relationship  and  Ukraine  
attempted  to  integrate  more  closely  with  the  European  Union,  Russia  behaved  aggressively,  first  
enacting  harsh  punitive  measures  and  then  offering  concessions  before  eventually  invading.  
The  Ukraine  case  study  offers  support  for  H4.  Russia  avoided  intervention  when  its  
economy  fared  poorly,  but  it  intervened  when  its  economy  had  recovered,  even  with  a  slower  growth  
rate.  Sensitivity  to  its  relative  weakness  compared  to  the  U.S.  economy  in  the  1990s  and  2004  is  
apparent,  while  its  intervention  occurred  at  a  point  of  comparative  strength.  The  second  metric  of  
analyzing  trade  relations  at  each  flashpoint  complements  this  conclusion.  When  trade  relations  were  
growing,  Russia  refrained  from  escalating,  but  when  Russia  was  in  a  position  to  exercise  its  
85  “Ukraine’s  Employers  Federation:  Russia’s  Customs  Service  Halts  All  Ukrainian  Imports.”  
Interfax-Ukraine/Kyiv  Post,  August  14,  2013.   
86  “Trading  Insults.”  The  Economist .  August  24,  2013.  
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significant  economic  leverage  over  Ukraine  —  especially  with  a  Ukraine-EU  agreement  at  stake  —  
Russia  intervened  militarily.   
 
Hypothesis  conclusions  
Overall,  the  hypotheses  fared  well,  although  they  did  not  provide  answers  for  all  questions.  
The  case  study  supported  H1  because  it  depicted  Russia’s  willingness  to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of  a  
non-NATO  state.  However,  H1  did  not  conclusively  explain  dependent  variable  variation  within  the  
case.  The  case  study  supported  H2  fairly  well,  although  the  time  gap  between  the  last  major  
pro-NATO  steps  and  Russian  intervention  remains  a  matter  of  note.  However,  consideration  of  
additional  factors  provided  a  more  robust  perspective  that  supported  the  hypothesis.  H3  was  
generally  supported,  but  more  specific  information  regarding  specific  groups  is  required  to  provide  
conclusive  support.  H4  fared  extremely  well  and  provided  valuable  insights.    
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Georgia:  Historical  Overview  
 87
The  Georgia  case  study  provides  further  support  for  the  paper’s  central  argument  in  the  
context  of  Russian  intervention  against  a  non-NATO  NA  state.  Flashpoints  for  potential  Russian  
intervention  occurred  in  the  early  1990s,  2003,  2004  and  2008.  As  in  the  Ukraine  case,  the  Georgia  
case  supports  the  paper’s  central  argument,  indicating  both  Russian  unwillingness  to  intervene  at  
high  intensity  against  a  non-NATO  NA  state  pursuing  membership  during  a  period  of  economic  
weakness  and  willingness  to  do  so  after  economic  stabilization  of  the  Russian  economy.  A  
description  of  relevant  historical  events  throughout  the  relationships  between  Georgia,  the  separatist  
republics  of  South  Ossetia  and  Abkhazia,  the  Russian  Federation  and  NATO  will  more  easily  
facilitate  discussion  of  the  hypotheses.   
Despite  ethnic  distinctions,  the  regions  of  South  Ossetia  and  Abkhazia  have  both  frequently  
been  grouped  together  politically  with  Georgia  throughout  history,  often  resulting  in  conflict.  Both  
87  “Map  of  Georgia,  Abkhazia,  South  Osetia.”  Wikimedia  Commons,  July  5,  2011.   
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regions  belonged  to  Georgia  during  its  brief  post-Russian  Empire  independence  from  1918  to  1922,  
but  South  Ossetia  engaged  in  an  unsuccessful  civil  war  against  Georgia  for  several  years.   During  88
the  USSR’s  administration,  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia  generally  remained  autonomous  republics  
within  the  Georgian  Soviet  Socialist  Republic.  After  Georgia  split  from  the  crumbling  Soviet  Union  
in  1991,  the  two  territories  again  waged  costly  civil  wars  in  attempts  to  win  independence  from  
Georgia.   The  Abhazians,  notably,  received  support  from  some  Russian  military  units.  The  Russian  89
leadership  was  divided  on  the  matter  of  the  war,  creating  subsequent  confusion  about  whether  
Russian  leaders  were  responsible  for  this  limited  military  support.  Russian  President  Boris  Yeltsin  
often  vocalized  his  support  for  Georgian  territorial  integrity.  At  the  same  time,  the  
Communist-dominated  parliament  tried  to  support  the  Abkhaz  forces  as  a  coercive  tool  to  push  
Georgia  into  the  CIS  and  to  retailate  against  support  that  the  Russians  alleged  Georgia  was  giving  to  
Chechnyan  rebels.   90
Yeltsin  claimed  Russian  soldiers’  involvement  was  simply  a  result  of  individual  local  
commanders’  agendas,  but  Georgian  President  Eduard  Shevarnadze  alleged  Russian  central  
leadership  organized  or  blessed  Abkhazian  attacks.   Circumstantial  evidence  indicates  that  Yeltsin  91
would  occasionally  “bend,  if  not  bow”  to  pressure  from  the  Parliament;  yet,  this  effort  did  not  
appear  centrally  coordinated  as  an  official  state  operation.   Abkhazia  essentially  defeated  Georgian  92
troops,  forcing  Georgia  to  enter  Russia’s  CIS  and  subsequently  request  CIS  peacekeepers  to  protect  
88  Markovic,  Nina.  “Behind  the  Scenes  of  the  Russia-Georgia  Conflict.”  Parliament  of  Australia,  
February  18,  2013.   
89  Ibid.  
90  Kozhokin,  Evgeny.  “Chapter  5:  Georgia-Abkhazia.”  In  U.S.  and  Russian  Policymaking  With  Respect  to  
the  Use  of  Force .  RAND  Corporation,  1996.  
91  Ibid.  
92  Ibid.  
         Rabin  53  
the  Abkhazia-Georgia  border.  Although  both  republics  declared  independence  and  are  often  
considered  de  facto  autonomous,  their  claims  remained  unrecognized  internationally  until  Russia  
took  up  their  case  in  2008.  
Georgia  entered  relations  with  NATO  in  the  early  1990s.  The  country  joined  NATO’s  North  
Atlantic  Cooperation  Council/Euro-Atlantic  Partnership  Council  in  1992  and  entered  the  PFP  in  
1994.  Georgian  forces  supported  NATO’s  Kosovo  mission  in  1999,  which  likely  irked  Russia,  an  ally  
of  Serbia  that  protested  against  the  NATO  mission.  Georgia  opened  joint  exercises  with  NATO  in  
2001  and  2002.   The  possible  NATO  accession  of  Georgia,  a  former  member  of  the  USSR,  93
evidently  stirred  Russian  apprehensions  in  the  late  2000s.  
Relations  between  Georgia  and  Russia  remained  volatile  throughout  the  late  1990s  and  early  
2000s,  as  Russia  accused  Georgia  of  aiding  and  training  Chechnyan  rebels.  Georgia  denied  these  
allegations  and  summoned  Organization  for  Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe  (OSCE)  monitors  
for  verification.  Yet,  in  mid-2000,  Russian  planes  struck  Georgian  guard  posts  and  towns  three  times,  
claiming  that  one  of  the  incidents  was  accidental.   At  this  point,  acknowledging  and  addressing  the  94
issue  of  a  potential  Chechen  rebel  presence  in  Georgia  allowed  both  states  to  strengthen  their  
positions  in  the  region.  Russia  could  claim  justification  for  limited  strikes  against  its  neighbor,  
Georgia  could  request  international  funding,  and  the  United  States  could  expand  on  its  regional  
footprint  by  providing  personnel  to  aid  Georgia.   95
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Yet,  the  events  of  the  2003  Rose  Revolution  would  prove  to  have  a  far  greater  impact  upon  
the  relationship  between  Georgia,  Russia  and  NATO.  After  Putin  became  Russian  president  in  2000,  
he  maintained  an  amicable  tone  toward  NATO  for  several  years.  The  Rose  Revolution  occurred  
during  this  stage  of  that  relationship.   After  Georgia’s  population  began  to  suspect  electoral  fraud  in  96
the  2003  presidential  election,  nearly  100,000  peaceful  protesters  blocked  the  streets  of  Tbilisi,  the  
Georgian  capital,  and  demanded  the  resignation  of  Shevardnadze,  who  had  been  in  power  since  a  
coup  early  in  the  days  of  Georgian  independence.  When  the  president  sent  several  hundred  armed  
soldiers  to  restore  order  in  the  streets,  the  protesters  handed  roses  to  the  soldiers  and  proceeded  to  
storm  the  parliament  building.  Mikhail  Saakashvili  personally  requested  Shevardnadze’s  resignation  
in  the  chamber  and  won  the  presidential  election  several  months  later.   97
Russo-Georgian  relations  soured  directly  after  the  revolution,  as  Russia  considered  the  
events  a  coup,  and  Saakashvili’s  preference  to  create  a  stronger  relationship  with  the  West  put  him  at  
odds  with  the  Kremlin.   Although  the  U.S.  had  supported  Shevardnadze,  Saakashvili’s  term  marked  98
a  distinct  turn  toward  NATO  and  the  West,  and  achieving  NATO  membership  dominated  his  
foreign  policy  after  he  entered  office.   He  openly  expressed  aspirations  for  Georgian  NATO  99
membership,  but  he  also  attempted  to  implement  serious  policy  reforms  to  expedite  the  process.  100
Georgian  soldiers  contributed  to  efforts  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  throughout  the  mid-2000s,  and  
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between  2004  and  2007,  Saakashvili  increased  Georgia’s  military  expenditure  from  1.37  percent  of  
GDP  to  9.1  percent.   These  efforts  to  strengthen  ties  with  NATO,  however,  would  prove  101
ineffective  when  battle-tested.  
The  2004  Adjara  crisis  represents  an  intriguing  and  anomalous  point  of  Russian  aid  —  rather  
than  intervention  —  in  Georgia’s  attempts  to  pacify  its  separatist  republics.  Adjara,  another  
autonomous  region  of  Georgia  controlled  by  a  Russia-friendly  ex-Soviet  leader,  Aslan  Abashidze,  
presented  a  crisis  immediately  after  Saakashvili’s  rise  to  power.  Adjara  was  an  independent  republic  
in  the  USSR  but  emerged  as  technically  part  of  the  Georgian  state.  Saakashvili’s  overt  determination  
to  bring  Adjara  fully  under  Georgian  control  fed  tensions  before  a  parliamentary  election,  as  
pro-Saakashvili  political  campaigns  spouted  anti-Abashidze  rhetoric.   
The  uneasy  situation  devolved  into  violence  in  February  2004  as  supporters  of  both  sides  
clashed  and  individuals  linked  to  Adjara’s  security  ministry  beat  a  prominent  Georgian  journalist.  102
Abashidze  protested  that  the  Georgian  government  was  attempting  to  foment  a  Rose  Revolution  in  
Adjara.  In  March,  he  traveled  to  Moscow  in  an  attempt  to  secure  Russian  backing,  as  a  remaining  
Russian  military  base  in  Adjara  ensured  Russia’s  deep  interest  in  the  region’s  security.  Tensions  
increased  when  Georgian  forces  were  put  on  high  alert  as  approximately  1,000  Adjarian  paramilitary  
and  special  forces  personnel  coalesced  near  the  territory’s  border.   The  crisis  reached  its  apex  after  103
separatists  destroyed  major  bridges  linking  the  region  to  Georgia  and  thousands  of  protesters  
marched  against  Abashidze  in  a  manner  reminiscent  of  the  Rose  Revolution.  Georgian  officials’  
remarks  at  this  time  alluded  ominously  to  the  violent  death  of  former  Romanian  dictator  Nicolae  
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Ceaușescu.  Eventually,  a  Russian  envoy  convinced  Abashidze  to  abdicate  his  position  and  flee  to  
Russia,  with  safe  passage  guaranteed  by  Georgia.  The  Russian  decision  to  use  the  country’s  influence  
to  facilitate  a  peaceful  resolution  of  the  crisis,  rather  than  to  support  the  Russia-friendly  leader  who  
supported  the  Adjara  Russian  military  base,  led  to  hopes  for  a  more  productive  Georgia-Russia  
relationship  and  future  collaboration  in  the  peaceful  resolution  of  Georgia’s  separatist  crises.   104
This  initial  thawing  of  their  bilateral  relationship  quickly  devolved  as  conflict  arose  in  South  
Ossetia  in  May  2004.  Directly  after  the  successful  diffusion  of  the  Adjara  crisis,  Saakashvili  ordered  
the  destruction  of  a  lucrative  smuggling  enterprise  lining  the  pockets  of  South  Ossetian  President  
Eduard  Kokoity.  Georgian  forces  closed  a  major  smuggling  market  by  force  and  bombed  roads.   In  105
July,  Georgian  peacekeepers  discovered  and  detained  a  Russian  peacekeeper  convoy  apparently  
bringing  arms  to  South  Ossetia,  driving  up  tensions  between  Georgia  and  Russia.   In  early  August,  106
the  Russian  Duma  labeled  Georgian  warnings  to  South  Ossetians  as  violations  of  Russian  
sovereignty,  warned  of  an  impending  large-scale  conflict  involving  Russia  and  asked  Putin  to  take  
action  for  the  sake  of  stability.   Clashes  between  Georgian  and  South  Ossetian  forces  soon  erupted,  107
but  a  ceasefire  was  established  in  August.   Yet,  a  Georgian  Defense  and  Security  committee  108
parliamentarian  alleged  that  video  evidence  proved  Russian  troops  were  preparing  to  attack  
Georgian  targets  until  Saakashvili  opted  to  recall  Georgian  units  from  South  Ossetia.  109
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Despite  Saakashvili’s  subsequent  offers  of  autonomy  for  South  Ossetia,  relations  worsened  
and  further  incidents  continued  to  sour  relations  between  Georgia,  South  Ossetia  and  Russia.  A  
2005  Georgian  proposal  to  grant  South  Ossetia  additional  autonomy  as  a  constituent  of  Georgia  
failed  to  attract  Ossetian  backing,  despite  cautious  Russian  approval.  Although  this  plan  entailed  a  
Georgian  compromise  by  offering  further  autonomy,  it  also  required  a  compromise  from  the  
Ossetians  —  recognition  of  direct  Georgian  control.  Instead,  Ossetians  later  voted  for  complete  
independence  in  an  unrecognized  referendum.   Trilateral  tensions  flared  in  2006  after  Georgia  110
arrested  several  Russian  military  officers  it  claimed  were  spies  who  planned  a  deadly  car  bombing  
and  Russia  restricted  its  levels  of  Georgian  exports.   In  2007,  a  Georgian  parliamentary  move  to  111
establish  a  temporary  Georgian  administration  in  South  Ossetia  again  inflamed  relations  with  Russia. 
  That  August,  a  missile  fired  from  a  Sukhoi  jet  landed  without  detonating  near  a  Georgian  village.  112
Georgia,  citing  radar  records,  alleged  that  the  jet  was  Russian,  while  the  Russians  denied  the  claim  
and  accused  Georgia  of  planting  the  missile.   A  month  later,  Georgia  claimed  it  shot  down  a  plane  113
that  had  repeatedly  entered  its  airspace  from  Russia,  while  Russia  and  Abkhazia  claimed  the  plane  
was  a  Georgian  plane  that  crashed  independently.  114
In  2008,  NATO  activity  pushed  Russian-Georgian  tensions  to  the  breaking  point.  At  the  
April  2008  NATO  summit  in  Bucharest,  American  advocacy  for  the  creation  of  Georgian  and  
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Ukrainian  MAP  plans  was  overruled  by  European  concerns  over  Russian  reactions.  The  decision  to  
grant  a  MAP  was  based  on  whether  NATO  members  considered  that  country’s  progress  within  the  
1994  PFP  program  adequate.   Despite  the  decision  to  refrain  from  granting  MAPs,  NATO  115
committed  to  granting  both  countries  membership  in  the  future  and  guaranteed  consideration  of  the  
matter  at  the  December  2008  summit.   Russia  reacted  harshly.  The  Russian  chief  of  staff  vowed  116
that  Russia  would  take  military  and  non-military  measures  to  protect  its  regional  interests,  and  the  
Russian  foreign  minister  declared  that  Russia  would  undertake  any  necessary  steps  for  preventing  
Georgian  and  Ukraininan  membership.   117
The  next  events  led  to  conflict  between  Georgia  and  Russia.  In  mid-April,  Putin  ordered  the  
official  recognition  of  businesses  in  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia,  created  formal  diplomatic  
connections  and  transferred  additional  military  forces  and  equipment  to  Abkhazia.   Russia  and  118
Abkhazia  then  accused  Georgia  of  massing  troops  near  the  Abkhaz  border,  although  United  
Nations  observers  stated  that  they  did  not  possess  evidence  of  this. Afterward,  a  plane  later  119
confirmed  by  UN  observers  to  be  Russian  shot  down  a  Georgian  unmanned  aerial  vehicle  (UAV)  
over  Abkhazia.  After  buses  transporting  Georgian  voters  during  a  parliamentary  election  were  blown  
up  —  a  move  that  UN  observers  suggested  may  have  been  staged  by  Georgia  —  Russia  deployed  
troops  to  rebuild  a  railway  connecting  Abkhazia  and  Russia  and  began  a  large-scale  military  exercise  
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near  its  border.   Two  days  after  the  railway  was  mended,  a  Georgian  police  vehicle  was  attacked  120
with  improvised  explosive  devices  that  the  US  ambassador  to  Georgia  privately  attributed  to  Russia,  
and  shooting  and  shelling  broke  out  between  Georgian  and  South  Ossetian  forces.   Although  121
attribution  remains  murky,  an  independent  EU  observer  alleges  Georgian  instigation  of  the  
firefights.   122
Within  the  week,  a  convoy  of  100  Russian  vehicles  entered  the  tunnel  linking  Russian  
territory  with  South  Ossetia.  Georgian  troops  then  shelled  the  South  Ossetian  capital  Tskhinvali  and  
occupied  the  city,  but  Russian  troops  launched  a  successful  counterattack.   At  this  time,  Russia  also  123
launched  crippling  cyberattacks  against  Georgian  websites.  Russian  planes  bombed  strategic  targets  
inside  Georgian  borders,  including  factories  in  the  Georgian  capital  Tbilisi  and  civilian  residences  in  
Gori,  while  Russian  troops  pushed  into  South  Ossetia  and  opened  a  new  front  in  Abkhazia.   The  124
Russians  pushed  far  into  Georgian  territory  before  a  ceasefire  agreement  was  reached  with  
international  moderation.  Russia  then  officially  recognized  the  two  separatist  republics  as  
independent  states,  despite  Western  criticism.  Russian  soldiers  remained  stationed  in  the  separatist  
enclaves.  125
Despite  periods  of  improved  diplomatic  relations  since  the  war,  tensions  remain.  The  war  
took  its  toll  on  Saakashvili’s  popularity,  and  after  his  2012  electoral  loss,  Georgia’s  government  
managed  to  gradually  improve  relations  with  Russia.  Tourist  visa  permissions  for  Russians  opened  in  
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2012,  providing  prospects  of  economic  growth  in  the  crucial  tourism  sector.   Late  that  year,  126
bilateral  diplomatic  discussions  reopened  for  the  first  time  since  the  war,  and  in  2013,  Russia  eased  
its  restrictions  on  Georgian  goods.  Yet,  despite  this  progress,  the  separatist  republics  have  remained  
sticking  points.  In  2017,  Russia  moved  to  incorporate  South  Ossetian  military  structures  into  its  
own,  formalizing  Russian  command  and  control.   Tensions  flared  again  in  2019  when  Georgian  127
crowds  protested  violently  after  a  Russian  politician  gave  a  speech  from  the  speaker’s  chair  of  the  
Georgian  parliament.  Although  Putin  rejected  the  Duma’s  motion  to  enact  retaliatory  sanctions,  the  
Kremlin  criticized  Georgia’s  inability  to  “pacify  anti-Russian  forces.”  128
Throughout  this  period,  multiple  opportunities  existed  for  Russia  to  intervene  militarily  in  
Georgian  affairs.  The  2008  Russo-Georgian  War  and,  to  a  limited  degree,  the  small-scale  Russian  
backing  of  separatists  in  the  early  1990s,  are  instances  in  which  Russia  opted  to  intervene,  while  the  
2003  Rose  Revolution  and  2004  Ajara  crisis  represent  notable  points  at  which  this  did  not  occur.  
This  thesis  questions  why  the  Russian  propensity  for  intervention  varied  across  the  different  
flashpoints  in  this  case.  
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Georgia:  Hypothesis  Analysis  
H1:  Near  abroad  states  with  NATO  membership  are  more  likely  to  successfully  achieve  general  deterrence  toward  
Russia.  
H1  posits  that  NA  states  that  have  attained  NATO  membership  are  more  likely  to  deter  
Russia  from  initiating  and  escalating  interventions.  In  the  case  of  Georgia,  the  independent  variable  
—  Georgia’s  status  as  a  NATO  member  or  non-member  —  has  remained  static.  Despite  Georgia’s  
efforts  in  the  mid-2000s,  it  has  not  yet  received  NATO  membership.  Georgia’s  case  therefore  adds  
to  the  body  of  evidence  for  Russia’s  willingness  to  intervene  against  non-NATO  member  NA  states.  
Russia  acted  militarily  against  Georgia  when  it  launched  overt  attacks  against  Georgia  in  the  2008  
Russo-Georgian  War.  Furthermore,  some  Russian  units  supported  separatists  against  Georgia  during  
the  conflicts  of  the  early  1990s;  this  involvement  does  not  appear  to  have  been  centrally  organized,  
but  the  leadership  may  have  turned  a  blind  eye  to  this  minor  military  support.  This  pattern  of  
interference  against  a  non-NATO  state  supports  H1.  However,  at  first  glance,  the  lack  of  Russian  
escalation  in  response  to  the  2003  Rose  Revolution  and  the  decision  to  aid  Georgia  during  the  2004  
Adjara  crisis,  rather  than  undermine  it  by  supporting  the  rebellious  territory,  warrant  explanation  in  
the  context  of  the  hypothesis.   
Russia’s  decisions  to  intervene  in  both  low-level  and  overt  military  manners  in  Georgian  
affairs  at  several  key  junctures  demonstrate  its  leaders’  comfort  with  applying  Russian  military  power  
against  non-NATO  former  USSR  members.  This  can  be  seen  in  Russia’s  willingness  to  both  support  
separatist  entities  within  Georgia  and  unilaterally  attack  targets  in  undisputed  Georgian  territory.  As  
Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia  waged  separatist  wars  against  Georgia  in  the  1990s,  Russian  planes  and  
ground  units  assisted  the  rebels.  Yeltsin  often  claimed  that  these  strikes  were  results  of  wayward  
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commanders,  but  such  repeated  instances  likely  indicated  that  Yeltsin  may  have  turned  a  blind  eye  to  
the  military’s  actions.  Russia’s  subsequent  decisions  to  launch  strikes  against  Georgian  forces  in  the  
separatist  territories  during  the  2008  crisis  and  to  escalate  the  conflict  by  attacking  targets  within  
undisputed  zones  in  Georgia  —  including  strategic  targets  like  warplane  factories  near  Tbilisi  —  
reveal  its  comfort  with  escalating  conflicts  against  weaker  non-NATO  member  NA  states.  
Given  this  demonstrated  Russian  risk-acceptance  vis-a-vis  Georgia,  the  Rose  Revolution  and  
Adjara  crisis  at  face  value  appear  to  be  slightly  surprising  points  of  non-intervention  at  a  basic  level;  
however,  closer  examination  of  each  situation  highlights  factors  that  could  have  reasonably  reduced  
the  probability  of  Russian  intervention.  The  Rose  Revolution  represented  the  popular  overthrow  of  
a  sitting  president  and  former  Soviet  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  by  a  staunchly  pro-Western  leader.  
Russia  has  historically  criticized  this  kind  of  political  revolution  in  its  region  and  has  often  accused  
the  West  of  supporting  such  revolutionary  factions.   
Yet,  Shevarnadze  was  also  viewed  as  an  ally  of  the  West  and  a  thorn  in  Russia’s  side.  His  
former  tenure  as  the  Soviet  foreign  minister  also  earned  him  little  love  among  Russians,  as  he  was  
perceived  to  have  played  a  role  in  the  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union.   Russia  aided  in  negotiations  129
between  Shevarnadze  and  the  opposition,  likely  because  it  saw  an  opportunity  to  nurture  closer  
relations  with  Georgia  at  the  onset  of  the  new  Georgian  president’s  term.  Russia  mostly  hardened  its  
rhetoric  regarding  the  revolution  and  blamed  the  West  after  opposition  parties  in  Moldova,  
encouraged  by  the  Rose  Revolution,  staged  protests  that  forced  the  Moldovan  president  to  back  out  
of  a  diplomatic  deal  with  Russia.   130
129  “A  Moment  of  Truth.”  The  Economist .  November  27,  2003.  
130  Ibid.  
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This  behavior  implies  that  Russia  was  initially  inclined  to  view  the  change  of  leadership  
optimistically,  especially  given  its  difficult  history  with  Shevarnadze.  Russia  seemed  to  bristle  
primarily  after  the  revolution  and  subsequent  presidential  turnover  directly  impacted  its  diplomatic  
initiatives  in  its  near  abroad.  This  observation  pairs  well  with  Russia’s  response  after  the  Euromaidan  
protests  in  Ukraine  removed  a  leader  who  had  yielded  to  Russian  pressure  and  dropped  a  deal  with  
the  EU  in  favor  of  closer  economic  ties  with  Russia.   
The  lack  of  Russian  intervention  in  the  2004  Adjara  crisis  was  also  likely  a  product  of  this  
early  period  of  cooperation  between  Putin  and  Saakashvili,  as  well  as  a  consequence  of  other  factors.  
Putin’s  willingness  to  actually  ameliorate  the  crisis  and  broker  a  peaceful  resolution  indicates  the  
optimistic  attitude  Putin  took  toward  this  aspect  of  Russia-Georgia  relations  at  the  time.  It  is  also  
noteworthy  that  anti-Russian  protests  occurred  in  Adjara  throughout  the  crisis  and  the  vast  majority  
of  the  Adjarian  population  is  ethnically  Georgian,  meaning  Russia’s  long-term  interest  in  helping  
Adjara  to  achieve  independence  is  limited.   Adjara,  unlike  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia,  does  not  131
border  Russia.  Even  if  Russia  could  weaken  Georgia  by  forcing  Adjara’s  secession,  Adjara  presents  a  
much  less  likely  candidate  for  possible  incorporation  into  the  Russian  Federation  than  the  other  two  
separatist  republics,  reducing  the  value  of  supporting  chaos  in  Adjara.  
Overall,  Russia’s  willingness  to  intervene  with  its  conventional  military  at  multiple  points  
throughout  its  relationship  with  Georgia  indicates  a  significant  lack  of  Georgian  deterrent  capability  
as  a  non-NATO  member  NA  state.   
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H1A:  The  United  States’  credibility  positively  affects  near  abroad  states’  abilities  to  deter  Russia.  
H1A  contends  that  the  U.S.’s  credibility  as  a  capable  actor  willing  to  intervene  militarily  
abroad  factors  into  Russian  calculations  for  intervention  in  NA  states.  The  Georgia  case  study  
provides  solid  support  for  this  hypothesis.   
U.S.  capability  and  credibility  in  the  early  1990s  was  at  an  exceptionally  high  point.  The  U.S.  
had  emerged  victorious  from  the  Cold  War  as  the  leading  power  in  a  unipolar  world,  at  the  price  of  
the  Soviet  Union’s  fall  from  bipolar  heavyweight  to  a  significantly  weaker  state  in  the  Russian  
Federation.  The  U.S.  also  proved  its  conventional  superiority  during  the  1990  Desert  Shield  and  1991  
Desert  Storm  operations.  Russia  did  support  separatist  forces  in  their  conflicts  against  Georgia,  but  
this  support  remained  limited,  and  the  degree  of  consensus  between  the  Russian  parliament  and  
Yeltsin  in  authorizing  this  support  is  unclear.  Therefore,  while  low-level  Russian  intervention  during  
this  period  did  occur,  its  highly  limited  nature  is  significant  to  the  hypothesis.  Leading  up  to  the  2003  
and  2004  flashpoints,  at  which  Russian  intervention  did  not  occur,  U.S.  credibility  again  was  solid.  
The  U.S.  invasions  of  Afghanistan  in  2001  and  Iraq  in  2003  underscored  both  the  U.S.  willingness  to  
intervene  across  the  world  and  the  capability  of  doing  so.  This  corresponds  with  Russian  
nonintervention  at  this  point.   
Yet,  by  2008,  U.S.  credibility  had  decreased  due  to  poor  progress  in  these  wars.  The  mere  fact  
of  the  U.S.’s  continued  deep  engagement  in  these  conflicts  inherently  reduced  the  chances  of  the  U.S.  
opening  a  new  major  conflict  by  responding  militarily  to  Russian  actions  in  Georgia.  The  U.S.  had  
just  committed  more  resources  and  personnel  to  the  fight  in  Iraq  in  2007,  a  move  that  not  only  
increased  U.S.  involvement  but  resulted  in  the  most  annual  casualties  among  U.S.  soldiers  during  the  
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conflict  until  that  point.   By  2008,  U.S.  public  opinion  had  shifted  drastically  against  the  War  in  132
Iraq,  with  54%  disapproval  and  38%  approval  as  opposed  to  22%  disapproval  and  72%  approval  in  
2003.   It  should  be  noted  that  Russia’s  2008  intervention  occurred  before  the  onset  of  the  global  133
financial  crisis  of  2008,  so  this  economic  distress  was  not  a  salient  factor  in  the  Russian  intervention  
calculus.  These  circumstances  align  well  with  the  Russian  decision  to  act  militarily  against  Georgia  in  
2008.   
Overall,  trends  of  U.S.  credibility  correspond  well  with  patterns  of  Russian  intervention  and  
nonintervention  in  Georgian  affairs.  The  Russian  active  support  of  the  separatists  in  the  early  1990s  
does  pose  an  issue  for  the  hypothesis,  but  it  is  important  to  note  both  the  questionable  centrality  of  
this  decision  and  the  limited  nature  of  the  intervention.  Russian  nonintervention  in  2003  and  2004  
matches  the  high  degree  of  U.S.  credibility  at  this  time,  while  intervention  in  2008  as  the  U.S.  
remained  entrenched  in  costly  and  increasingly  unpopular  conflicts  also  supports  the  hypothesis.   
 
H2:  Overt  NATO  deliberations  surrounding  an  NA  state’s  possible  entry  without  officially  giving  membership  
decrease  that  state’s  ability  to  deter  Russia.  
H2  argues  that  an  NA  state  engaging  in  overt  constructive  dialogue  with  NATO  regarding  
membership  or  openly  making  progress  in  NATO  programs  intended  to  groom  for  membership  has  
a  lesser  likelihood  of  deterring  Russian  intervention.  The  Georgian  case  study  provides  solid  support  
for  H2,  although,  as  in  the  discussion  of  H1,  non-intervention  in  the  cases  of  the  Rose  Revolution  
and  the  Adjara  crisis  must  be  examined.   
132  “A  Timeline  of  the  U.S.  War  in  Afghanistan.”  Council  on  Foreign  Relations.  Accessed  March  18,  
2020.  
133  Rosentiel,  Tom.  “Public  Attitudes  Toward  the  War  in  Iraq:  2003-2008.”  Pew  Research  Center,  
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The  major  flashpoint  at  which  Russian  behavior  supports  H2  is  Russian  intervention  in  
2008.  The  uncanny  timing  of  Russia’s  decision  to  intervene  actively  in  Georgian  relations  with  the  
separatists  suggests  a  strong  connection  between  NATO  activity  and  Russian  military  actions.  
Although  NATO  did  not  offer  Georgia  a  MAP  plan  at  its  2008  Bucharest  summit  —  a  decision  
NATO  members  guided  by  prescient  concerns  that  Russia  would  respond  in  a  violent  or  
destabilizing  manner  —  it  suggested  to  Georgia  that  it  would  eventually  receive  membership  and  
committed  to  taking  up  the  matter  as  soon  as  that  December.  Russia’s  civil  and  military  leaders  
responded  openly  to  these  NATO  promises  by  threatening  military  and  non-military  actions  to  
protect  Russian  national  interests.   
Within  weeks,  Russia  escalated  tensions  by  opting  out  of  the  CIS  economic  sanctions  on  
Abkhazian  and  Ossetian  businesses,  shooting  a  Georgian  drone  and  potentially  blowing  up  a  
Georgian  police  vehicle,  although  the  Russians  argued  the  Georgians  blew  up  the  vehicle  to  blame  
the  attack  on  the  Ossetians  and  trigger  a  conflict.  It  also  mobilized  its  military  and  prepared  for  a  
military  incursion  into  the  separatist  territories  before  the  outbreak  of  conflict.  When  Georgian  
troops  entered  South  Ossetia,  Russia’s  military  response  was  massive  and  swift.  Russia’s  deliberate  
opening  of  a  second  front  in  Abkhazia  and  subsequent  invasion  of  Georgia  indicate  a  political  
objective  revolving  around  Georgia,  rather  than  the  simple  intention  to  defend  Ossetians  and  
stabilize  the  region.  It  is  evident  that  within  weeks  of  NATO’s  promises,  Russia  intentionally  
escalated  tensions  between  Georgia  and  the  separatists  and  capitalized  upon  the  opportunity  to  
invade  Georgia.  These  actions  fall  in  line  with  the  Kremlin  and  Russian  military’s  blunt  promises  to  
assert  Russian  interests  through  military  and  non-military  means.  
         Rabin  67  
Some  might  argue  that  NATO’s  MAP  promises  might  not  have  been  the  immediate  trigger  
for  Russian  intervention  but  rather  were  preemptive  deterrent  responses  to  a  perceived  immediate  
threat  of  Russian  intervention  against  Georgia.  According  to  this  logic,  if  the  MAP  was  discussed  for  
the  sole  purpose  of  preventing  an  imminent  Russian  intervention,  the  Russian  intervention  could  
not  technically  be  considered  a  response  to  the  stimulus  of  the  MAP  comments.  Yet,  this  
assumption  is  flawed.  NATO  grants  its  MAP  programs  to  countries  with  which  it  has  developed  
long-standing  and  productive  relationships.  Its  members  assess  whether  the  aspirant  country  has  
progressed  far  enough  in  military  and  political  reforms  previously  established  as  necessary  for  
NATO  accession.  Saakashvili  consistently  supported  Georgian  military  reforms  for  years  before  
tensions  with  Russia  reemerged,  and  these  efforts  resulted  in  a  steadily  increased  percentage  of  
Georgian  GDP  dedicated  to  military  reformation  after  2004.  NATO’s  consideration  of  Georgian  
MAP  requests  in  2008  occurred  at  a  reasonable  period  of  time  given  Georgian  efforts.  Such  
concerns  of  reversed  causality  between  Russian  intervention  and  NATO’s  guarantees  are  therefore  
unfounded.    
The  flashpoint  of  Russian  intervention  in  the  early  1990s,  although  it  might  constitute  
Russian  military  intervention  against  Georgia  on  behalf  of  separatist  territories,  is  not  necessarily  
relevant  to  H2.  Georgian  relations  with  NATO  at  that  point  in  time  were  largely  undeveloped,  and  
the  minimal  Russian  military  support  for  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia  appears  more  closely  linked  to  
disputes  with  Shevarnadze,  allegations  of  Georgian  support  for  Chechnyan  separatists  and  direct  
concerns  over  the  orientation  of  the  separatist  territories  than  with  NATO  and  Georgia.  While  
forcing  Georgia  into  a  position  in  which  it  would  feel  forced  to  join  the  CIS  certainly  played  a  large  
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role  in  this  decision,  there  is  little  evidence  that  this  was  directed  in  response  to  specific  
developments  in  NATO-Georgia  relations.  In  this  conflict,  NATO  did  not  play  a  central  role.  
In  a  vein  similar  to  the  discussion  of  H1,  the  Rose  Revolution  presented  a  complicated  
situation  for  Russia  that  did  not  initially  represent  an  obvious  Georgian  step  closer  to  NATO.  
Although  Saakashvili  was  considered  pro-Western  and  many  of  the  NGOs  involved  in  Shevarnadze’s  
removal  were  backed  with  Western  money,  this  change  did  not  inherently  imply  a  shift  toward  
NATO.  Shevarnadze  was  friendly  toward  NATO  and  only  the  previous  year  had  allowed  American  
advisors  into  Georgian  territory  for  counterterrorism  training.   Saakashvili’s  rise,  although  134
problematic  for  Russia,  initially  may  have  also  presented  an  opportunity  to  develop  closer  relations  
with  a  new  leader.  Russia’s  position  toward  Saakashvili  had  not  yet  soured  to  a  point  of  concern.  
Russian  non-intervention  in  the  Adjara  crisis  follows  this  logic.  Georgia  had  not  yet  pivoted  
toward  NATO  to  a  degree  that  would  stoke  Russian  aggression.  Relations  with  Saakashvili  and  
Georgia  were  still  trending  up  as  Saakashvili  and  Putin  worked  constructively  during  this  period.  In  
the  context  of  this  cooperative  period,  Russia  aided  Georgia  in  diffusing  the  Adjara  crisis,  rather  than  
standing  by  or  aiding  it.  Furthermore,  as  noted  in  the  discussion  of  H1,  demographic  and  
geographic  factors  make  Adjara  an  unlikely  candidate  for  incorporation  into  Russia,  lessening  the  
appeal  of  assisting  its  separatism.  Non-intervention  in  this  case  follows  logically.  
Overall,  this  case  supports  H2  when  considering  formal  steps  in  the  process  leading  to  
Georgian  NATO  accession.  Russia’s  rhetoric  and  reaction  to  NATO’s  strong  suggestions  of  a  
Georgian  MAP  reflect  this  causality.  Georgia’s  relationship  with  NATO  had  not  yet  progressed  to  a  
point  Russia  considered  threatening,  so  the  Rose  Revolution  did  not  trigger  intervention.  
134  “US  Army  Trainers  Land  in  Georgia.”  BBC  News.  BBC,  May  19,  2002.  
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H3:  Near  abroad  states  are  less  likely  to  successfully  deter  Russia  if  Russia  is  able  to  use  a  covert  method  of  attack.  
H3  identifies  the  ability  to  use  a  covert  method  of  attack  or  the  availability  of  plausible  proxy  
forces  as  causal  factors  in  Russian  intervention.  The  Georgian  case  study  provides  a  sizable  body  of  
evidence  to  support  H3.  In  this  case,  the  availability  of  willing  proxy  forces  seems  to  be  a  greater  
factor,  as  proxies  were  closely  linked  to  Russia’s  immediate  strategic  goals.  However,  Russia  did  
evidently  take  opportunities  for  covert  action  in  conjunction  with  its  support  of  proxy  armies.  As  in  
the  discussions  of  H1  and  H2,  non-intervention  during  the  2004  Adjara  crisis  warrants  examination.   
Both  instances  of  Russian  intervention  support  H3.  As  Georgia  struggled  to  fight  against  
separatists  in  South  Ossetia  and  Abkhazia  in  the  early  1990s,  Russia  backed  the  separatists  militarily  
both  through  arms  aid  and  actual  deployment  of  Russian  units.  Yet,  it  seems  that  Russia  effectively  
secured  a  degree  of  plausible  deniability  through  the  presence  of  its  proxies,  as  the  separatists  could  
act  with  low-visibility  Russian  backing  and  Yeltsin  could  claim  at  various  points  that  Russian  
commanders  were  acting  independently,  separating  the  central  Russian  government  from  Russian  
military  actions.  Russia  was  therefore  able  to  pursue  its  strategic,  operational  and  tactical  goals  with  
both  proxies  and  conventional  forces  for  which  it  could  deny  responsibility.  Russian  interest  in  using  
proxies  and  pursuing  covert  action  is  also  visible  in  its  behavior  during  the  tense  buildup  to  the  2008  
crisis.  The  confirmed  Russian  jet  strike  against  a  Georgian  drone  and  alleged  Russian  role  in  the  
police  car  bombing  suggest  a  Russian  interest  in  engaging  in  covert  brinkmanship  at  this  point.  
Clearly,  the  existence  of  strong  and  feasible  proxies  in  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia  encouraged  overt  
Russian  intervention  in  2008.  In  this  case,  the  Russian-backed  separatist  troops  seemed  to  almost  
play  the  role  of  trigger  forces,  as  Russia  launched  a  well-prepared  and  large-scale  military  response  
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immediately  after  the  separatists  engaged  in  combat.  This  willingness  to  launch  an  attack  due  to  the  
availability  of  proxies  is  precisely  the  behavior  predicted  by  H3.  
It  is  true  that  these  proxies  have  been  constantly  available  to  Russia;  therefore,  one  might  
argue  that  since  the  independent  variable  remains  the  same  throughout  the  case  study,  Russian  
intervention  in  this  case  cannot  be  attributed  to  the  availability  of  proxies.  Yet,  it  is  not  variation  of  
proxies’  availability  in  this  case  that  supports  H3.  Rather,  it  is  notable  that  Russia  exhibited  comfort  
intervening  with  its  proxies  at  numerous  points  in  response  to  other  stimuli  besides  an  increasing  
availability  of  proxies.  Their  availability  has  allowed  Russia  to  intervene  easily  and  constantly  when  it  
desires  to  do  so.  Essentially,  the  relatively  high  level  and  frequency  of  intervention  in  this  case  
reflects  the  steady  availability  of  proxy  actors.  
The  Adjara  crisis  may  at  first  seem  an  appropriate  opportunity  for  intervention  given  the  
availability  of  local  proxies,  but  additional  factors  render  these  less  viable  options  than  the  separatists  
in  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia.  Unlike  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia,  Adjara  is  completely  separated  
from  the  Russian  border  by  Georgian  territory.  This  creates  additional  barriers  to  supplying  arms  
and  maintaining  a  consistent  flow  of  materials.  In  addition  to  Adjara’s  geographic  position,  the  
territory’s  majority  ethnic  Georgian  population  may  also  make  the  Adjarians  less  desirable  proxy  
partners  for  Russia  due  to  the  impossibility  of  eventually  incorporating  the  territory  into  Russia.   
Yet,  one  of  the  most  salient  reasons  Russia  chose  to  aid  Georgia  in  this  case  is  that  the  crisis  
occurred  in  the  broader  political  context  of  a  positive  bilateral  relationship.  H3  does  not  suppose  
blindly  that  Russia  will  intervene  in  every  scenario  in  which  a  separatist  group  presents  a  potential  
proxy  force;  it  only  assumes  that  Russia  will  have  a  lower  threshold  for  intervening  in  such  
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environments  when  intervention  is  in  Russian  political  interests.  This  crisis  did  not  occur  at  such  a  
point.  
The  Georgian  case  study  broadly  supports  H3,  as  the  availability  of  South  Ossetian  and  
Abkhazian  separatist  forces  —  and  the  long-term  political  relationships  Russia  formed  with  these  
entities  —  enabled  Russian  intervention  at  numerous  points.  
 
H4:  The  extent  of  Russian  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  near  abroad  states  reflects  the  strength  of  the  Russian  
economic  strategic  position.  
H4  argues  that  if  Russia  is  performing  well  economically,  holds  a  stronger  economic  position  
relative  to  the  West  or  holds  strategic  economic  leverage  over  the  NA  state  in  question,  it  is  more  
likely  to  intervene.  
Russia’s  economy  performed  poorly  in  comparison  to  that  of  the  U.S.  in  the  early  1990s.  As  
the  U.S.’s  GDP  continued  a  trend  of  steady  expansion  and  averaged  2.23%  growth  from  1990  to  
1994,  the  Russian  economy  shrank.   Russian  GDP  averaged  a  loss  of  -8.76%  over  that  same  135
period.   Notably,  this  is  a  time  when  Russia  was  apparently  providing  light  military  support  to  the  136
separatists  fighting  Georgia.  At  this  point,  this  contrast  in  economic  performance  would  have  
predicted  non-intervention.   
At  the  2003  and  2004  flashpoints,  the  Russian  economy  was  performing  extremely  well  and  
recovering  from  the  late  1990s’  crash.  Russian  GDP  averaged  growth  of  6.07%  from  2000  to  2004,  
although  the  economy  was  still  small  compared  to  its  size  a  decade  beforehand.   During  this  same  137
135  “GDP  Growth  -  United  States.”  The  World  Bank.   
136  “GDP  Growth  -  Russian  Federation.”  The  World  Bank.   
137  Ibid.   
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period,  the  U.S.  was  continuing  a  longstanding  trend  of  slow  and  steady  growth,  averaging  2.41%  
growth  from  2000  to  2004.   While  a  comparison  of  short-term  economic  performance  favors  138
Russian  growth  rates  over  those  of  the  U.S.,  it  is  important  to  note  that  Russian  non-intervention  in  
2003  and  assistance  in  2004  occurred  at  a  time  when  Russia’s  economy  was  just  approaching  its  
previous  size,  and  the  U.S.  economy  had  never  been  larger.  The  relative  rates  do  not  support  H4  
regarding  the  2003  and  2004  flashpoints,  but  the  overall  balance  of  capability  does.  
By  the  2008  flashpoint,  Russia’s  economy  was  still  growing  rapidly  while  the  U.S.’s  growth  
was  slowing  and  approaching  stagnation.  Russia’s  economy  averaged  7.05%  growth  from  2005  to  
2008  and  far  surpassed  the  Russian  economy’s  highest  point  before  the  late  1990s’  default.   Over  139
the  same  period,  the  U.S.  economy  averaged  2.02%  growth,  but  its  growth  rate  was  decreasing  
before  the  economic  crisis.   This  comparison  of  economic  performance  does  not  immediately  140
suggest  intervention,  although  the  basic  balance  of  growth  rates  indeed  favors  Russia  here.  The  
success  in  absolute  terms  of  Russia’s  economy  relative  to  its  previous  state  is  particularly  notable.  
Georgia’s  geographic  position  leaves  it  particularly  vulnerable  to  Russian  economic  pressure.  
Russia  has  historically  been  Georgia’s  main  gas  provider,  and  it  exploited  this  to  increase  prices  
steeply  for  Georgia  after  the  Rose  Revolution.   Although  Georgia  began  to  purchase  gas  from  141
Azerbaijan  in  2008,  Russia  was  still  able  to  exploit  its  power  grid  links  in  Georgia  through  utilizing  
pre-existing  connections  and  buying  Georgian  companies.   These  factors  give  Russia  a  heightened  142
ability  to  apply  significant  economic  pressure  to  Georgia,  and  it  has  often  pursued  this  strategy  at  
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various  flashpoints  instead  of  military  intervention.  This,  therefore,  does  not  indicate  causality  
between  direct  economic  leverage  over  Georgia  and  escalation.  
Ultimately,  the  Georgian  case  study  does  not  support  H4  when  examining  the  relative  rate  of  
economic  growth  and  when  considering  changes  in  Russia’s  ability  to  exert  economic  pressure.  Yet,  
examination  of  this  issue  suggests  that,  rather  than  reacting  to  how  its  economy  is  faring  when  
compared  to  that  of  the  U.S.,   Russia  is  responsive  to  expansion  of  its  absolute  economic  capabilities.   
 
Hypothesis  conclusions  
The  Georgia  case  study  supports  H1  because  of  Russia’s  evident  willingness  to  intervene  
militarily  in  the  affairs  of  a  non-NATO  member  NA  state.  The  pattern  of  Russian  intervention  also  
reflects  a  sensitivity  to  U.S.  credibility,  supporting  H1A.  This  case  also  provides  strong  support  for  
H2,  as  Russia  evidently  intervened  militarily  in  response  to  Georgia’s  possible  imminent  acquisition  
of  a  MAP.  The  case  is  favorable  to  H3  in  a  general  sense,  as  while  the  IV  did  not  vary  across  the  
timeline,  Russian  intervention  always  involved  proxy  separatist  forces.  H4  was  partially  supported,  as  
comparison  of  the  growth  rates  of  Russia  and  the  U.S.  did  not  yield  correlations,  but  Russia  did  
clearly  act  more  aggressively  when  its  economy  had  rebounded  in  absolute  terms.  
 
Estonia:  Historical  Overview  
As  the  case  examining  the  only  NATO  member  from  the  subset  in  question,  the  Estonian  
case  study  provides  important  support  for  this  paper’s  argument.  Flashpoints  for  potential  Russian  
intervention  against  Estonia  occurred  in  1993,  2004  and  2007.  In  a  manner  consistent  with  Russian  
behavior  toward  the  non-NATO  NA  states,  Russia  refrained  from  intervention  when  its  economy  
         Rabin  74  
was  faring  poorly.  Yet,  by  the  late  2000s,  when  its  economy  had  recovered,  Russia  intervened  at  a  
significant  level  of  intensity.  However,  while  its  interventions  against  Ukraine  and  Georgia  reached  
the  intensity  of  overt  military  conflict,  Russian  intervention  against  Estonia  remained  capped  at  the  
level  of  large-scale  cyberattacks,  which  indicates  an  unwillingness  to  directly  attack  a  NATO  
member.  A  description  of  relevant  historical  events  throughout  the  relationships  between  Estonia,  
the  Russian  Federation  and  NATO  will  more  easily  facilitate  discussion  of  the  hypotheses.   
Although  the  Estonian  Republic  gained  independence  during  the  interwar  period  of  the  early  
twentieth  century,  it  was  forcibly  occupied  during  World  War  II  first  by  the  Germans  and  
subsequently  by  the  Soviet  Union,  in  which  it  remained  until  the  superpower’s  final  days.   Estonia’s  143
bid  for  independence  from  the  USSR,  a  concerted  nonviolent  nationwide  effort,  resulted  in  
Moscow’s  unsuccessful  mobilization  of  military  force  to  halt  the  revolutionary  proceedings.  
Encouraged  by  new  Soviet  leader  Mikhail  Gorbachev’s  introspective  approach  to  reforming  the  
USSR’s  political  and  cultural  structure  in  the  mid-1980s,  an  Estonian  cultural  revival  promoting  
traditional  nationalistic  songs  emerged.   This  Estonian  nationalist  movement  involved  events  like  a  144
1988  Tallinn  musical  festival  that  attracted  almost  25%  of  Estonia’s  population  and  featured  
members  of  the  political  leadership  who  advocated  for  Estonian  independence.   Supporters  of  145
further  Estonian  autonomy  included  leadership  of  the  governing  Communist  Party,  which  passed  a  
parliamentary  declaration  of  Estonian  sovereignty  that,  in  addition  to  provisions  like  declarations  of  
ownership  over  Estonian  natural  resources,  asserted  the  primacy  of  Estonian  laws  over  Soviet  laws. 
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  Over  the  next  three  years,  these  movements  and  mass  events  increased  in  power  and  frequency,  146
leading  to  the  development  of  local  government  institutions  in  competition  with  the  existing  Soviet  
structures.   In  1991,  during  a  Moscow  Soviet  nationalist  coup,  Soviet  tanks  and  soldiers  were  147
deployed  into  Estonia  to  prevent  further  defection,  but  nonviolent  crowds  of  Estonians  physically  
blocked  access  to  vital  infrastructure  until  the  coup’s  failure  the  next  day.  This  victory  contributed  to  
the  collapse  of  the  USSR.  Weeks  later,  the  leadership  of  the  new  Russian  state  acknowledged  the  
formal  independence  of  Estonia  and  the  two  other  Baltic  states.  148
In  the  beginning  and  middle  of  the  1990s,  Estonia’s  tough  stance  on  Russian  troop  
withdrawal  and  citizenship  created  a  potential  flashpoint  with  Russia.  Estonia  approached  its  
independence  with  the  perspective  of  continuing  the  tenure  of  the  Estonian  Republic,  which  it  
deemed  illegally  annexed  by  the  USSR,  as  opposed  to  the  formation  of  a  new  country.  Estonian  
readoption  of  its  1938  Law  on  Citizenship  in  1992  therefore  essentially  prevented  dozens  of  
thousands  of  ethnic  Russians  living  in  Estonia  from  automatically  receiving  Estonian  citizenship.  149
At  this  time,  only  slightly  over  60%  of  the  1.6  million-person  population  in  Estonia  was  ethnically  
Estonian.   Several  months  later,  Estonia,  in  conjunction  with  the  other  Baltic  states,  demanded  full  150
Russian  removal  of  Soviet  forces.  Yet,  after  an  Estonian  presidential  election  in  which  over  40%  of  
the  population  was  unable  to  vote  as  a  result  of  the  strict  citizenship  laws,  Russian  President  Boris  
Yeltsin  stopped  the  removal  of  soldiers  from  the  Baltic  states  and  demanded  more  rights  for  the  
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Russian  populations  in  those  states,  appealing  to  the  UN.  In  the  eastern  Estonian  city  of  Narva,  
known  for  its  sizable  Russian  population,  protests  erupted  against  these  Estonian  government  
policies.    In  the  summer  of  1993,  after  the  Estonian  Alien  Registration  Law  demanded  that  people  151
who  immigrated  into  Estonia  during  the  Soviet  period  register  with  the  government  and  denied  
Estonian  residence  to  retired  Soviet  military  officers  born  after  1930,  Russia  severed  its  natural  gas  
flow  to  Estonia  in  protest.   
Estonian  President  Lennart  Meri  then  responded  to  Russian  pressure  by  suspending  the  
Alien  Registration  law,  but  the  city  council  of  Narva,  which  not  only  held  a  large  Russian  population  
but  also  faced  rapid  post-Soviet  deindustrialization,  declared  a  referendum  on  autonomy  the  day  
after  the  law’s  suspension.  Although  the  vast  majority  of  voters  opted  for  autonomy,  Narva’s  leaders  
conceded  defeat  after  the  Estonian  Supreme  Court  declared  the  referendum  illegitimate.   Yet,  152
among  other  hardline  Russian  organizations  in  Estonia,  a  group  of  Russian  veterans  alleged  human  
rights  violations  to  the  UN.  A  Liberal  Democratic  Party  politician  called  for  retired  Russian  veterans  
in  Estonia  to  organize  and  enact  armed  resistance,  but  most  Russian  groups  disavowed  the  calls  to  
arms.   153
As  debates  over  Russian  minorities  and  troop  withdrawal  continued  into  1994,  Russian  
statements  against  Estonian  treatment  of  its  Russian  minorities  slowed  the  troop  withdrawal  process.  
After  Estonia  then  claimed  pre-1940  borders,  which  claimed  territory  then  under  Russian  control,  
Yeltsin  fully  halted  troop  withdrawal  and  sent  the  transitioning  forces  back  to  their  Estonian  bases.  A  
bilateral  agreement  facilitating  troop  withdrawal  in  exchange  for  the  citizenship  of  10,000  retired  
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Soviet  officers  and  families  resolved  that  tension.   While  debates  around  these  issues  continued  for  154
the  rest  of  the  decade,  this  period  represented  the  highest  degree  of  tension  over  these  issues.  
During  this  same  period,  Estonia  had  pushed  for  revision  of  borders.  After  1994,  Estonia  
announced  a  more  positive  approach  toward  diplomacy  with  Russia  and  dropped  the  issue,  although  
this  may  have  related  both  to  an  utter  lack  of  support  from  the  West  on  the  issue  at  a  time  when  
Estonia  sought  membership  in  the  EU.  155
Throughout  this  period,  Estonia  began  to  strengthen  its  relations  with  NATO,  which  
reached  a  more  productive  stage  after  the  deescalation  of  Estonia’s  immediate  crises  with  Russia.  
Estonia  largely  pursued  this  cooperation  in  conjunction  with  the  other  Baltic  states.  Estonia  helped  
to  found  the  North  Atlantic  Cooperation  Council  (NACC)  in  1991,  but  the  development  of  this  
partnership  largely  began  after  1993.   Estonia  joined  the  PFP  in  early  1994,  and  after  the  Russian  156
parliamentary  elections  in  1993  led  to  increasingly  assertive  Russian  rhetoric,  many  Estonian  leaders  
suggested  a  turn  toward  the  West  out  of  concern  for  Russian  intentions  in  the  region.   Estonia  157
opened  an  official  dialogue  with  NATO  about  membership  in  1996  and  received  a  MAP  in  1999  
after  NATO  designated  it  a  “probable  applicant  country.”   Among  other  developments,  Estonia  158
and  the  other  Baltic  states  increased  their  defense  spending  to  meet  the  NATO  2%  GDP  target  at  
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the  turn  of  the  century.   Estonia  and  NATO  held  accession  talks  in  2002  and  2003,  and  NATO  159
eventually  granted  Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania  membership  in  2004.   160
Russia  frequently  responded  to  these  signs  of  progress  in  closeness  between  Estonia  and  
NATO  with  economic  punishments,  like  its  1994  denial  of  Most  Favored  Nation  status  to  Estonia  
and  bans  on  select  Estonian  imports.  Yet,  Estonia’s  2004  NATO  accession  happened  to  coincide  
with  its  2004  EU  accession,  preventing  subsequent  arbitrary  economic  measures  as  a  result  of  the  
common  market.   At  this  point,  the  Russian  response  toward  this  NATO  expansion  remained  161
mixed.  Putin  grudgingly  labeled  the  prospect  of  Estonian  NATO  accession  a  non-threat  in  2002. 162
Yet,  Russia  anticipated  Estonia’s  NATO  accession  with  hints  of  red  line  statements,  a  general  
parliamentary  declaration  against  further  NATO  expansion  and  an  alleged  incursion  into  Estonian  
airspace  the  month  before  accession.  
  Despite  this  clear  animosity,  however,  Russia’s  response  remained  largely  rhetorical.  163
Russia’s  aggressive  tone  simmered  soon  after  the  official  accession.  Putin  noted  later  in  2004  that  
every  country  has  the  right  to  choose  its  preferred  form  of  security  and  that,  despite  his  objections,  
he  hoped  NATO’s  expansion  would  increase  international  trust.   In  2005,  however,  Russia  cut  off  164
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talks  with  Estonia  about  its  border,  citing  negative  Estonian  comments  about  the  country’s  history  
under  the  USSR.  165
In  2007,  Estonia-Russian  relations  reached  their  most  drastic  flashpoint,  including  
cyberattacks  widely  interpreted  as  authorized  by  the  Russian  government,  when  the  Estonian  
government  removed  a  statue  honoring  Soviet  soldiers  who  fought  in  World  War  II  from  its  
prominent  place  of  display.  The  Estonian  government  claims  it  moved  the  statue  from  the  public  
square  and  to  rebury  the  remains  of  Soviet  soldiers  in  a  military  cemetery  because,  beginning  in  
2005,  radical  Soviet  revisionist  groups  had  started  to  convene  at  the  statue.   Despite  the  approval  166
of  several  prominent  Russian  politicians  and  alleged  Estonian  efforts  to  include  Russia  in  the  
relocation  process,  Moscow  accused  the  Estonian  government  of  anti-Russian  sentiment.   The  day  167
that  Estonia  began  the  statue’s  relocation  process,  April  26,  2007,  the  country  was  hit  with  
cyberattacks  that  lasted  for  weeks.  The  first  wave  of  attacks  appeared  uncoordinated,  poorly  funded  
and  facilitated  through  hacking  forums.  The  day  these  attacks  began,  Russia  suddenly  dismantled  
strategically  significant  railroads  for  alleged  maintenance  work.  Analysis  of  these  first  attacks  
indicates  they  were  likely  not  orchestrated  directly  by  the  Kremlin.   168
Large  riots  in  Estonia  accompanied  the  first  wave  of  cyberattacks.  Riots  in  the  center  of  the  
Estonian  capital  Tallinn,  in  which  mostly  ethnic  Russian  protesters  chanted  “Russia”  and  brandished  
Russian  flags,  resulted  in  nearly  100  documented  instances  of  vandalism  and  looting.  Rioting,  
involving  the  burning  of  the  statue  of  an  Estonian  military  leader  who  opposed  Russia  in  Estonia’s  
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1918  independence  war,  also  broke  out  in  Johvi  and  Kohtla-Jarve,  far  northeastern  Estonian  towns  
with  majority  ethnic  Russian  populations.   Estonian  leaders  accused  Russia  of  funding  and  169
deploying  many  of  the  rioters.   In  Moscow,  the  pro-Putin  Russian  nationalist  youth  group  Nashi  170
organized  large  protests  blockading  the  Estonian  embassy  for  over  a  week  and  physically  disrupted  a  
press  conference  with  the  Estonian  ambassador.   171
When  the  protests  in  Estonia  quieted  one  week  later,  a  second  wave  of  cyberattacks  —  more  
closely  coordinated  and  more  advanced  in  capability  than  the  first  —  began.  This  wave  has  been  
more  closely  linked  to  the  Russian  government.  This  sophisticated  wave  targeted  Estonian  banks  —  
a  shrewd  choice,  given  the  Estonian  population’s  incredibly  high  reliance  upon  online  banking  at  the  
time.  The  attacks  peaked  on  a  prominent  Russian  national  holiday  and  dissipated  after  several  weeks. 
  172
Many  IP  addresses  of  those  responsible  for  the  Distributed  Denial  of  Service  (DDoS)  attack  
pointed  to  Russian  nationals,  including  former  employees  of  political  parties.  Additionally,  the  
structure  of  the  attacks,  including  the  start  at  midnight  Moscow  time,  the  apparently  coordinated  
end  of  the  attacks  and  the  attacks’  advanced  flexibility  to  adapt  to  countermeasures,  indicated  central  
control  and  collection  of  intelligence  throughout  the  attacks.   These  aspects,  in  conjunction  with  173
the  non-cyber  Russian  measures  and  Russian  refusal  to  assist  in  combating  the  attacks,  led  Estonian  
politicians  to  accuse  Russia  of  interfering  in  Estonian  internal  affairs.   Russia  denied  playing  any  174
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role  and  claimed  that  independent  “patriotic”  groups  and  hackers  were  responsible.  Estonia  
subsequently  tightened  its  relations  with  NATO,  as  well  as  its  cyber  infrastructure  capability,  in  the  
years  following  these  attacks.  In  2008,  Estonia  and  NATO  established  the  NATO  Co-operation  
Cyber  Defence  Center  of  Excellence  in  Estonia.   175
Minor  disputes  and  arguments  emerged  between  the  two  countries  in  the  following  years,  
but  their  relations  generally  improved  from  their  2007  low  point  in  the  following  years,  although  
several  Russian  agents  were  discovered  in  Estonian  government  positions  in  the  early  2010s.  Talks  
about  the  border  resumed  in  2012.  Yet,  they  soured  again  in  late  2014  when  Russia  apparently  
abducted  Estonian  intelligence  official  Eston  Kohver  on  the  Estonian  side  of  a  border  crossing.  
Kohver  had  anticipated  meeting  Russian  smuggling  informants,  but  smoke  and  stun  grenades  
launched  from  the  Russian  area  of  the  border  obscured  his  backup  team’s  view  while  he  was  
removed  from  the  meeting  point.  A  joint  Estonia-Russia  border  guard  report  initially  confirmed  that  
the  border  security  had  been  violated  from  the  Russian  side,  but  Russian  officials  later  refused  to  
confirm  this  statement.  Throughout  his  career,  Kohver  disrupted  smuggling  operations  potentially  
linked  to  the  Russian  FSB’s  criminal  networks.   However,  it  is  also  notable  that  his  abduction  176
occurred  merely  two  days  after  U.S.  President  Barack  Obama  visited  Tallinn  to  reaffirm  NATO’s  
commitment  to  defending  Estonia.   After  Russia  sentenced  Kohver  to  15  years  in  prison  in  2015,  177
Estonia  secured  his  freedom  for  the  exchange  of  a  Russian  mole  arrested  in  Estonia  in  2012.   178
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Relations  have  since  remained  somewhat  icy.  NATO  launched  large-scale  drills  in  the  Baltic  
region  in  2015  and  announced  plans  to  expand  its  conventional  arsenal  in  the  Baltic,  while  in  turn  
Russia  expanded  its  nuclear  arsenal.   As  of  2018,  Russia  had  not  ratified  a  border  treaty  signed  with  179
Estonia  in  2015,  preventing  the  solidification  of  a  formal  border  accord.   Low-level  tension  has  180
persisted,  as  Russia  has  taken  actions  like  airspace  violations  in  the  Baltic  states  and  established  a  
helicopter  based  on  a  small  island  between  Estonia  and  Finland.  181
Throughout  Estonia’s  relationship  with  Russia,  several  potential  opportunities  for  Russian  
escalation  of  intensity  levels  have  occurred.  Serious  intervention  has  occurred  only  at  the  point  of  
the  2007  cyberattacks,  and  no  escalation  to  the  point  of  military  action  has  occurred.  The  point  at  
which  Russia  responded  to  its  1993  disagreements  with  Estonia  by  freezing  natural  gas  pipelines  
represented  a  potential  opportunity  for  higher  level  intervention,  as  Russia  was  moving  large  
numbers  of  troops  throughout  Estonia  and  considered  its  large  minority  population  in  Estonia  to  be  
threatened.  The  second  potential  flashpoint  at  which  potential  Russian  intervention  seems  plausible  
is  Estonia’s  2004  NATO  accession.  The  third  major  flashpoint,  at  which  the  most  intense  Russian  
intervention  in  Estonian  affairs  since  Estonian  independence  occurred,  was  the  2007  crisis.  Yet,  it  is  
notable  that  this  intervention  did  not  reach  the  intensity  level  of  military  action.  Although  Russia  
seemingly  opted  for  large-scale  cyberattacks  in  conjunction  with  physical  pressure  on  the  Estonian  
embassy,  an  armed  action  against  the  embassy  or  incursion  into  a  heavily  Russian  area  like  Narva  
could  have  occurred.  Yet,  it  did  not.   
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Estonia:  Hypothesis  Analysis  
H1:  Near  abroad  states  with  NATO  membership  are  more  likely  to  successfully  achieve  general  deterrence  toward  
Russia.  
H1  implies  that  Russia  is  less  likely  to  instigate  an  armed  conflict  against  an  NA  state  with  
NATO  membership.  The  Estonian  case  study,  judged  from  Estonia’s  2004  accession  and  onward,  
ultimately  supports  this  hypothesis.  Yet,  H1  alone  cannot  explain  the  lack  of  Russian  intervention  
escalation  at  the  1993  flashpoint.   
Since  Estonia  joined  NATO  in  2004,  Russia  has  not  intervened  militarily  in  Estonian  affairs,  
despite  its  occasionally  threatening  rhetoric  and  ominous  troop  movements.  Instead,  in  the  2007  
bilateral  diplomatic  crisis  involving  the  highest  level  of  Russian  intervention,  Russia  opted  for  
cyberattacks.  This  move  indicates  some  degree  of  restraint  on  the  part  of  the  Russians,  given  the  
seemingly  provocative  nature  of  the  Estonian  government’s  decision  to  relocate  the  statue  and  
graves.  Russia  did  not  choose  to  restrain  from  intervening  in  this  instance.  Its  leaders  indeed  
considered  the  stimulus  worthy  of  a  large-scale  response  against  the  Estonian  government  and  
populace.  Yet,  it  confined  this  response  to  the  cyber  domain  and,  if  indeed  linked  to  the  
government,  to  support  of  protests  in  Estonia  and  intimidation  of  the  Estonian  ambassador  in  
Moscow.   These  measures  were  the  extent  of  the  immediate  Russian  response,  but  conditions  182
during  some  of  these  flashpoints  could  have  presented  potential  incentives  for  Russian  military  
action.  The  pro-Russian  violence  in  Tallinn  certainly  would  have  provided  encouragement,  but  
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perhaps  more  significant  are  the  protests  that  occurred  in  northeastern  Estonia.  These  protests  
emerged  in  majority-Russian  towns  mere  miles  from  the  Russian  border.   
These  factors  presented  possible  conditions  for  a  Russian  military  incursion,  and  these  
conditions  are  indeed  discernible  in  instances  of  Russian  military  action  like  the  annexation  of  
Crimea.  Yet,  Russia  refrained  from  any  military  intervention  against  Estonia.  Furthermore,  even  the  
Russian  cyberattacks  remained  within  domains  likely  considered  to  be  at  a  safe  distance  from  sectors  
of  cyberspace  that  could  trigger  enactment  of  the  NATO  Article  V  collective  defense  mechanism.  
Considered  together,  these  factors  indicate  a  deliberate  Russian  ambition  to  intervene  but  also  a  
distinct  restraint  from  intervention  that  could  provoke  NATO.   
It  should  be  noted  that  although  the  Estonian  case  study  indicates  Russian  sensitivity  to  
NATO  during  the  2007  crisis,  there  is  no  point  before  Estonia’s  NATO  accession  at  which  Russia  
displayed  a  willingness  to  intervene  at  a  higher  level  during  a  comparable  crisis.  There  is  therefore  no  
pre-accession  case  of  military  intervention  to  compare  to  the  post-accession  case  of  substantial  
non-military  intervention.  During  the  period  of  tense  Estonian-Russian  relations  in  the  early  1990s,  
Russia  took  steps  to  indicate  its  disapproval  of  Estonian  diplomacy.  At  the  point  at  which  Russia  
halted  its  Estonian  gas  flows  in  1993,  Russia  had  troops  stationed  within  Estonia  and  remained  
extremely  vocal  in  its  concerns  about  the  Estonian  government’s  perceived  marginalization  of  ethnic  
Russians.  Russia  halted  the  withdrawal  of  its  troops  and  returned  them  to  their  former  posts  during  a  
particularly  contentious  diplomatic  exchange,  but  no  military  intervention  actually  occurred.   
Overall,  The  case  supports  H1.  Although  an  intervention  in  the  1990s  would  have  helped  to  
link  Estonia  and  H1,  H1  simply  predicts  that  Russia  will  not  act  militarily  after  NATO  accession,  not  
that  Russia  will  always  be  intervening  if  a  state  is  not  in  NATO.  The  factors  present  during  the  2007  
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flashpoint  indicate  a  Russian  sensitivity  to  a  potential  NATO  response,  even  if  this  cannot  be  fully  
confirmed  without  an  example  of  high-level  intervention  before  accession  for  comparison.   
 
H1A:  The  United  States’  credibility  positively  affects  near  abroad  states’  abilities  to  deter  Russia.  
H1A  argues  that  the  United  States’  credibility  as  a  powerful  actor  with  the  willingness  and  
capability  to  respond  militarily  to  Russian  aggression  impacts  Russia’s  willingness  to  intervene  in  the  
affairs  of  the  country  in  question.  The  intensity  levels  of  Russian  intervention  in  Estonian  affairs  
over  time  support  this  hypothesis,  although  the  capping  of  Russian  escalation  levels  to  cyberattacks  
and  diplomatic  intimidation  during  the  2007  crisis  likely  results  from  the  predictions  of  H1  as  well  as  
those  of  H1A.  
The  early  1990s  and  early  2000s  marked  a  strong  point  for  the  U.S.’s  military  credibility.  Its  
performance  in  the  1990  Operation  Desert  Shield  and  1991  Operation  Desert  Storm  operations  
showcased  the  elite  capabilities  of  American  conventional  forces.  These  events  not  only  announced  
the  U.S.’s  willingness  to  intervene  in  foreign  affairs  with  its  conventional  might  but  also  signaled  the  
implications  of  the  onset  of  a  unipolar  world  helmed  by  a  hegemonic  U.S.  Russia,  the  legal  successor  
to  the  USSR,  was  unlikely  to  test  the  U.S.’s  patience  at  this  point.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  U.S.  had  
not  communicated  a  distinct  interest  in  incorporating  the  Baltic  states  into  NATO  at  the  time,  but  in  
this  context  it  is  unlikely  that  Russia  would  have  sought  to  antagonize  the  situation  in  that  region  
through  military  intervention.  Similarly,  the  U.S.  enjoyed  a  credible  reputation  for  effective  
conventional  intervention  during  Estonia’s  2002  and  2003  NATO  accession  talks.  The  U.S.’s  2001  
invasion  of  Afghanistan  and  2003  invasion  of  Iraq  again  highlighted  its  conventional  power  and  
willingness  to  intervene  militarily  abroad.   
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By  2007,  the  year  during  which  Russia  chose  to  respond  to  Estonian  internal  affairs  with  
massive  cyberattacks,  U.S.  credibility  as  an  effective  and  willing  military  power  had  waned.  The  U.S.  
invasions  in  the  Middle  East  had  created  widespread  insurgencies,  and  the  counterinsurgency  
operations  required  colossal  American  investments  in  finances  and  manpower.  The  wars  became  
deeply  unpopular  domestically,  and  the  prospect  of  additional  U.S.  military  deployment  to  another  
area  of  the  world  with  a  delicate  political  balance  —  especially  against  a  resurgent  European  power  
—  was  unlikely  to  appeal  to  voters  and  policymakers.  A  U.S.  military  response  was  even  more  
unlikely  in  the  event  of  cyberattacks  limited  to  non-kinetic  domains.  Enough  U.S.  credibility  likely  
remained  to  disincentivize  a  Russian  military  action  in  this  case  —  a  reality  that  supports  H1  due  to  
the  U.S.’s  position  as  a  major  driver  of  NATO’s  military  muscle.  Yet,  the  Russian  leadership  still  felt  
comfortable  pursuing  massive  cyberattacks  in  this  case.  
Ultimately,  the  Russian  pattern  of  nonintervention  at  the  first  two  flashpoints  and  low-level  
intervention  at  the  third  flashpoint  corresponds  well  to  the  trajectory  of  American  conventional  
might  and  willpower.  
 
H2:  Overt  NATO  deliberations  surrounding  an  NA  state’s  possible  entry  without  officially  giving  membership  
decrease  that  state’s  ability  to  deter  Russia.  
H2  posits  that  as  a  state  overtly  progresses  toward  NATO  membership,  Russia  is  more  likely  
to  intervene  in  that  country’s  affairs.  While  the  Estonian  case  study  does  not  seem  to  provide  
supportive  evidence  for  this  hypothesis,  this  absence  of  assertive  behavior  in  anticipation  of  
potential  Estonian  NATO  membership  may  result  from  external  factors.   
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In  the  leadup  to  Estonia’s  NATO  accession,  between  the  1999  MAP  provision  and  2002,  
Russia  did  not  instigate  military  action  or  even  low-intensity  isolated  military  actions  in  response  
against  Estonia.  Considering  the  core  assumption  guiding  this  hypothesis  that  for  Russia,  and  
especially  for  Putin,  NA  state  NATO  accession  inherently  creates  an  undesirable  zero-sum  loss,  this  
lack  of  aggressive  responses  to  Estonia’s  pursuit  of  NATO  membership  seems  aberrational.  In  the  
context  of  Russia’s  critical  rhetoric  regarding  the  Estonian  government’s  disparagement  of  the  Soviet  
1940  takeover  —  an  issue  important  not  only  for  Russian  national  pride  but  also  for  potential  
Russian  reparations  responsibilities  —  this  seems  even  more  surprising.   183
Yet,  despite  the  likelihood  that  even  at  that  time  Russian  leaders  viewed  Estonian  NATO  
accession  unfavorably,  Russia  opted  for  non-intervention  likely  because  of  external  factors  like  its  
own  aspirations  for  its  relationship  with  NATO,  its  potential  acknowledgement  of  the  Baltic  
countries’  eventual  acceptance  into  NATO  and  the  aforementioned  increase  in  U.S.  credibility  as  
Estonia’s  accession  became  increasingly  likely.  In  the  late  1990s  and  early  2000s,  Russian  leaders  were  
actively  seeking  to  develop  a  positive  Russia-NATO  relationship,  even  if  largely  to  enhance  Russia’s  
influence  upon  the  alliance’s  decision-making  processes.   Prior  to  1997,  Russian  leaders  were  likely  184
not  overly  concerned  with  a  potentially  imminent  accession  for  Estonia,  as  the  U.S.  had  taken  a  
careful  approach  epitomized  by  Secretary  of  Defense  William  Perry’s  statement  that  Estonia  was  not  
prepared  to  enter  the  alliance.  When  Madeleine  Albright  became  U.S.  Secretary  of  State  in  1997,  the  
U.S.  began  to  openly  consider  Estonian  accession  more  seriously.   Pressuring  Estonia,  now  a  likely  185
candidate  for  eventual  NATO  accession,  would  likely  have  inserted  a  roadblock  into  these  relations.   
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Putin’s  statements  and  actions  at  the  onset  of  his  presidency  also  indicate  that  Estonia’s  
imminent  accession  may  have  become  an  unavoidable  reality  to  Russia  by  that  time.  In  early  2001,  
Putin  signed  a  declaration  with  the  president  of  Lithuania  —  a  fellow  Baltic  country  to  which  
Estonia  remained  closely  linked  in  its  pursuit  of  NATO  membership  —  recognizing  each  country’s  
right  to  pursue  its  own  security  in  any  manner  not  jeopardizing  the  security  of  other  countries.  186
While  Putin’s  subsequent  statements  in  June  2002  showed  that  he  did  not  favor  the  Baltics’  
accessions,  this  joint  declaration  indicates  he  did  not  consider  challenging  the  Baltics’  accessions  
worth  the  price  of  provoking  the  U.S.  and  NATO.   Relating  to  H1A,  these  remarks  and  the  most  187
intense  steps  of  Estonia’s  path  to  NATO  occurred  soon  after  the  U.S.  launched  Operation  Enduring  
Freedom  and  invaded  Afghanistan  in  October  2001,  certainly  a  serious  sign  of  its  credibility  at  the  
time  as  a  capable  and  willing  military  power.  The  ensuing  American  invasion  of  Iraq  in  2003  
emphasized  this  point.  At  the  time,  the  calculus  for  Russia  reflected  nonintervention  as  the  most  
reasonable  option,  regardless  of  Russian  preferences.  
 
H3:  Near  abroad  states  are  less  likely  to  successfully  deter  Russia  if  Russia  is  able  to  use  a  covert  method  of  attack.  
H3  argues  Russia  is  more  likely  to  intervene  if  it  is  able  to  employ  methods  of  attack  that  
provide  it  with  plausible  deniability.  This  capability  for  Russia  revolves  around  its  ability  to  rely  on  
capable  proxy  forces.  The  degree  to  which  these  forces  are  actually  available  in  Estonia  is  highly  
debatable;  much  scholarly  discourse  focuses  on  majority-ethnic  Russian  town  Narva  and  similar  
areas  as  pockets  of  potential  latent  separatism  that  Russia  could  exploit.  Yet,  this  population  does  
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not  actually  appear  to  harbor  capable  and  strong-willed  separatist  militia  groups  available  for  Russian  
exploitation.  Furthermore,  since  its  independence,  Estonia  has  fostered  local  defense  groups  that  
likely  present  a  further  obstacle  for  foreign  mobilization  of  proxies  within  the  population.  The  
Estonian  case  study  thus  provides  some  support  for  H3,  since  a  lack  of  viable  proxy  groups  has  thus  
far  corresponded  with  a  lack  of  military  intervention.  
At  first  glance,  conditions  in  areas  like  Narva  seem  parallel  to  those  in  Crimea  and  the  
Georgian  separatist  republics.  The  population  largely  consists  of  Russophone  ethnic  Russians  whose  
families  immigrated  to  the  area  under  Soviet  administration.  Narva’s  leadership  also  organized  a  
referendum  for  autonomy  after  Estonia’s  split  from  the  Soviet  Union.  The  town  and  its  neighboring  
areas  also  saw  pro-Russian  rioting  during  the  2007  crisis.  These  factors  create  conditions  similar  to  
those  in  areas  where  Russia  has  attempted  to  mobilize  the  population  in  separatist  conflicts.   
Yet,  notable  differences  set  Narva  apart  from  these  areas.  The  Narva  leadership  
acknowledged  that  it  would  abide  by  the  Estonian  court’s  ruling  on  its  autonomy  referendum  even  
before  the  court  announced  its  ruling,  showing  a  level  of  deference  to  the  governing  NA  state  not  
characteristic  of  the  other  separatist  movements.  The  area’s  inhabitants  also  point  to  the  adjacent  
Russian  region’s  poverty  as  a  deterrent  for  seeking  incorporation  into  Russia.   When  a  politician  in  188
the  1990s  attempted  to  organize  an  armed  rebellion  of  Russian  veterans  in  Estonia,  prominent  
Russian  groups  in  eastern  Estonia  opposed  him.  The  existence  and  active  participation  of  locally  
networked  Estonian  paramilitary  defense  groups  like  the  Estonian  Defense  League,  which  played  a  
key  role  in  preventing  the  Soviet  capture  of  Estonian  broadcasting  services  in  the  early  1990s,  has  
also  likely  provided  a  serious  deterrent.  The  pro-Russian  sentiment  and  organizational  structures  
188  Balmforth,  Tom.  “Russians  Of  Narva  Not  Seeking  'Liberation'  By  Moscow.”  Radio  Free  
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that  Russia  seeks  simply  do  not  exist  in  sufficient  quantities,  and  these  factors  have  remained  
constant  since  the  first  flashpoint  of  the  early  1990s.   
  It  is  also  notable  that  Russia’s  most  serious  intervention  in  Estonian  affairs,  which  occurred  
years  after  Estonia’s  NATO  accession,  was  largely  limited  to  the  cyber  domain.  Despite  the  qualified  
conclusions  of  experts  in  the  field,  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  confirm  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  
with  concrete  evidence,  that  the  Russian  government  played  a  central  role  in  organizing  the  attacks.  
This  opacity  likely  played  a  major  role  in  Russia’s  decision  to  employ  cyberattacks.  It  could  apply  
coercive  force  against  Estonia  while  maintaining  a  degree  of  plausible  deniability.   
 
H4:  The  extent  of  Russian  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  near  abroad  states  reflects  the  strength  of  the  Russian  
economic  strategic  position.  
H4  posits  that  Russia’s  economic  strategic  position  determines  its  willingness  to  intervene  in  
NA  states’  affairs.  This  position  can  be  examined  either  by  tracking  Russia’s  relative  economic  
strength  and  growth  when  compared  to  powerful  NATO  members  like  the  U.S.  or  by  examining  any  
direct  economic  leverage  Russia  has  over  the  NA  state  in  question.  Ultimately,  while  the  Russian  
growth  rate  relative  to  that  of  the  U.S.  does  not  seem  to  play  a  significant  role  in  Russian-decision  
making,  absolute  Russian  growth  in  this  case  does  seem  to  be  an  indicator  supporting  H4.   
Russia’s  economy,  relative  to  that  of  the  U.S.,  fared  poorly  in  the  early  1990s.  As  Russian  
leaders  transitioned  Russia  from  a  centrally  controlled  economy  to  a  market  economy,  Russia’s  GDP  
contracted  significantly.  With  shrinkage  rates  increasing  from  -3%  in  1990  to  -12.57%  in  1994,  
Russia  was  unlikely  to  pursue  a  costly  intervention  in  Estonia  —  especially  when  considering  the  
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chaotic  impact  of  economic  reformation.   When  this  data  is  paired  with  the  U.S.’s  steady  growth  189
during  that  time  period,  with  GDP  growth  ranging  from  1.88%  in  1990  to  4.02%  in  1994,  Russia’s  
strategic  position  for  pursuing  provocative  interventions  was  meager.  190
  Leading  up  to  the  2004  flashpoint,  the  playing  field  became  more  level  in  terms  of  GDP  
growth.  Although  Russia’s  economy  suffered  from  a  debt  default  in  the  late  1990s,  the  reemerged  
economy  of  the  new  millennium  was  finally  performing  well.  At  that  point,  Russia’s  GDP  was  
expanding,  continuing  from  5.1%  in  2001  to  7.2%  in  2004.   The  U.S.’s  economy  was  still  191
continuing  along  its  steady  growth  trend,  ranging  from  .99%  in  2001  to  3.79%  in  2004.  When  Russia  
escalated  to  its  highest  level  of  intervention  in  2007,  its  economy  was  thriving.  Russian  GDP  grew  by  
6.4%  in  2005,  8.2%  in  2006  and  8.5%  in  2007.   Comparatively,  the  U.S.  economy  was  still  growing  192
steadily  (although  at  a  decreasing  rate),  expanding  3.51%  in  2005,  2.85%  in  2006  and  1.87%  in  2007. 
  Russian  growth  in  both  absolute  and  relative  terms  was  high  at  the  2004  and  2007  flashpoints.  193
While  it  supports  intervention  in  2007,  it  does  not  correspond  with  nonintervention  in  2004.   
Throughout  Russia’s  relationship  with  Estonia,  it  has  provided  much  of  Estonia’s  energy  
resources  and  has  leveraged  this  position  at  various  flashpoints.  In  1993,  a  point  at  which  Russia  
apparently  supplied  all  of  Estonia’s  natural  gas,  Russia  cut  off  its  natural  gas  flows  to  Estonia  in  
response  to  the  Estonian  residency  controversy.   Similarly,  during  the  2007  crisis,  Russia  halted  its  194
oil  supply  to  Estonia.  Russia’s  leveraging  of  its  strategic  position  aligns  well  with  the  flashpoints,  but  
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it  does  not  explain  the  lack  of  intervention  during  the  earlier  two  flashpoints,  as  the  availability  of  
this  strategy  as  a  coercive  tool  was  consistently  available.  
Although  the  balance  of  relative  Russian  and  U.S.  growth  rates  does  not  appear  to  drive  
Russian  escalation  in  the  Estonian  case  study,  the  nonintervention  and  lower  level  interference  of  the  
early  1990s  and  early  2000s,  as  well  as  the  intervention  at  the  2007  flashpoint,  support  the  hypothesis  
when  Russia’s  absolute  growth  is  the  metric  considered.  Essentially,  the  comparison  between  U.S.  
and  Russian  growth  rates  does  not  seem  to  play  a  significant  role,  while  the  rate  of  Russian  growth  
examined  by  itself  seems  a  successful  indicator.  
 
Hypothesis  conclusions  
The  Estonia  case  supports  H1  overall,  as  even  though  no  high-level  intervention  occurred  
before  Estonia’s  NATO  accession  to  confirm  that  the  2007  cyber  attack  was  a  muted  response,  the  
Russian  decision  to  cap  its  escalation  at  the  cyber  domain  —  especially  subdomains  that  likely  were  
utilized  to  avoid  definitive  attribution  —  indicates  that  considerations  of  NATO  affected  Russian  
decision-making.  In  a  manner  similar  to  the  Georgia  case,  due  to  the  similarities  in  flashpoint  timing,  
the  Estonian  case  supports  H1A,  as  U.S.  credibility  was  high  in  the  1990s  and  early  2000s,  but  it  had  
decreased  substantially  by  the  time  of  the  2007  cyber  attacks.  This  case  largely  does  not  provide  
support  for  H2’s  predictions  that  Russia  would  interfere  to  prevent  Estonia’s  NATO  accession,  
although  this  may  result  from  the  negative  effects  of  economic  weakness,  a  prediction  of  H4,  rather  
than  a  lack  of  desire  to  intervene.  The  case  also  appears  to  support  H3’s  predictions  that  Russia  is  
more  likely  to  escalate  its  intervention  to  levels  at  which  covert  tactics  afford  plausible  deniability.  
Although  a  potential  target  population  exists,  it  has  not  been  the  direct  subject  of  Russian  
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intervention  attempts,  unlike  the  Georgia  and  Ukraine  cases,  because  it  appears  unwilling  to  provide  
a  proxy  role.  Yet,  Russia  was  willing  to  use  large-scale  cyberattacks  because  Estonia’s  highly  
interconnected  system  proved  particularly  vulnerable,  while  the  tactic  provided  plausible  deniability.  
If  the  first  wave  of  cyberattacks  was  indeed  unrelated  to  the  Russian  government,  the  fact  that  
Russia  likely  organized  the  second  wave  seems  to  result  from  the  successful  shield  of  deniability  
provided  by  the  first  wave.  In  a  manner  similar  to  the  Georgian  case,  the  Estonian  case  provides  
some  of  the  strongest  support  for  H4  in  terms  of  Russian  growth.  
 
Chapter  4:  The  Findings  
Comparative  Hypothesis  Analysis  
H1:  Near  abroad  states  with  NATO  membership  are  more  likely  to  successfully  achieve  general  deterrence  toward  
Russia.  
Comparison  of  each  case’s  results  for  H1  indicates  that  NATO  membership  is  an  effective  
deterrent  of  Russian  military  intervention.  Russia  was  willing  to  intervene  in  Ukraine  in  2014  and  in  
Georgia  in  2008.  The  independent  variable  of  NATO  membership  has  remained  consistent  for  both  
countries;  neither  Ukraine  nor  Georgia  has  achieved  NATO  membership.  Yet,  while  Russia  readily  
intervened  militarily  in  the  affairs  of  these  non-NATO  member  NA  states,  it  has  completely  
refrained  from  acting  militarily  against  Estonia,  which  entered  NATO  in  2004.  When  examining  this  
question  across  the  cases,  the  pattern  supports  the  claim  that  NATO  membership  deters  Russian  
military  intervention.   
In  the  case  of  Estonia,  it  is  also  significant  that  the  level  of  intervention,  when  one  flashpoint  
resulted  in  an  instance  of  escalation,  remained  below  the  thresholds  of  both  armed  conflict  and  
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territorial  annexation.  In  2007,  Russia  intervened  through  cyber  attacks  as  opposed  to  military  
methods.  When  military  intervention  was  possible,  Russia  refrained  not  only  from  military  action  but  
also  from  targeting  specific  domains  that  were  most  likely  to  trigger  NATO  action.  This  apparent  
intervention  cap,  in  comparison  to  the  armed  interventions  of  Georgia  in  1993  and  2008  and  in  
Ukraine  in  2014,  further  suggests  that  NATO  membership  deters  military  intervention.   
Yet,  it  should  be  noted  that  Russia  also  did  not  intervene  militarily  in  Estonia’s  affairs  before  
Estonia  entered  NATO.  Therefore,  while  the  IV  varies  within  the  Estonia  case  study,  the  internal  
variation  does  not  confirm  the  cross-case  conclusion.  This  paper  will  later  argue  that  the  
non-intervention  during  the  1993  flashpoints  in  all  three  cases  is  a  result  of  the  predictions  of  H4,  
rather  than  a  failure  of  H1.   
 
H1A:  The  United  States’  credibility  positively  affects  near  abroad  states’  abilities  to  deter  Russia.  
Examination  of  H1A’s  predictions  across  the  cases  indicates  that  U.S.  credibility  as  a   willing  
and  effective  force  deployer  effectively  deters  Russian  military  intervention  against  NA  NATO  
members  and  NA  non-NATO  member  states.  In  the  early  1990s,  when  the  U.S.  was  a  newly  
emerged  hegemon  that  had  demonstrated  its  military  power  during  Operations  Desert  Shield  and  
Desert  Storm,  Russia  largely  refrained  from  escalating  against  these  countries  to  the  intensity  level  of  
military  action.  No  intervention  occurred  in  Estonia  or  Ukraine  in  1993.  The  apparent  exception  
comes  in  the  form  of  its  limited  support  for  Georgian  separatists,  but  this  support,  which  may  have  
been  only  tacitly  supported  by  Yeltsin,  remained  confined  to  a  small  scale  and  does  not  appear  to  be  
truly  state-sanctioned.  Therefore,  while  this  example  represents  more  serious  intervention  than  
espionage,  this  paper  does  not  consider  it  a  true  limited  military  intervention.  Similarly,  after  the  U.S.  
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deployed  on  a  large  scale  to  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  in  the  early  2000s,  Russia  did  not  intervene  
militarily  during  the  Georgian  2003  or  2004  flashpoints,  Estonian  2004  flashpoint  or  Ukrainian  2004  
flashpoint.   
Yet,  by  the  mid-to-late  2000s,  a  clear  shift  in  U.S.  credibility  occurred.  The  opportunities  
created  for  Russia  are  evident,  as  Russia  intervened  militarily  in  the  non-NATO  NA  states  and  at  the  
cyber  level  in  Estonia  after  this  point.  By  the  2007  Estonian  flashpoint  and  2008  Georgian  
flashpoint,  the  U.S.’s  deep  and  somewhat  unsuccessful  entrenchment  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  had  
decreased  its  credibility.  In  an  infamous  incident  just  before  Russia’s  2014  military  intervention  in  
Ukraine,  U.S.  leadership  failed  to  enforce  its  red  line  in  Syria,  incurring  serious  domestic  ridicule.  
This  pattern  within  each  case  and  consistent  across  all  three  cases  provides  clear  support  for  the  
relevance  of  H1A.  It  should  be  noted  that  while  H1A  corresponds  with  these  patterns,  it  is  likely  not  
a  driving  force  affecting  Russian  decisions  due  to  specific  NATO  threats  but  rather  a  broad  indicator  
of  the  effects  of  U.S.  engagement  abroad.  
 
H2:  Overt  NATO  deliberations  surrounding  an  NA  state’s  possible  entry  without  officially  giving  membership  
decrease  that  state’s  ability  to  deter  Russia.  
Findings  from  the  case  studies  indicate  H2  predicts  accurately  after  the  mid-2000s,  although  
the  hypothesis  did  not  appear  to  predict  accurately  before  the  mid-2000s.  In  response  to  states’  
progress  toward  NATO  membership  in  the  mid-to-late  2000s,  Russia  acted  to  destabilize  those  
countries  and  prevent  NATO  accession.  Russia  intervened  militarily  against  Georgia  in  2008  and  
later  acted  in  2014  to  destabilize  Ukraine.  Yet,  when  Estonia  progressed  along  the  path  to  NATO  
membership  after  1999  and  acceded  in  2004,  despite  negative  Russian  rhetoric,  no  intervention  
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occurred.  Non-intervention  in  this  case  contradicts  the  predictions  of  H2.  This  seems  to  indicate  a  
distinct  shift  in  the  mid-to-late  2000s  from  unwillingness  to  willingness  to  block  states’  NATO  
accession  via  intervention.  This  paper  will  later  argue  that  this  shift  likely  derives  from  the  effects  
predicted  by  H4.  
 
H3:  Near  abroad  states  are  less  likely  to  successfully  deter  Russia  if  Russia  is  able  to  use  a  covert  method  of  attack.   
Examination  of  the  cases  generally  supports  the  claim  that  Russia  is  more  likely  to  intervene  
or  to  escalate  its  intervention  if  methods  providing  plausible  deniability  are  available.  In  the  
Ukrainian  case,  the  availability  and  strength  of  the  Crimean  separatist  movement  corresponded  with  
Russian  attempts  to  destabilize  Ukraine  through  Crimea,  including  serious  armed  intervention  
during  the  second  such  flashpoint.  Russia’s  annexation  of  Crimea  and  attempts  to  carve  out  sections  
of  eastern  Ukraine  relied  upon  its  ability  to  mobilize  separatist  armies,  as  well  as  its  ability  to  deploy  
Russian  soldiers  and  feasibly  disguise  them  as  Crimean  separatists.  In  the  Georgian  case,  the  IV  did  
not  vary;  separatist  proxies  and  allies  were  consistently  available.  This  does  not  suggest  that  Russia  
would  constantly  intervene  militarily  in  Georgian  affairs;  rather,  it  is  significant  that  both  instances  of  
Russian  military  action  in  Georgia  directly  involved  separatists  and  mingled  Russian  forces  with  
those  of  the  separatists.   
The  Estonian  case  also  provides  several  strains  of  support  for  this  hypothesis.  The  Estonian  
region  bordering  Russia  houses  a  poorly  assimilated  and  majority-ethnic  Russian  population,  similar  
to  the  communities  from  which  Russia  extracted  proxies  in  Ukraine  and  Georgia;  however,  this  
group  has  generally  displayed  little  desire  to  leave  Estonia  for  Russia.  Correspondingly,  Russia  has  
not  seriously  and  actively  attempted  to  weaponize  this  population  as  proxies  or  to  attempt  covert  
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convention  operations  under  the  guise  of  Estonian  separatists.  This  provides  an  example  of  
non-intervention  when  a  population  does  not  provide  substantial  viable  proxies,  which  complements  
Russia’s  evident  tendency  for  intervention  when  such  proxies  are  reasonably  viable,  as  in  Ukraine  
and  Georgia.  Yet,  Russia  opted  for  cyber  attacks,  which  inherently  enable  plausible  deniability,  to  
weaken  Estonia’s  highly  networked  online  infrastructure.  The  cover  afforded  by  this  tactic  appears  
significant  in  Russia’s  decision  to  act  against  Estonia.  In  all  cases,  Russia  appears  to  favor  methods  of  
instigation,  attack  or  interference  that  offer  plausible  deniability.   
 
H4:  The  extent  of  Russian  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  near  abroad  states  reflects  the  strength  of  the  Russian  
economic  strategic  position.  
Comparative  analysis  of  the  case  studies  substantially  supports  H4’s  prediction  that  Russia’s  
strategic  economic  position  significantly  influences  its  intervention  calculus.  The  impact  of  Russia’s  
growth  relative  to  that  of  the  U.S.  proved  less  illuminating  than  anticipated,  as  the  case  studies  did  
not  reflect  significant  variation  in  conjunction  with  the  two  states’  comparative  rates.  However,  
variation  matched  isolated  overall  Russian  growth  trends  more  closely,  and  Russia’s  absolute  growth  
corresponded  significantly  with  its  intervention  patterns.  The  Ukraine  case  study  demonstrated  this  
connection,  as  Russia  did  not  intervene  at  its  1993  flashpoint,  as  its  economy  struggled,  or  at  its  
2004  flashpoint,  by  which  its  economy  had  just  recovered  from  its  downward  spiral.  Russian  
intervention  in  Ukraine  occurred  in  2014,  after  the  country’s  economy  had  grown  significantly.   
The  intensity  of  Russian  intervention  in  Georgia  follows  a  similar  pattern,  although  the  
small-scale  intervention  of  the  early  1990s  warrants  discussion.  While  this  intervention  did  occur  at  a  
point  of  economic  shrinkage,  as  discussed  previously,  it  remained  quite  limited.  As  in  the  Ukraine  
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case  study,  Russia  refrained  from  intervention  in  2004  but  pursued  it  in  2008,  after  its  economy  had  
rebounded  and  grown  enormously.  The  Estonia  case  study  reflects  the  same  general  pattern  as  the  
other  two  cases.  No  intervention  occurred  at  its  1993  and  2004  flashpoints,  and  Russia’s  cyber  
intervention  occurred  in  2007,  just  after  Russia’s  initial  economic  resurgence.  The  pattern  of  Russian  
nonintervention  during  periods  of  economic  weakness  and  significant  intervention  when  the  
country  fared  well  economically  is  clear  and  consistent  across  all  cases.  Furthermore,  this  pattern  is  
evident  chronologically.  Russia  engaged  in  almost  no  military  intervention  in  these  states  in  the  early  
1990s  and  early  2000s  but  engaged  in  interventions  against  all  three  states  between  the  mid-2000s  
and  mid-2010s.   
 
Hypothesis  Synthesis  
Considered  together,  the  implications  of  the  case  studies  for  the  hypotheses  predict  that  
Russia  is  most  likely  to  intervene  militarily  if  it  is  performing  well  economically  and  the  NA  state  in  
question  is  a  non-NATO  member  progressing  toward  membership.  Russia  is  even  more  likely  to  
intervene  if  these  factors  remain  true  and  if  Russia  can  instigate  or  prosecute  an  intervention  with  
plausible  deniability  —  especially  at  a  time  when  the  U.S.  is  unlikely  to  interfere  militarily  with  
Russia’s  plans.   
This  conclusion  is  visible  when  a  two-stage  periodization  of  Russian  intervention,  in  
consideration  of  the  five  hypotheses,  is  constructed.  From  the  early  1990s  until  the  mid-2000s,  the  
negative  predictions  of  H4  —  that  Russia  will  not  intervene  militarily  in  NA  states  when  its  economy  
is  struggling  —  are  dominant  over  the  predictions  of  the  other  hypotheses.  Regardless  of  Russia’s  
degree  of  interest  in  intervening  during  this  period  of  poverty,  it  refrained  from  doing  so.  This  
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correlation  also  aligns  nearly  perfectly  with  the  pattern  of  H1A’s  implications.  This  is  only  logical;  
Russia  opts  for  nonintervention  when  its  economy  is  faring  poorly,  which  is  also  a  situation  in  which  
the  deterrent  power  of  a  credible  U.S.  military  and  political  will  proves  especially  potent.  This  period,  
during  which  Russia  had  little  ability  to  intervene  and  little  desire  to  do  so  in  the  face  of  decisive  U.S.  
military  superiority,  manifests  H4’s  predictions  for  Russian  nonintervention.   
The  mid-to-late  2000s  prove  to  be  a  liminal  point  at  which  Russian  poverty  and  
corresponding  nonintervention  (Stage  1)  transition  into  economic  strength  and  corresponding  
intervention  (Stage  2).  At  this  point,  H4’s  negative  predictions  cease  to  be  true,  and  H4’s  positive  
predictions  of  the  impact  of  Russian  prosperity  on  its  appetite  for  intervention  begin  to  apply.  
During  this  second  period,  H4’s  implications  no  longer  prevent  the  other  hypotheses’  predictions  
from  impacting  Russian  behavior.  When  Russia  is  performing  well  economically,  the  interaction  of  
the  implications  of  H1  and  H2  becomes  the  dominant  factor.  In  Stage  2,  if  an  NA  state  is  a  NATO  
member,  Russia  is  extremely  unlikely  to  pursue  military  intervention.  However,  if  a  non-NATO  
member  NA  state  is  seriously  progressing  toward  membership,  Russia  is  more  likely  to  pursue  
preventive  intervention  to  either  coerce  the  NA  state  into  remaining  in  the  Russian  sphere  of  
influence  or  to  render  that  state  an  undesirable  and  unstable  candidate  for  NATO.   
In  Stage  2,  as  in  Stage  1,  H1A  is  influential.  All  three  instances  of  Stage  2  Russian  
intervention  discussed  in  the  case  studies  occurred  at  points  at  which  a  challenge  from  the  U.S.  was  
perceived  as  implausible  due  to  U.S.  engagement  elsewhere  or  notable  failures  to  act  on  its  deterrent  
threats.  Just  as  Russia  intervenes  less  intensely  against  NATO  members,  it  apparently  selects  into  
interventions  at  points  with  low  likelihoods  of  active  U.S.  challenges.  
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This  periodization  is  crucial  for  understanding  why  Russia  did  not  intervene  while  Estonia  
approached  and  achieved  NATO  membership  but  has  yet  displayed  a  consistent  willingness  to  
intervene  to  prevent  Ukrainian  and  Georgian  membership.  Essentially,  the  Estonian  accession  
process  occurred  during  Stage  1,  while  Ukraine  and  Georgia  only  began  to  seriously  pursue  and  
progress  toward  membership  during  Stage  2.  When  Estonia  secured  a  MAP  in  1999,  entered  NATO  
accession  discussions  in  2002  and  acceded  in  2004,  Russia  responded  rhetorically  but  was  not  
positioned  economically  to  intervene,  especially  during  a  time  when  the  newly  dominant  U.S.  could  
reasonably  threaten  to  defend  NATO’s  interests.  Yet,  by  the  mid-to-late  2000s,  Russia  had  developed  
the  economic  capability  to  issue  challenges  in  defense  of  its  interests  and  to  withstand  the  economic  
consequences  of  its  interventions.  This  resurgence  corresponds  well  with  a  fivefold  increase  in  the  
prices  of  oil  and  gas,  which  would  have  given  Russia  increased  leverage  over  the  international  
community.   This  period  also  coincided  with  the  waning  of  U.S.  credibility  during  its  Global  War  195
on  Terrorism.  These  factors  permitted  Russia  to  intervene  in  2007  —  although  Estonia’s  NATO  
status  resulted  in  a  cap  on  the  intervention  intensity  level.  These  factors  also  invited  Russian  
intervention  in  2008;  Georgia’s  non-NATO  status  permitted  military  intervention,  while  its  overt  
progression  toward  membership  actively  encouraged  Russian  intervention.   
In  terms  of  the  hypotheses,  the  restrictions  of  a  weak  economy  under  Stage  1  H4  prevented  
Russian  intervention  during  Estonia’s  accession  process,  while  the  increased  flexibility  provided  by  a  
stronger  economy  under  Stage  2  H4,  permitted  Russian  intervention  generally  against  all  three  
countries.  This  largely  occurred  with  the  aid  of  H3’s  predictions,  the  benefits  of  employing  a  covert  
strategy  providing  plausible  deniability,  at  points  in  time  permitted  by  H1A’s  negative  implications,  or  
195  Piet  Rémi,  and  Roger  E.  Kanet.  Shifting  Priorities  in  Russia’s  Foreign  and  Security  Policy .  Taylor  and  
Francis,  2016.  p.  59.  
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moments  at  which  the  U.S.  was  in  a  poor  position  to  pick  fights  abroad.  In  the  economically  sound  
Stage  2  of  H4,  while  H1  prevented  Russia  from  escalating  its  Estonian  intervention  beyond  
cyberattacks  and  minor  threats  against  diplomats  due  to  Estonia’s  NATO  status,  H2  induced  Russia  
to  intervene  against  Ukraine  and  Georgia  at  high  intensities  since  those  countries  were  advancing  
toward  NATO  membership.  These  interventions  in  the  midst  of  Ukraine  and  Georgia’s  progressions  
toward  NATO  membership  essentially  blocked  further  serious  progress  and  thereby  prevented  H1,  
the  deterrence  provided  by  NATO  membership,  from  becoming  relevant  to  these  states.  The  
periodized  synthesis  of  these  hypotheses’  implications  is  represented  in  the  following  figure.  
 
In  summary,  this  periodization’s  dissection  of  the  hypotheses’  relevance  to  the  case  studies  
demonstrates  that  Russia  refrains  from  directly  attacking  NATO  members  but  may  intervene  when  
states  approach  membership,  as  long  as  it  has  the  capability  of  doing  so.   
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Chapter  5:  Concluding  Thoughts  and  Broader  Implications  
This  study  has  sought  to  illuminate  the  factors  that  drive  Russian  intervention  and  
nonintervention  against  other  ex-Soviet  states,  as  a  cursory  examination  of  Russia’s  regional  foreign  
relations  revealed  a  variation  in  intervention  levels  across  different  circumstances.  Internal  and  
comparative  analysis  of  the  three  case  studies,  which  represented  the  totality  of  such  cases  up  to  this  
point  in  time,  has  yielded  significant  findings.  When  Russia’s  economic  capabilities  were  stunted  in  
the  1990s  and  early  2000s,  no  major  intervention  occurred  against  these  NA  states,  even  during  
severe  diplomatic  crises.   
After  Russia’s  economic  recovery  in  the  mid-2000s,  it  displayed  a  willingness  to  intervene  in  
its  near  abroad,  although  the  intensity  of  its  actions  depended  on  whether  a  state  had  already  
achieved  NATO  membership  or  was  a  non-member  pursuing  membership.  In  2007,  Russia  evidently  
was  willing  to  launch  a  large-scale  intervention  against  NATO  member  Estonia,  but  this  
intervention  remained  capped  at  the  intensity  level  of  cyberattacks.  Russia  has  not  intervened  
militarily  against  Estonia.  However,  Russia  was  willing  to  act  militarily  against  non-NATO  states  at  
this  time,  as  it  invaded  Georgia  in  2008,  annexed  Crimea  in  2014  and  launched  a  separatist  conflict  
in  eastern  Ukraine  the  same  year.  In  these  situations,  the  ability  to  intervene  in  a  covert  way  seemed  
to  have  increased  Russia’s  level  of  intervention.  
The  examination  was  inspired  by  events  that  altered  the  course  of  twenty-first  century  
international  relations  and  resulted  in  concrete  and  serious  consequences  for  the  populations  
involved.  It  is  therefore  critical  not  only  to  consider  what  lessons  and  patterns  can  be  extracted  from  
the  past  but  also  to  explore  these  findings’  implications  for  the  future  across  multiple  domains  of  
international  politics.   
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Most  directly,  the  findings  hold  implications  for  how  Russia  may  interact  with  countries  
within  its  near  abroad  in  the  future.  The  obvious  prediction  stemming  from  this  thesis  is  that  if  
other  post-Soviet  neighboring  states  indicate  interest  in  and  make  serious  progress  toward  NATO  
membership  —  perhaps  signified  by  a  MAP  program  —  Russia  is  likely  to  intervene  militarily.  This  
possibility  is  elevated  if  those  states  have  pro-Russian  separatist  groups  or  pockets  of  ethnic  Russian  
minority  populations  that  are  poorly  integrated  into  that  country’s  cultural  fabric,  as  Russia  could  
either  attempt  to  mobilize  those  groups  or  disguise  its  own  troops  as  members  of  those  groups.  Yet,  
this  hinges  on  Russia’s  ability  to  weather  potential  punitive  actions  from  the  international  
community,  which  in  turn  depends  on  Russia’s  economic  capacity.   
If  Russia  attempts  this  strategy  against  multiple  states  in  too  condensed  a  period  of  time,  it  
risks  incurring  massive  economic  sanctions  that  would  prevent  it  from  pursuing  such  activities.  Such  
a  situation  would  therefore  prove  an  interesting  case  for  the  findings  of  this  paper.  It  may  present  a  
scenario  in  which  Russia  is  presented  with  several  countries  in  which  it  would  hope  to  keep  out  of  
NATO,  but  it  is  forced  to  limit  its  intervention  to  only  one  or  two  of  those  states  due  to  material  
constraints.  Yet,  this  policy  of  attempting  simultaneous  NA  state  accessions  would  prove  a  risky  
course  of  action  for  NATO;  Russia  might  combat  this  NATO  effort  by  targeting  one  or  two  key  
states,  assuming  that  NATO  leaders  would  not  continue  their  course  when  faced  with  such  
aggression.   In  this  situation,  considerations  of  the  credibility  of  potential  U.S.  intervention  and  of  
possible  covert  intervention  avenues  may  play  outsized  roles  in  Russian  decision-making.  Otherwise,  
new  factors  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  may  ultimately  force  those  decisions.   
This  paper’s  conclusions  also  hold  significant  implications  for  how  the  U.S.  and  NATO  may  
seek  to  proceed  with  diplomacy  in  eastern  Europe.  Visible  shifts  in  NATO’s  priorities  for  expansion  
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are  already  observable,  as  the  alliance  has  shifted  toward  incorporating  members  from  central  
Europe  rather  than  expanding  eastward.  Russia’s  efforts  in  Georgia  and  Ukraine  seem,  therefore,  to  
have  fulfilled  their  primary  objective  of  freezing  those  countries  in  place,  but  they  also  appear  to  
have  successfully  signaled  Russia’s  broader  intent  to  defend  the  integrity  of  its  sphere  of  influence.   
Yet,  it  is  feasible  that,  as  leadership  rotates  and  time  passes  after  these  major  Russian  
incursions,  NATO  might  once  again  consider  admitting  countries  bordering  Russia  as  members.  
Absent  a  major  shift  in  NATO-Russia  relations  or  a  Russian  economic  downturn  like  that  of  the  
1990s,  NATO  should  expect  vehement  pushback  from  the  Russians,  as  demonstrated  in  the  past.  Of  
course,  even  given  severe  Russian  rhetoric,  it  is  possible  that  NATO  may  still  be  able  to  maneuver  its  
way  to  successful  incorporation  of  the  state  in  question.  However,  if  Russia  maintains  an  aggressive  
posture,  to  proceed  successfully  with  these  accession  efforts,  NATO  may  need  to  pursue  more  
drastic  actions.   
Ultimately,  NATO’s  course  of  action  depends  on  the  issues  that  it  intends  to  address  in  the  
long  term.  If  NATO  aims  to  prevent  further  destabilizing  Russian  military  interventions  against  NA  
states,  it  must  acknowledge  the  roots  of  such  invasions.  Assertive  NATO  behavior  geared  toward  the  
accession  of  further  NA  states  is  likely  to  prompt  further  Russian  responses  in  the  form  of  military  
action.  As  a  result  of  NATO’s  successful  enlargement  efforts  in  the  late  1990s  and  early  2000s,  the  
alliance  became  complacent  and  assumed  it  could  promise  Ukraine  and  Georgia  the  same  treatment.  
Yet,  it  must  be  noted  that  if  Russia  were  not  experiencing  a  period  of  crippling  weakness  at  this  time,  
it  likely  would  have  reacted  far  more  aggressively  to  the  membership  processes  of  Estonia  and  even  
the  Warsaw  Pact  countries.   
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Russia  was  only  able  to  assert  its  stance  when  it  regained  the  ability  to  intervene  militarily.  In  
late  2014,  eminent  offensive  neorealist  John  Mearsheimer  published  an  article  entitled  “Why  the  
Ukraine  Crisis  Is  the  West’s  Fault.”  Mearsheimer,  predictably,  attributes  Russia’s  annexation  of  
Crimea,  among  other  factors,  to  NATO’s  bold  steps  forward  in  bringing  Ukraine  closer  to  the  
alliance.  He  labels  this  situation  a  case  of  “Geopolitics  101,”  as  “great  powers  are  always  sensitive  to  
potential  threats  near  their  home  territory,”  and  ultimately,  “it  is  the  Russians,  not  the  West,  who  …  
get  to  decide  what  counts  as  a  threat  to  them.”   It  is  only  logical  that  this  attitude  will  continue  to  196
guide  Russian  strategic  thought  as  its  leaders  carefully  observe  NATO’s  actions  in  the  region.  If  
NATO  aims  to  drastically  reduce  the  odds  of  armed  Russian  interventions  in  NA  states,  it  will  likely  
need  to  shelve  any  plans  to  give  membership  to  any  of  those  countries.  
Yet,  if  NATO  primarily  seeks  to  continue  incorporating  additional  NA  states  into  the  
alliance,  this  paper  implies  that  no  long-term  solution  agreeable  to  Russia  exists.  If  this  is  NATO’s  
goal,  it  might  consider  freezing  efforts  at  NA  state  accession  unacceptable  and  might  instead  
consider  pursuing  membership  for  these  countries  in  a  covert  manner.  This  would  hinge  on  the  
alliance’s  ability  to  develop  both  those  countries’  military  capacities  and  their  military  coordination  
capabilities  with  NATO  without  Russia  observing  this  process,  with  the  assumption  that  if  NATO  
suddenly  announced  the  state’s  membership,  Russia  would  be  unable  to  intervene  militarily  in  
protest.   
Obviously,  this  snap-intervention  approach  would  prove  extremely  risky  for  the  entire  
alliance  and  any  NA  state  involved.  It  is  likely  impossible  in  the  first  place  to  achieve  this  without  
Russian  knowledge.  Furthermore,  even  if  this  were  possible,  it  would  constitute  an  incredibly  risky  
196  Mearsheimer,  John.  “Why  the  Ukraine  Crisis  Is  the  West’s  Fault.”  Foreign  Affairs ,  September  2014,  
82.  
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policy.  A  Russian  discovery  of  any  secret  efforts  to  develop  an  NA  state’s  military  capacity  and  
military  links  to  NATO  would  likely  result  not  only  in  severe  direct  intervention  but  also  in  
considerable  long-term  damage  to  the  diplomatic  relationships  between  Russia  and  Western  states.  
Even  if  this  gambit  did  succeed  and  NATO  could  suddenly  announce  the  membership  of  one  or  
multiple  states,  this  policy  would  cause  potentially  irreparable  damage  to  the  trust  between  Russia  
and  NATO.  Yet,  although  this  option  obviously  entails  tremendous  risks,  it  undeniably  does  contain  
benefits  for  the  alliance,  as  NATO  would  gain  more  valuable  footholds  along  the  Russian  border.  
Despite  this  advantage,  however,  the  potential  costs  of  such  an  approach  likely  outweighs  the  
benefits.   
Aside  from  these  predictions,  a  continuation  by  the  U.S.  of  current  President  Donald  
Trump’s  more  entrenched  and  isolationist  approach  toward  international  politics  could  have  
significant  effects  on  Russia’s  intervention  calculus.  Trump’s  skeptical  attitude  toward  NATO,  if  
continued,  may  severely  reduce  both  NATO’s  ability  to  expand  eastward  and  also  the  credibility  of  
NATO  deterrent  threats.  If  NATO,  in  the  long  term,  adopts  a  policy  of  reduced  engagement  in  
eastern  Europe,  there  are  several  different  reactions  that  Russia  might  take.  It  might  see  this  period  
as  providing  increased  leeway  to  intervene  militarily  against  non-NATO  NA  states  with  reduced  risk  
of  international  intervention  or  severe  punishment.  However,  it  could  also  view  this  situation  as  an  
opportunity  for  coercing  these  countries  into  closer  relationships  through  non-military  means.  If  
U.S.  leaders  continue  to  question  the  importance  of  NATO,  it  is  also  possible  that  Russia  may  feel  
more  comfortable  with  intervening  against  NATO  states  in  non-military  domains  or  may  even  test  
NATO’s  commitment  to  responding  to  lower-intensity  kinetic  aggression  in  areas  like  Estonia’s  
Narva.  
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Predicting  the  events  of  the  future  based  on  the  trends  of  the  past  is  never  simple,  but  it  is  
my  hope  that  this  paper’s  findings  may  serve  as  a  historically  grounded  guide  for  understanding  the  
Russian  intervention  calculus  as  new  crises  emerge.  In  an  ideal  world,  the  twenty-first  century  could  
represent  a  point  of  yet  unprecedented  levels  of  cooperation  between  Russia  and  the  Western  
nations  of  NATO  in  the  current  format  of  the  international  system.  Yet,  barring  any  enormous  
shifts  in  the  balance  of  great  power  politics,  conflicts  and  flashpoints  are  sure  to  emerge,  stemming  
from  either  familiar  catalysts  or  triggers  unforeseeable  at  this  point  in  time.  In  such  an  environment,  
it  is  the  careful  consideration  of  the  underlying  factors  that  influence  Russian  behavior,  and  not  the  
blanket  labeling  of  Russian  behavior  as  benign  or  revanchist  without  qualification,  that  will  enable  
current  and  aspiring  NATO  states  to  navigate  peaceful  diplomacy  with  Russia.  Perhaps  with  this  
attitude  and  theoretical  base,  the  Narva  River’s  Hermann  Castle  and  Ivangorod  Fortress  will  witness  
nothing  more  than  the  quiet  chatter  of  tourists  and  commuters,  and  not  the  roar  of  artillery,  at  the  
Russian  border  crossing.     
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